[igtf-general] Re: [caops-wg] Certificate Profile document, update v0.5

[Jensen, J (Jens)]

David, I have now finally had time to go through the document
and made only a few changes.  And fixed a few bugs, like commonName
cannot use IA5String as encoding.  I used Word's change tracker.

http://www.grid-support.ac.uk/files/eugridpma-certprofile-20060814-0-6-jens.doc

What would be the consequences of saying in 4.1 "RDNs MUST be
in the Right Order".  Will we lose SWITCH and Purdue?

Would it be worth expanding section 5 into a general annotated
openssl.cnf?  If new CAs feel this would be useful, I will be
happy to provide something (if so, please reply to me).

The document has also gradually started to describe how software
deals with certificates - browsers, OpenLDAP, etc.  This could
be expanded.

Thanks,
			--jens


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-caops-wg at ggf.org [mailto:owner-caops-wg at ggf.org]On Behalf Of
David Groep
Sent: 14 August 2006 13:08
To: dg-eur-ca at services.cnrs.fr
Cc: All IGTF Members (igtf-general); CAOPS-WG
Subject: Re: [igtf-general] Re: [caops-wg] Certificate Profile document,
update v0.5


Hi Reimer,

Thanks for the comments. Answers in-line, and a new document is on the
web at

   http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/eugridpma-certprofile-20060814-0-6.pdf
   http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/eugridpma-certprofile-20060814-0-6.doc


Reimer Karlsen-Masur, DFN-CERT wrote:
> ... 
> In section 2.2:
> 
> Within the Issuer and Subject DNs, the following attributes *are known 
> to cause problems*:

That was a piece of legacy text that I ought to have removed. As the
document was restructure, this is now a plain list of attributeTypes.

> 2.2.4 DomainComponent, country, organization, organizationalUnit, etc.
> ...
> 2.2.5 commonName
> ...
> 
> I am confused. Why are these causing problems, except maybe for multiple 
> RDNs of same name (except for DCs)?

Multiple "O"'s are OK, and even multiple CNs are rumoured to be OK (the
CERN-IS CA will find out :-)

> 
> In section 3.3.8 only some forms of the AKI block the in-place 
> replacement of CA certificates. If the AKI does only contain the hash 
> value I think it is working fine. IMO this hash only changes if the CA 
> key changes. And "in-place replacement" means extending the lifetime of 
> a CA certificate and maybe changing the serial number but nothing else, 
> right?
> 
> If the AKI of an EE cert contains the dirname (i.e. the subject DN) of 
> the issuing CA issuing CA (note: this is the right number of repetitions 
> of "issuing CA" cause it is the *issuer* DN of the EE certs issuing CA 
> cert) plus the EE certs issuing CAs certificate serial number the 
> problems start when the replacement CA certificate gets a new serial 
> number (which it should as to sections above).
> 
> When an in-place CA cert replacement is eventually planned for in the 
> future and this will come with a CA key change, above does not apply and 
> it is better to not use AKIs at all.

This updated text should be better:
   The authorityKeyIdentifier is not usually interpreted by the software. It is
   not known to cause issues with grid software, as it is ignored. The extension
   MUST NOT be marked critical.

   If the AKI contains information that changes when the CA certificate is
   modified, it will block any “smooth” replacement of CA certificates (i.e.
   updating a CA certificate to modify the expiry date). Possible attributes in
   AKI include the directoryName of the authority that issued the issuer
   certificate (safe as it should not change) plus the serial number (which may
   or may not change), and/or the keyId of the end-entity issuing CA. If the
   keyIdentifier has been generated using one of the two recommended methods from
   RFC3280 (i.e. is purely derived from the public key value), it will not impair
   smooth replacement.


> 
> AKIs are also used in (Sub-)CA certificates, so similar apply there.
> 
> In section 3.3.12 the AIA could additionally/alternatively hold the 
> issuing CAs certificate download URI. Can also be set in Sub-CA 
> certificates. This can be used to automatically retrieve CA certs for 
> validation path building and path validation. IMO at least Microsoft's 
> smart card Single-Sign-Logon is using these.

Added to 3.3.12.

	Cheers,
	DavidG.



-- 
David Groep

** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group **
** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **