The cheap low risk node majority attack, pki, geoip, etc
On 6/6/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
Since nobody asked, here's a description of why neither TOR nor any other existing or presently planned anonymizing protocol I know of can be relied on to conceal a user's identity from the Five Eyes or any of several other hostile actors. I surface this concept every year or so, but so far nobody seems interested in discussing it. Maybe it's just too discouraging to think about. No matter who created it or why, TOR and similar mix networks are at best security theater, relative to top tier State adversaries.
what if an effectively unlimited number of compromised routers, subject to realtime observation and internal manipulation, were available to hostile actors? Game over, I think.
About 15 years ago I used online traceroute utilities and whois lookups to determine (roughly) where all the high performing Mixmaster remailers were physically located. Over half of them, including most with "exotic sounding" TLDs, were apparently in the state of Texas.
Then I used my data to construct "hard to compromise" chains, routing Mixmaster messages through national jurisdictions not likely to have comprehensive data sharing between their security services, and started sending test messages. None of these test messages ever made it back to me.
So I concluded that, despite its major technical superiority to other anonymized networking protocols, the Mixmaster network was most likely compromised by passive observation (one owner for a majority of reliable remailers) and active intervention (traffic between uncontrolled remailers interrupted in transit).
Owning enough of the routers in an anonymizing network to negate its security is largely a question of money: How much budget to you have, how certain do you want to be that nobody is really anonymous?
While money can buy shill humans to stand in, as below, it's costly, and casual human interactions by multiple signers reviewing them may expose them to risk.
proxy hosts could be machines owned by "friendly" actors, rooted consumer grade routers, purpose built appliances, conventional Windows botnets or some combination of these.
Govt seems to have no issue doing such illegal / unethical things. And they certainly can use their own network, tor, to do it.
The only defense I can think of is to assure that message traffic passes back and forth between mutually hostile national jurisdictions before delivery.
This is suggested often on tor-talk. And tor devs continually pass on it.
This would be a bit of a hairball to implement
Not really. Tor already loads GeoIP. So 20 or so lines of code and you've got a separate country for each hop. A few more lines to define groups like FVEY / BRICS, hemispheres, regions, AS, etc. Users could isolate on whatever they wanted. And a bunch more lines to include attributes as to "verified to be a human node operator in person" pki web of trust into the consensus. At least that way it raises the cost and risk to adversaries who today just use their Govt credit card to order up VPS nodes all over the world. Does it benefit? Tor devs say trust the random node selection. Others say at least some subset of users know the / their environment better and could use such tools to advantage. Tor still refuses to do it. So like mixmaster, you have to do it yourself. That sucks. It could stand to be talked over a bit more.
have to be taken into account. But this approach could increase the cost and reduce the reliability of Hydra attacks against anonymizing
Long story short: If you want to be /really/ anonymous in the presence of hostile State sponsored actors, do not rely on a software-only approach: Use physical security measures to conceal your identity from the physical router that connects you to the Internet
No "airtight" security protocol has ever survived contact with end users.
password:12345, lol.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/07/2016 12:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
On 6/6/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
[...]
The only defense I can think of is to assure that message traffic passes back and forth between mutually hostile national jurisdictions before delivery.
This is suggested often on tor-talk. And tor devs continually pass on it.
This would be a bit of a hairball to implement
Not really. Tor already loads GeoIP. So 20 or so lines of code and you've got a separate country for each hop. A few more lines to define groups like FVEY / BRICS, hemispheres, regions, AS, etc. Users could isolate on whatever they wanted.
And a bunch more lines to include attributes as to "verified to be a human node operator in person" pki web of trust into the consensus. At least that way it raises the cost and risk to adversaries who today just use their Govt credit card to order up VPS nodes all over the world.
Making users prove they are human without disclosing any personally identifying information is not an easy task. As far as I know, nobody has found a way to do it. The closest the IT industries have come so far is the CAPTCHA. Automated CAPTCHA breaking methods include forwarding the challenge image, puzzle or etc. to 3rd party websites where users solve CAPTCHAS to access content, and submitting those users' solutions back the site your automated gadget wants to fool.
Does it benefit? Tor devs say trust the random node selection. Others say at least some subset of users know the / their environment better and could use such tools to advantage.
Tor still refuses to do it. So like mixmaster, you have to do it yourself. That sucks. It could stand to be talked over a bit more.
Routing TOR traffic back and forth across mutually hostile borders would indeed be easy to do. It only requires, as Dr. Strangelove would say, The WILL to do so! However, this would lead to...
lots of slippery variables and potential counter-actions by hostiles that would have to be taken into account.
The State Department funds TOR to defeat national firewalls of "repressive regimes", enabling communication favorable to the U.S. National Interest. TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks. But apparently State, CIA etc. will not give TOR up, because of its role in the development and management of dissident groups in countries slated for destruction. A really big bump in TOR traffic crossing the borders of "repressive regimes" could create traffic jams that degrade TOR's performance right where the State Department wants TOR to work best, and escalate the arms race between TOR and the operators of national firewall filters. This would shift the cost/benefit ratio for TOR's sponsors in the wrong direction. Hence "hairball." One possible solution would be to build privacy directly into Internet protocols. That could drive the costs associated with network surveillance way up compared to today's rates, while making TOR and etc. redundant. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6973 Of course, every State and Corporate stakeholder will unite against implementing any such scheme, even if practicable solutions are found. But someday, somewhere a window of opportunity might open up, and meanwhile "there's no such thing as wasted basic research." :o/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXVxmOAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqfwEIAJRNYp3byLHPUiU/hXhGbjR2 BgXN0IiXO7PnU1tRBmaeXaBSt6Bb51XlZzSiD1pa76GOMFnF8aGEaZnucPxUUnat 0LagY7w6XtX1WoOQPvaoQxij5EPkrfaU3Wk+OErcF4dW96/w7KV7RFUayQMs1zD9 O8MUstF89RaE1eDU8Iw+EqhvUdcZoDVwkTluq6xwLrNBxz4lRmWAr/5CuFrx8Z5J Y2IQ21VZctYUO0lbVljh4TfF4mSvS68ddZVlfmZbmpjHZYQWSJFTmnrkgRLRtzoQ HkWlyrxZQ1hqkUt0tp8iQSISj/RrRtm9U1SuR9sZWQNXs/D6jFlu6u7l+j9nhNM= =KYGq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 14:59:26 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
The State Department funds TOR to defeat national firewalls of "repressive regimes", enabling communication favorable to the U.S. National Interest.
true
TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks.
False, please do not post garbage. By now any 'observer' should realize that the nsa is a 'fully capable' 'global passive adversary' - In no way tor can be used against the **US** national interest. HELL, even tor scumbags admit it http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-correlatio... Do your fucking homework Steve.
But apparently State, CIA etc. will not give TOR up, because of its role in the development and management of dissident groups in countries slated for destruction.
There's absolutely no reason for the US government to give up tor since it's perfectly working AS DESIGNED AND INTENDED.
A really big bump in TOR traffic crossing the borders of "repressive regimes" could create traffic jams that degrade TOR's performance right where the State Department wants TOR to work best, and escalate the arms race between TOR and the operators of national firewall filters. This would shift the cost/benefit ratio for TOR's sponsors in the wrong direction. Hence "hairball."
One possible solution would be to build privacy directly into Internet protocols. That could drive the costs associated with network surveillance way up compared to today's rates, while making TOR and etc. redundant.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6973
Of course, every State and Corporate stakeholder will unite against implementing any such scheme, even if practicable solutions are found. But someday, somewhere a window of opportunity might open up, and meanwhile "there's no such thing as wasted basic research."
:o/
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/07/2016 03:13 PM, juan wrote:
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 14:59:26 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks.
False, please do not post garbage. By now any 'observer' should realize that the nsa is a 'fully capable' 'global passive adversary' - In no way tor can be used against the **US** national interest.
HELL, even tor scumbags admit it
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-corr elation-tor-realistic-adversaries
Do your fucking homework Steve.
Garbage, please do not post "False." TOR can be used effectively as a component in tactical security protocols, because TOR can prevent identification of users who do brief hit-and-run network access via physical routers not associated with the users in question. And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services. :o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXVyfdAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqpCcH/RMepc8NDnZvDSnd2Q05eK67 orX2TIlhE3Ee4XHR03Dqm7jmltWok7JkHkBT6BHTuFLuW2p3AGyxp7aDqCZYjeTA YtowxSR8uOirsAqvAt3FmHln9kvdhsagu3Chsubp3jaMx+vymoPtGOUqBwvgdVMP WNcGREwX6Za8/PJ4gfp/fWXpgaOwsFoRGaU6qvYmemtzug2kxuPrbn+7XcPKgJAg rwIkjbnd0kjYp8UUazLnSu7cIlM+HL89qEE/0fi+SWz6vQ8YyQXW3sDffZ15Nt5p u79cHC/cRdQpMWdvTjvVs7ALPtvCSpBMdOcy3vbNiclKa9RSUVcfEI6tyrGZitY= =3uG5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 16:00:29 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
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On 06/07/2016 03:13 PM, juan wrote:
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 14:59:26 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks.
False, please do not post garbage. By now any 'observer' should realize that the nsa is a 'fully capable' 'global passive adversary' - In no way tor can be used against the **US** national interest.
HELL, even tor scumbags admit it
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-corr elation-tor-realistic-adversaries
Do your fucking homework Steve.
Garbage, please do not post "False."
Take it up with fucking syverson steve. It's quite interesting that the highest capo mafioso from tor admits it doesn't work and yet you deny it.
TOR can be used effectively as a component in tactical security protocols, because TOR can prevent identification of users who do brief hit-and-run network access via physical routers not associated with the users in question.
like any cheap VPN or proxy cnt.
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Which is not the point, motherfucker.
:o)
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/07/2016 04:09 PM, juan wrote:
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Which is not the point, motherfucker.
So in other words, I'm right, you're wrong, and you know it? ;o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXV0/tAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqNAwH/jw7D0XvppNYljl/aBLKOxOR Q0UjAM2SrbO0JYhjDdbw7WrPys6jTQ+szRdxwHfoAwcHTEp8nxMcOEhnuoryBYt3 yN7RUApwyuRTJtzcMuqIg+N8/xYI0WeiEYzKXFuu4U3vwfPzi5FrY0Vnfo93jT2W 5Ji5Ike+3A/aYvpb2oryN0ciEuNQ2CQ41f9iuaC9YocQsVsl3mlAlAfGRW1GbXTa 71NxbYvb7W0a8+db4HvvXyn8fn0yhK0Zlmyy0sgioUogmKCJqU+s983NiCT7qxv6 ZUOw3Ul4g0r2BpCM+3R7cCOCVOeNtVnXWBfQCiIp4ron5BcuGCsSveQ0aqELoSM= =L6zN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 18:51:25 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
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On 06/07/2016 04:09 PM, juan wrote:
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Which is not the point, motherfucker.
So in other words, I'm right, you're wrong, and you know it
What am I wrong about, exactly? You can re-read my previous messages and notice all the stuff I said and you ignored. Especially my first message explaining why tor is a scam. THen, read the 'paper' from scumbag syverson. Then, come back.
;o)
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/07/2016 06:59 PM, juan wrote:
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 18:51:25 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
On 06/07/2016 04:09 PM, juan wrote:
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Which is not the point, motherfucker.
So in other words, I'm right, you're wrong, and you know it
What am I wrong about, exactly? You can re-read my previous messages and notice all the stuff I said and you ignored.
Especially my first message explaining why tor is a scam.
The big error I see is your apparent belief that TOR should be able to do impossible things, and interpreting its failure to do so as evidence of malicious intent by its sponsors and developers. Overly enthusiastic fans of tools like TOR promise "airtight security," because they believe that airtight security is possible. Overly enthusiastic critics of TOR and similar tools demand the same impossible performance, and consider anything less to be a betrayal of public trust. One of the most effective ways to defeat a grass roots political adversary is to build and unleash opposing camps of True Believers to fight for and against a simplistic, misrepresented version of whatever the "unwelcome" advocates are trying to accomplish. What makes this approach so effective is that people will do it ALL BY THEMSELVES in many instances; guiding them to do it harder, faster and better is no challenge at all if one has a budget for that. I don't imagine that every outspoken critic of my little ideas is a paid enemy agent; I prefer a more evidence based brand of paranoia. To me, the tempest in TOR's teacup looks like a perfectly natural phenomenon, driven by false hope vs. harsh reality problems. Everyone has a right to petition the Universe for redress of grievances against the laws of physics; this can even be productive, as and when it leads to an improved understanding of those laws. :o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXWHvnAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqfIYH/ROrA+wSAQyDzWB8QHoCQ0aB 8g03ILCC54SG5tWk/9IyvOKXGo89Jqyh+31ur+Dhkme3reBqlmD6FUengm0UCDAD tGJ7qMNP2EAqzRbXNWckrJSiFgDPH1BjDcwSNwu9/r9+foq3VVJ2SRIg0dO0U5V5 w6lRmwbhDAWqZhHkLzXO8IkOXG2ge/7rFtvcvjuex0Pvfm1d0ZhCvzh46QuUOThy R/psKyW/TGNPRlagdbtQjokdq+XDcPc0S0kWexIQEqfIwRoLHRuUIlLZ98slNNW3 1NlLrN1yFpANA/GpZfp1+x0/GcrTXziyztcV2iu2nYMM/w5OdqS8qmCaT9XR8Cw= =WvFe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Steve Kinney 'asserted' : "TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks." Steve Kinney is a charlatan who hasn't done basic research about tor and simply parrots bullshit he got from the 'main stream media' When informed about basic research showing tor's flaws Steve Kinney blantantly ignores it, because he is an intellectual fraud. And then he writes baseless bullshit like the stuff below.
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On 06/07/2016 06:59 PM, juan wrote:
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 18:51:25 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
On 06/07/2016 04:09 PM, juan wrote:
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Which is not the point, motherfucker.
So in other words, I'm right, you're wrong, and you know it
What am I wrong about, exactly? You can re-read my previous messages and notice all the stuff I said and you ignored.
Especially my first message explaining why tor is a scam.
The big error I see is your apparent belief that TOR should be able to do impossible things, and interpreting its failure to do so as evidence of malicious intent by its sponsors and developers.
Overly enthusiastic fans of tools like TOR promise "airtight security," because they believe that airtight security is possible. Overly enthusiastic critics of TOR and similar tools demand the same impossible performance, and consider anything less to be a betrayal of public trust.
One of the most effective ways to defeat a grass roots political adversary is to build and unleash opposing camps of True Believers to fight for and against a simplistic, misrepresented version of whatever the "unwelcome" advocates are trying to accomplish. What makes this approach so effective is that people will do it ALL BY THEMSELVES in many instances; guiding them to do it harder, faster and better is no challenge at all if one has a budget for that.
I don't imagine that every outspoken critic of my little ideas is a paid enemy agent; I prefer a more evidence based brand of paranoia. To me, the tempest in TOR's teacup looks like a perfectly natural phenomenon, driven by false hope vs. harsh reality problems. Everyone has a right to petition the Universe for redress of grievances against the laws of physics; this can even be productive, as and when it leads to an improved understanding of those laws.
:o)
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This list degenerated into a shitshow for paranoid poseurs like Juan. Un-subbing. On 6/9/2016 5:28 AM, juan wrote:
Steve Kinney 'asserted' :
"TOR is a two edged sword that can also be used against the National Interest, so the NSA thinks TOR stinks."
Steve Kinney is a charlatan who hasn't done basic research about tor and simply parrots bullshit he got from the 'main stream media'
When informed about basic research showing tor's flaws Steve Kinney blantantly ignores it, because he is an intellectual fraud.
And then he writes baseless bullshit like the stuff below.
On 06/07/2016 06:59 PM, juan wrote:
On Tue, 7 Jun 2016 18:51:25 -0400 Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
On 06/07/2016 04:09 PM, juan wrote:
>> And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against >> adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence >> services. > > Which is not the point, motherfucker.
So in other words, I'm right, you're wrong, and you know it
What am I wrong about, exactly? You can re-read my previous messages and notice all the stuff I said and you ignored.
Especially my first message explaining why tor is a scam.
The big error I see is your apparent belief that TOR should be able to do impossible things, and interpreting its failure to do so as evidence of malicious intent by its sponsors and developers.
Overly enthusiastic fans of tools like TOR promise "airtight security," because they believe that airtight security is possible. Overly enthusiastic critics of TOR and similar tools demand the same impossible performance, and consider anything less to be a betrayal of public trust.
One of the most effective ways to defeat a grass roots political adversary is to build and unleash opposing camps of True Believers to fight for and against a simplistic, misrepresented version of whatever the "unwelcome" advocates are trying to accomplish. What makes this approach so effective is that people will do it ALL BY THEMSELVES in many instances; guiding them to do it harder, faster and better is no challenge at all if one has a budget for that.
I don't imagine that every outspoken critic of my little ideas is a paid enemy agent; I prefer a more evidence based brand of paranoia. To me, the tempest in TOR's teacup looks like a perfectly natural phenomenon, driven by false hope vs. harsh reality problems. Everyone has a right to petition the Universe for redress of grievances against the laws of physics; this can even be productive, as and when it leads to an improved understanding of those laws.
:o)
Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf Our results show that Tor users are FAR MORE SUSCEPTIBLE to compromise than indicated by prior work. QUITE SIMPLE AND EFFICIENT TECHNIQUES CAN CORRELATE TRAFFIC at these separate locations by taking advantage of identifying traf- fic patterns [29]. As a result, the user and his destination may be identified, completely subverting the protocol’s security goals. Given the SEVERITY OF THE TRAFFIC CORRELATION PROBLEM and its se- curity implications, we develop an analysis framework for evaluat- ing the security of various user behaviors on the live OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT 80% OF ALL TYPES OF USERS MAY BE DE- ANONYMIZED BY A RELATIVELY MODERATE TOR-RELAY ADVERSARY WITHIN SIX MONTHS. OUR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP) signed paul FUCKING syverson Now, all the RETARDS who parrot that 'tor stinks' perhaps should try to update their mental databases.
On Wed, Jun 08, 2016 at 12:30:31AM -0300, juan wrote:
Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries
http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
Our results show that Tor users are FAR MORE SUSCEPTIBLE to compromise than indicated by prior work.
QUITE SIMPLE AND EFFICIENT TECHNIQUES CAN CORRELATE TRAFFIC at these separate locations by taking advantage of identifying traf- fic patterns [29]. As a result, the user and his destination may be identified, completely subverting the protocol’s security goals.
Given the SEVERITY OF THE TRAFFIC CORRELATION PROBLEM and its se- curity implications, we develop an analysis framework for evaluat- ing the security of various user behaviors on the live
OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT 80% OF ALL TYPES OF USERS MAY BE DE- ANONYMIZED BY A RELATIVELY MODERATE TOR-RELAY ADVERSARY WITHIN SIX MONTHS.
OUR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP)
signed paul FUCKING syverson
Now, all the RETARDS who parrot that 'tor stinks' perhaps should try to update their mental databases.
This needs to be +1'ed, noted well, remembered, reminded and generally proclaimed loudly. The use cases of "benefit" are looking slim indeed, and in fact "you have at most one month and even then a ~30% chance of being specifically identified. The metaphorical hit and run is the remaining use case, assuming you don't make any mistake at all whilst hitting the tor network and running for your hope to be not detected arse. Fill traffic overlay net, and hardware based "new mesh network" seem to be the only sane approaches for sane future work named thus far... Juan, you've been so fucking right it's, it's, it's ... I ...
On 06/08/2016 03:38 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
UR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY
ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP)
What? You exshpect to live forever? Three months is a lifetime. Use it wisely. Ps. there's a high probability of metadata being matched to users using simple search techniques. A Stanford graduate student has shown just how easily names can be matched with phone records, contradicting some of the legal justification offered by federal authorities for the National Security Agency’s bulk collection of phone data. President Barack Obama said in June that the surveillance captured only which telephone numbers were connected to others. “There are no names … in that database,” Obama said. Just last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said cell phone customers had no reasonable expectation to privacy because the data collected by the NSA because it did not contain their names. But researcher Jonathan Mayer and co-author Patrick Mutchler reported that they’d gathered thousands of phone numbers from volunteers and checked various public online directories to link some of the 5,000 numbers chosen at random from their database to individuals. With “marginal effort,” they matched more than 27 percent of the numbers using just Yelp, Google Places and Facebook. They then randomly sampled 100 numbers from the database and ran Google searches for each. “In under an hour, we were able to associate an individual or a business with 60 of the 100 numbers,” Mayer wrote. “When we added in our three initial sources, we were up to 73. "Between Intelius, Google search and our three initial sources, we associated a name with 91 of the 100 numbers,” http://auntieimperial.tumblr.com/post/71327622408
On Wed, 8 Jun 2016 08:57:35 -0700 Rayzer <rayzer@riseup.net> wrote:
On 06/08/2016 03:38 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
UR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY
ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP)
What? You exshpect to live forever? Three months is a lifetime. Use it wisely.
Exacty the kind of thing a government agent would say.
On 06/08/2016 10:23 AM, juan wrote:
On Wed, 8 Jun 2016 08:57:35 -0700 Rayzer <rayzer@riseup.net> wrote:
On 06/08/2016 03:38 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
UR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY
ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP) What? You exshpect to live forever? Three months is a lifetime. Use it wisely.
Exacty the kind of thing a government agent would say.
Exactly the kind of thing a pragmatist would say. Rr
On Wed, Jun 08, 2016 at 10:59:06AM -0700, Rayzer wrote:
On 06/08/2016 10:23 AM, juan wrote:
Rayzer <rayzer@riseup.net> wrote:
What? You exshpect to live forever? Three months is a lifetime. Use it wisely.
Exacty the kind of thing a government agent would say.
Exactly the kind of thing a pragmatist would say.
Awww, heartwarming backslapping of one another, how cute. <WARNING: Ignore "mis-contextualization for rimshot purposes", as such droll unpacking of weakly attempted humour does not improve the comedic factor of the text nor the presumably inducted mirth states (being a vector, not an absolute) in those reading said text. Indeed such unpackings is usually viewed with raised eyebrows and mild derision (perhaps almost as much derision as the attempted first instance or echoes of grammar precision axii) since "well that was obvious" and perhaps a weak but self satisfied "and those who didn't get it are too stupid to worry about" resulting in that sanguine dissatisfied half smile of all sarcastic ego positions having no basis in utility to our fellow man or anything for that matter.>
On 6/7/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
And of course, TOR can be up to 100% effective against adversaries who are /not/ top tier signals intelligence services.
Not really. If said tt-si-services have a liking toward such minor adversaries, or to any particular bigcorp, political movement, etc, or to anything that's to their advantage and your weakness... that you are using tor (or for that matter, any GPA-weak network) against, or to evade... the tt-si-services will rat or parallel you out to them without hesitation.
On 6/7/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
And a bunch more lines to include attributes as to "verified to be a human node operator in person" pki web of trust into the
Making users prove they are human without disclosing any personally identifying information is not an easy task. As far as I know, nobody
Did not say "users". I said "operators", ie: relays. For which there are 1000 exits and 7000 relays. For which single humans run subgroups of them. For which users, operators, etc worldwide could have keysigining parties with them, inject that into the consensus, and give knobs to "users". Which is for some users a far better option and cost raiser than dirt cheap govt / adversary VPS of... 1150 "router (Unnamed|default|ididnteditheconfig)" with no contact info.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/08/2016 12:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
On 6/7/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
And a bunch more lines to include attributes as to "verified to be a human node operator in person" pki web of trust into the
Making users prove they are human without disclosing any personally identifying information is not an easy task. As far as I know, nobody
Did not say "users". I said "operators", ie: relays. For which there are 1000 exits and 7000 relays. For which single humans run subgroups of them. For which users, operators, etc worldwide could have keysigining parties with them, inject that into the consensus, and give knobs to "users". Which is for some users a far better option and cost raiser than dirt cheap govt / adversary VPS of...
1150 "router (Unnamed|default|ididnteditheconfig)" with no contact info.
Something like that did cross my mind, and I'm glad you expanded on the theme. Here we see the difference between a "protocol" as defined in software, and a "protocol" for face to face human interaction. In theory, the approach outlined above would make a network like TOR orders of magnitude more effective. But a problem remains: Software based solutions are easy to deploy, "just do it." End users who know something happened (likely a small minority, unless the changes degrade service) can keep using, drop out, or fork the project. Meatspace based solutions are hard: They require the informed participation of /numerous/ geographically dispersed participants. Compare the case of the PGP web of trust: It only works if a critical mass of well informed, proactive end users make it work. Getting enough TOR users to do real work in the real world to register themselves as TOR users sounds like a non-starter to me. :o/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXWHDpAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqNFMIAMuOzSukl9tqMvM0EvFjPRfy M+DFaujsWbwme+zc6qlHxqAVmD7VmXlvyJ9KqKBHitRg1mV8fmsTCy9pFqd0lzsP zR0DRYN2nCk0dkR1WA3kkwu2VoaQqXP4PfQabxJbN9dMVpNBfSrzfxKI0XClJ4Hf bnHgehnqKjPRXbAiznsLWgJ3SKGqW8vBc9GEA2fBzGY6NmyVZaTXpp4AM28aT6Eg gCXSOtKFXWJU9xm4x4Rd32ujsKnqJdO9+bscbbr5tLDR+g2gvbNOSqjboIyjJ6zw qWlp+BinZe6EIiW9BGRrt+m6AGFCEgBL1PkYlD9ovVQ8Varb8Tdg+pAzvKgj7mw= =LbIM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (6)
-
Charles -
grarpamp -
juan -
Rayzer -
Steve Kinney -
Zenaan Harkness