[caops-wg] Version 06-09 of the OCSP document.

jluna at ac.upc.edu jluna at ac.upc.edu
Fri May 12 05:58:40 CDT 2006


Hello again Milan,
Please find below some other comments to your previous email, sorry for the late
response and hope the CAOPS Meeting at Tokio was OK!

Best regards,
Oscar & Jesus

>Throughout the document:
>I'd rather skip all referencing to "blacklisting". It is being used here in
>a pure authorization meaning - denying somebody access to a
>resource. I don't think authorization decisions should be handled by
>invalidating the result of authentication.

JLG:
Let me cite here a previous email exchanged with David Chadwick a few months
ago, precisely about 
blacklist-like mechanisms and OCSP:

"Of course. CRLs, revocation, OCSP are all black list mechanisms. The
alternative is to have white lists and to ask the issuer if a cert is on
its white list or not. But this is a different type of validation to the
one that I am talking about with the CVS. It is only an initial
important first step in validation."


>5.5 Responder Discovery
>----------------------
>- I'm not sure I understand the section properly.
>"Any OCSP server acting as Clearinghouse or Trusted Responder MUST be
>contacted first."
>- Why?

JLG: 
Clearinghouses & Trusted Responders sign OCSP Responses with a private key
issued by an authority
in which the relying parties implicitly trust (ie IGTF). Compare versus
Authorized Responders 
signing OCSP Responses with a private key in which relying parties must trust
explicitly. 


>6.3. Revocation Information Sources
>-----------------------------------
>"blacklist" again

JLG:
Pls refer to first response and previous email.

> 8.2.1 Delta CRLs
> ----------------
>  - I don't seem to see the point here. Let me try to express my
>    reading of the section:
>
> "One of the problems with current Grid CAs' full CRLs is
> their long expected lifetime, i. e. the nextUpdate pointing
> to at least 7 days in the future. This behavior is motivated
> by the software used by Grids
> (OpenSSL) and by the potential network problems. However,
> this usage of nextUpdate takes out the possibility of
> expressing the CRL issuance frequency in the CRL itself (some
> CAs issue them several times a day but the the only place to
> find out the frequency is their CP/CPS). The Delta CRLs are
> proposed to solve the problem - their nextUpdate would
> reflect the actual CRL issuance frequency so that the OCSP
> responder feed with them could provide the more appropriate
> value for the nextUpdate in the response."
>
>   Am I reading the section right?
>
>   If I am, doesn't that effectively mean that there would be
> a new delta CRL issued with every full one (or at least with
> every full CRL containing no new revocation records)?
>
>

OM:
Milan, your summary of the section is correct.
However, your conclusion is not. When a full CRL is issued,
there are no deltaCRLs to issue because such D DeltaCRLs
always refer to the full CRL that was issued last.
In any case, I don't see what is the point you want to make.
Do you propose rephrasing the section?


>9.1 OCSP Service Architecture
>-----------------------------
>What are the "OCSP High Level Responders"?

JLG:
Please find explanation in section 7.1.3 adcording to the Relying Party's point
of view.


>OCSP Client Configuration Examples
>----------------------------------
>The actual example is missing.

JLG:
Appendix B.1, page 21?





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