Re: NSA Spying Relies on AT&T'S "Extreme Willingness to Help"
appears to stand up well. I believe it's very possible that Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-surro und-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673
:o/
This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than anything about Snowden. He had widespread network access - but not specific compartmental access. I would guess rather than risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't) attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI access - which is where the technical details live. Everything I have seen dumped from his trove is purely presentational/summary reports handed around between offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination. Granted in much detail, but it's not the the source, as it were. I have been curious since the start to see if any of the future releases from the Snowden Cache reveal any actual technical source documentation. There might well be some, and not being released for a variety of legit (and not) reasons. Conversely as per above, it's more than likely there isn't any whatsoever. In the big picture those details don't change the validity of the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is purely an apologist or diversion tactic. I think the situation speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source. Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/22/2015 12:49 PM, Softy wrote:
appears to stand up well. I believe it's very possible that Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-sur
ro
und-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-su rro%0Aund-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673>
:o/
This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than anything about Snowden. He had widespread network access - but not specific compartmental access. I would guess rather than risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't) attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI access - which is where the technical details live. Everything I have seen dumped from his trove is purely presentational/summary reports handed around between offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination.
My thoughts exactly: Snowden never left the reservation when he collected his docs, except in that he copied quite a lot of them and carried them out. Reading up on what your internal customers use the network for is healthy and encouraged behavior for admins - - up to the point of "sensitive sources and methods."
In the big picture those details don't change the validity of the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is purely an apologist or diversion tactic. I think the situation speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source. Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons.
Ah yup. Project scopes, code names, and functional descriptions give one a high level but fairly definitive picture of the systems described. Once one knows what they are doing, the how is largely self explanatory. The only surprise in the whole Snowden dump is the scope and depth of U.S. engagement in cyber-spying: Going from well founded suspicion to detailed documentary evidence is a quantum leap, converting knowledge into intelligence. The extent of Greenwald & Co. cooperation with State authorities, vs. purely commercial motives, remains an open question. It may be a coincidence that the first two Big Stories of the Snowden Saga broke on the same days as the last two major events in the Manning trial. Greenwald knocked Chelsea's story right off the public's radar. I do believe in coincidences, but I try not to bet on them, and this one casts a creepy, PsyOps kind of light on the Snowden business. The sale of those documents to Pierre Omidyar also seems a little creepy to me: http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/13/greenwald-omidyar-joint-v enture-the-blurring-lines-between-being-a-source-being-a-journalist/ One content gap that I find puzzling is the absence of references in published Snowden docs to what was formerly called Romas/COIN then Odyssey, a system revealed by the H.B. Gary e-mail dump. Maybe I missed a description of that program under another name: I have not been reading everything that comes down the pipe. Romas/COIN was the name of Uncle Sam's cellular network, smart phone and social media surveillance and exploitation toolkit from Hell (see echelon2.org). As a rich source of high quality collection in regions vital to the National Interest, I am sure that the NSA taps into this kit's databases and/or work products, even if it "belongs to" another Service. Maybe somebody here recognizes Romas/COIN as somthing appearing under another name in Snowden docs? :o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJV2WmpAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0LhOAP/3iAeJwbt+BFyM3eX2A5hsbT /QY7cnIR8/Xxrakl/fxjAe8Io3KYE3NRoPlxn1qEgTOIvqMV93xIPNI2wvw7LdMn 7QTWChic0L1iHIHvjC8qH7FyYmexbOddRpeLU+dANmekCXB58tR0D0/XXSMzob5s 7N8utgxZpvbHdKlDQaEWTh9/7vOMwQ1620l0WCslafe8H94/g8w1ydfMKXhsTWyw K8kQi2rgmVMMYRlAgR1rzIksAgFcrdYre7y8uwKTf0RP0PkIS2+JUwti5cJSUvKf 00n3k373grus2R60RL1d/o8E6rjvqx0IjVs2Z0Kle3zkFP5s+8c0PI8ypiPaw2kk XmleNHhwEOMlMmNC9izWhqoZkgx9vCN+7yhskXH96BhijAPjGzsQKkg23teO6Gl2 fTTRavgsE7rM65x/jZIQ1oyi/5CzSXyx41o5YC8VzHjoB3THOaB0EVBq35mrCr5K l7OasL02huSzT8M6fSJ3tY09vagcILnKwAztiQ4QASJOy7ojkabkkgbBrPo8iGN6 AY1mB8ksoTsSyfNLeVh5cAkwiOipJQ3CuZDURvXpZb+05Q0dFTPkJO9y7VRCWAyo EpeLCcIYOVuNReeaCkKqNqwnegdW1IRXyJJqKkDGgy0AW8LuspgUKU+i3aBBEb1f 9NtVcX6NVOyFxippoY0S =eVua -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
interesting
and devastating that fucking barrett is writing for fucking intercept ...
whenever he gets out of solitary i guess = horror
gg didnt even know anything about pierre before he signed up to work for
him and fucking scahill thought that was funny haha ... money
On Aug 23, 2015 9:40 AM, "Steve Kinney"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
On 08/22/2015 12:49 PM, Softy wrote:
appears to stand up well. I believe it's very possible that Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-sur
ro
und-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-su rro%0Aund-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673>
:o/
This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than anything about Snowden. He had widespread network access - but not specific compartmental access. I would guess rather than risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't) attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI access - which is where the technical details live. Everything I have seen dumped from his trove is purely presentational/summary reports handed around between offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination.
My thoughts exactly: Snowden never left the reservation when he collected his docs, except in that he copied quite a lot of them and carried them out. Reading up on what your internal customers use the network for is healthy and encouraged behavior for admins - - up to the point of "sensitive sources and methods."
In the big picture those details don't change the validity of the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is purely an apologist or diversion tactic. I think the situation speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source. Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons.
Ah yup.
Project scopes, code names, and functional descriptions give one a high level but fairly definitive picture of the systems described. Once one knows what they are doing, the how is largely self explanatory. The only surprise in the whole Snowden dump is the scope and depth of U.S. engagement in cyber-spying: Going from well founded suspicion to detailed documentary evidence is a quantum leap, converting knowledge into intelligence.
The extent of Greenwald & Co. cooperation with State authorities, vs. purely commercial motives, remains an open question.
It may be a coincidence that the first two Big Stories of the Snowden Saga broke on the same days as the last two major events in the Manning trial. Greenwald knocked Chelsea's story right off the public's radar. I do believe in coincidences, but I try not to bet on them, and this one casts a creepy, PsyOps kind of light on the Snowden business. The sale of those documents to Pierre Omidyar also seems a little creepy to me:
http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/13/greenwald-omidyar-joint-v enture-the-blurring-lines-between-being-a-source-being-a-journalist/
One content gap that I find puzzling is the absence of references in published Snowden docs to what was formerly called Romas/COIN then Odyssey, a system revealed by the H.B. Gary e-mail dump. Maybe I missed a description of that program under another name: I have not been reading everything that comes down the pipe.
Romas/COIN was the name of Uncle Sam's cellular network, smart phone and social media surveillance and exploitation toolkit from Hell (see echelon2.org). As a rich source of high quality collection in regions vital to the National Interest, I am sure that the NSA taps into this kit's databases and/or work products, even if it "belongs to" another Service. Maybe somebody here recognizes Romas/COIN as somthing appearing under another name in Snowden docs?
:o)
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participants (3)
-
Cari Machet -
Softy -
Steve Kinney