Primary Sources for "The Woman Who Smashed Codes" on Elizabeth Friedman
Jason Fagone, author "The Woman Who Smashed Codes," on Elizabeth Friedman, has begun posting primary source documents: http://archive.org/details/@jason_fagone An interview of Fagone in the NY Times, October 15, 2017: <https://t.co/1J4WdiqkGp>nytimes.com/2017/10/15/books/tell-us-5-things-woman-who-smashed-codes-jason-fagone.html The book: https://www.amazon.com/Woman-Who-Smashed-Codes-Outwitted/dp/0062430483 https://www.harpercollins.com/9780062430489/the-woman-who-smashed-codes
In order to solve a sybil problem, want to show that each peer is accepted as a peer by three peers, and we don't want these peers to be sybils. Related directed graph problem: Google trying to distinguish real links from networks of fake websites giving links to each other. Suppose you have an undirected graph in which every vertex is connected to at least three other vertexes (because we collapse vertices with only one connection or two connections) Now suppose we want to make sure that the total graph is well connected - that every subgraph is connected to at least three vertexes of the rest of the graph. We want to collapse subgraphs that are only connected to the rest of the graph by one connection into the vertex by which they are connected, and collapse subgraphs that are only connected to rest of the graph by two connections into a single edge. And suppose our graph is very large, thousands, perhaps millions, of vertices Purported peers that have only one connection are clients of the entity to which they are connected, and he is responsible for their good behavior, similarly those that have only two connections. Three good peer connections make you a peer of all the other peers, two good connections do not make you a peer - don't get equal treatment to the vertices by which you are connected, get graylist treatment. --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
On 10/27/2017 5:43 AM, James A. Donald wrote:
Purported peers that have only one connection are clients of the entity to which they are connected, and he is responsible for their good behavior, similarly those that have only two connections. Three good peer connections make you a peer of all the other peers, two good connections do not make you a peer - don't get equal treatment to the vertices by which you are connected, get graylist treatment.
What if you only have two good connections but each of your two connections have 3+ connections - how would good peers with only two connections be able to gain reputation in such a system? i.e. if the connections can be laterally traversed in order to reach any connected node, how would the other nodes be able to know if a peer is honest or if it has been spoofed? I believe this is actually how the recent ransomware spread in networks. They use systems that trust other systems. In order to prevent such attacks, the networking protocols need to be amended. An additional negotiation sublayer can be created which asks the other peer a question only they can know the answer to. This can be something such as encrypting all connections at the tcp/ip level, or applying something like proof of work to make it uneconomical for sybils (but this actually only solves the issue in a probabilistic way). ./gv
On 10/28/2017 5:01 AM, George Violaris wrote:
how would good peers with only two connections be able to gain reputation in such a system?
Nobody gains reputation. It is intended that identities are valuable, and people don't want them blacklisted. Byzantine failure loses reputation. To get into the system, you have to be accepted by three others, which is intended to cost time, thought, effort and money, so that once you are in, you don't want to get negative reputation. Observe how Ebay works. One negative review is really bad. No number of positive reviews is particularly valuable. --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
participants (3)
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George Violaris -
James A. Donald -
John Young