The May Proposal

[L. Detweiler]

Just when I think I'll lie low awhile, tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C.
May) drops a bombshell:

>I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
>PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
>to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.

I'm quite aghast at this little gem of a proposal, which might be
deemed `treasonous' by some (however, I'll limit my flames). In many
ways it is more unpalatable than the Clipper announcement. PGP is
*solid* software for cryptography that is available *now*. What other
software is available? Sure, there are plenty of vague promises and
vaporware, or bits and pieces for little nooks and crannies of
platforms. PGP is the closest thing to *widespread* strong cryptography
available *across* platforms.  

Look, support whatever you want. Cypherpunks don't have an official
policy sheet.  But to recommend they stop promoting something that has
formed one of the most stable core commitments of the group is divisive
in itself.  (Sheesh, this group couldn't reach a consensus if only one
person was subscribing!)

>1. If RSA fails to take actions against sites and users, it weakens their
>legal position with respect to their patents. The government does not need
>licenses in any case, but users of Clipperphones *do* (not the final
>end-users, but the suppliers of Clipperphones to non-government customers).

are you saying that RSA needs to support Clipperphones? or that they
need the legal torque to suppress granting the patent to
implementations of it? If RSA sells out, which I see every sign of this
happening (lacking explicit reassurances from Bidzos, and in light of
his apparent devotion to the company `stockholders'), then the point is
mute. What makes you so sure they won't (or haven't)?  Also, your
reasoning is bizarre. If RSA wants to protect their patents, then they
should attempt prosecution or pursue agreement, one or the other.  It
is the failure to prosecute that weakens their case, not the existence
of infringers per se. Actually, that is the only way they have to
strengthen their case, to attempt prosecution of perceived infringers.
If they fail to do this then they are implicitly acknowledging their own weakness.

>2. The "guerrilla crypto" aspect of the PGP community (and our group) is
>charming, but may be counterproductive. If we are viewed as outlaws, the
>target even of RSA, then we have almost no influence, save for underground
>subversion.

I just don't get this strange and insatiable drive to `respectability'
by outspoken members of this list.  This is the critical period when
cryptography itself is in jeopardy, precisely at the point that we
must, to a large extent, work outside the ``system'' that has
unequivocally demonstrated its hostility to the basic premise of
widespread unbreakable cryptography.  Currently, we cannot have our
unbreakable cryptography and respectability too.  You all remind me of
Denning, who wants to underhandedly promote Clipper and retain her
scientific respectability at the same time. Or the NSA, who wants to
regulate commercial cryptography but completely suppress any innovative
commercial ideas that threaten their (increasingly threatened and
seriously weakened) domination.

>(To put this another way, if we are seen as RSA Data's enemy, we lose a
>potential ally. I am suggesting that a coming war between strong crypto on
>one side and government snooping on the other will force all participants
>to choose up sides.)

I'm on the side that commits to widespread availability of strong
cryptography at any cost and any sacrifice. As Mr. Hughes has written,
``no compromises''.  I think RSA had better make it clear right away
whether they will support the Clipper and Capstone projects or not.
That is the crucial decision at stake. Every minute that a strong
statement is lacking I am further skeptical and suspicious of their true intent.

>3. Supporting a legal version of strong crypto, which RSA Data-approved
>programs are and PGP is *not*, is a much more solid foundation from which
>to fight possible restrictions on strong crypto.

All this vague legal mumbo jumbo and wonderful rhetoric like `solid
foundation' may have some value in the future, and may even be a
decisive pivot. But the pace of litigation is glacial, and we need
powerful tools *now*.  PGP is such a tool.  The strongest approach to
fighting restrictions on strong cryptography is to USE IT RIGHT NOW.

RSA in a MINUTE could guarantee the legality of PGP by offering
licenses to users. Many have expressed the sincere desire to become
`legitimate'. I consider it a wholly reasonable approach.  Their
continued silence on this point is deafening.  They have not addressed
the possibility whatsoever publicly except to hint that they regret
their inability or inaction in the area.  Why do they refuse to assent?
 There are overtures & negotiations to get the RSADSI libraries into
the code, but this is just (so far) a decoy, distraction, and diversion
in my opinion.  I think the bottom line is that RSA wants more control
over the public key algorithm than P. Zimmerman (a true cypherpatriot)
is willing to grant, and he is willing to take a calculated but
considerable risk, which so far has payed vast, global, valuable
dividends reaped by tens of thousands.

>4. Our time could better be spent by solidifying existing RSA programs,
>including RIPEM, RSAREF-derived programs, MailSafe, and so forth. This is
>the approach several major companies have taken (Apple, Lotus, Sun, etc.). 

again, not enough platform-independent availability or fanatical
commitment on the part of the companies.  Is there a *universal*,
*freely available* package in there?  How many of those vendors would
take out the strong cryptography if a law were passed to do it?  How
many have already demonstrated their spinelessness by weakly assenting
to disembowel their embedded strong cryptographic techniques? How many
are subject to the whims of RSA or the NSA?

>I've urged Jim Bidzos to work toward some compromise with the PGP community
>(and I think everyone recognizes the positive aspects of this growing
>community). This might include creating translation programs so MailSafe or
>RIPEM can read PGP files, a reworking of PGP to conform to licensing
>requirements, etc.

Oh, so we abandon PGP until Mr. Bidzos works out a compromise on his
own terms and own time schedule, is that the idea? He has had *years*
to demonstrate his willingness to `compromise'.  Some parts of the PGP
community would gladly submit to even a one-sided `compromise' of
expensive individual licensing. So far, in my view, he has done nothing
but string along the PGP team, when he (or somebody) has the power to
end the bickering and tension *immediately*.  Many PGP users don't
object to RSA getting rich off the algorithm licenses.  It is not an
issue of money, apparently, though, it is an issue of *control*
(something that any true cypherpatriot should recognize as critical and
not to be given away).  Do you want your strong cryptographic
techniques to be controlled by yourself or someone else?

>I'm hoping that Phil Zimmermann can see what the real battle is. The PGP
>community is not likely to win their battle in court, and the effect of
>such a court battle will be divisive and ultimately may help the government
>in its plans. Phil Z. is most unlikely to ever see any real revenues from
>PGP. 

Mr. Zimmerman has never seen `any real revenues' from his work and to
attribute his basic past motive to that purpose is mercenary and
tasteless. He has a true and passionate commitment to strong
cryptography, enough that he risked his personal comfort and sacrificed
years of his life to promoting it, and the documentation accurately
represents that drive.

Yes, a court battle would be divisive. It would probably bankrupt Mr.
Zimmerman and distract RSA if pursued vigorously. But RSA can wholly
avoid it. On the other hand, a court battle could bring public favor to
the cryptographic cause. It could set a clear precedent for the dubious
legality of software patents. There are many wildcards. Would many
people send Zimmerman money if he was prosecuted? Would EFF get
involved? Would he be perceived as the David vs. the Goliath? Does RSA
have a strong, legal, legitimate case?  Only a Sternlight would think
the issue is clear cut.

>I think the benefits of a strong, legal, supported crypto product are
>greater than the dubious benefits of having a "free" piece of software. At
>any reasonable hourly wage, the cost of MailSafe ($125, last time I
>checked) is dwarfed by the amount of time crypto activists like ourselves
>spend debating it, downloading it, awaiting patched versions, etc.

PGP is essential now because it is supported on many platforms, has a
common format, is not limited to mail, has attained a sophisticated
degree of reliability, is continuing to be supported extremely
responsively, is not limited by wishywashy and halfhearted commitment
by its developers, was born of the true motive that *everyone* deserves
and requires strong cryptography *today* and that there's something
just a little upsetting about big conglomerates getting rich off of
selling algorithms for a freedom like privacy.  Do you want to trade
something solid for something vapid?

>(All is not rosy on the RSA Data side, either. RSA Data chose to
>concentrate on getting RSA built in to e-mail products from the major
>companies and chose not to devote much effort to PGP-like personal
>encryption products (such as MailSafe, which runs on DOS and UNIX only and
>which hasn't changed much since 1988). Support for RSA Data should mean
>more support for these kinds of products. We could essentially ask RSA for
>a commitment in this area.)

I will support RSA when they show an unequivocal commitment to the
proliferation of strong cryptography by allowing individual users to
obtain licenses. So far, they have only worked with companies. They
stand to make *more* if they had the unorthodox whim to allow users to
receive licenses. People have been asking for ``a commitment from RSA
in this area'' for *many months* if not *years*.  There are ulterior
motives present that are not apparent in talking exclusively to Bidzos, I'm sure.

Here is my position on PGP: yes, it has dubious legal ground. But so
did many other revolutionary technologies at the time of their
inception. RSA has had plenty of opportunities to send a clear signal
by either prosecuting or promoting PGP (the former in potentially
devastating ways, the latter in potentially lucrative ways). That they
have not done either suggests to me that they don't understand the
fundamental importance of the issue in some way.  It seems to me
somebody directing RSA (Bidzos perhaps) wants to straddle the fence,
and is continuing to do so, and that PGP and Clipper (so far) are just
two aspects of a pattern. But I think somebody at RSA had better pick a
side soon or they will be speared by both sides of the fence.

I think it would be overly optimistic and idealistic to think that PGP
will be here, say, 10 years from now. It is a stepping stone to grander
things, but a *crucial* one at this point, and not to be abandoned but
remembered, revered, and *used*.  Do you know how many man-hours have
gone, and continue to go, into its development and maintenance?  Many
new wrinkles will be occuring in time, but right now PGP is the
well-deserving cyphersoftware of choice.

Until RSA makes some clear statements of their intent on critical
issues like Clipper/Capstone/PGP, I don't consider them an ally.  At
this point their silence can be taken as an affront to *all* sides. 
Right now I think the clock is ticking on a blatant sellout, but I'd
just love to be pleasantly surprised. So far the only thing surprising
about RSA is their conspicuous inconspicuousness.  And there are
ominous rumors that they will be or are starting to target prominent
PGP users in a mailwriting campaign.  The issue is not ``will RSA be
our ally if we sacrifice PGP?'' but ``why has RSA not responded despite
reasonable overtures?''

In my opinion, J. Bidzos needs to answer the following explicitly and
satisfactorily before cypherpunks consider RSA their Salvation:

1. Will RSA sell licenses to companies seeking to use the public key
algorithm in Capstone and Clipper implementations?  What was the exact
RSA involvement in those areas prior to the announcement?

2. Why has RSA refused to sell individual licenses to PGP users despite
the continued expressions of willingness and desire to cooperate on the
part of many of those users?

3. What is the real RSA position/plan/policy on patent infringers, if there is one?

4. Who is fundamentally in control of RSA, anyway? Bidzos? R. S. & A.?
Shareholders? the NSA? Accountants and lawyers? What is the underlying agenda?


>I'm arguing that we should look carefully and see what the real issues are,
>who the real enemy is, and then make plans accordingly. 

``Friends come and go, but enemies accumulate.''