shot over the bow - BIS to control crypto exports anywhere (to ensure backdoor enabled?)
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/17/intel_subsidiary_crypto_export_fine/ """ Wind River Systems exported its software to China, Hong Kong, Russia, Israel, South Africa, and South Korea. BIS [Bureau of Industry and Security] significantly mitigated what would have been a much larger fine because the company voluntarily disclosed the violations. We believe this to be the first penalty BIS has ever issued for the unlicensed export of encryption software that did not also involve comprehensively sanctioned countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan or Syria). This suggests a fundamental change in BIS’s treatment of violations of the encryption regulations. Historically, BIS has resolved voluntarily disclosed violations of the encryption regulations with a warning letter but no material consequence, and has shown itself unlikely to pursue such violations that were not disclosed. This fine dramatically increases the compliance stakes for software companies — a message that BIS seemed intent upon making in its announcement. """ fuck BIS!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 "Any self-respecting open-source developer will establish anonymity, develop code, and release it to the world with no authorization whatsoever. The code will live or die on its own merit." ~ from the 'Export Controls' section of "Darknet for Beginners" [[ August 12, 2013 post at https://odinn.cyberguerrilla.org/index.php/2013/08/12/darknet-for-beginners/ ]] - - Odinn coderman wrote:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/17/intel_subsidiary_crypto_export_fine/
"""
Wind River Systems exported its software to China, Hong Kong, Russia, Israel, South Africa, and South Korea. BIS [Bureau of Industry and Security] significantly mitigated what would have been a much larger fine because the company voluntarily disclosed the violations.
We believe this to be the first penalty BIS has ever issued for the unlicensed export of encryption software that did not also involve comprehensively sanctioned countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan or Syria). This suggests a fundamental change in BIS’s treatment of violations of the encryption regulations.
Historically, BIS has resolved voluntarily disclosed violations of the encryption regulations with a warning letter but no material consequence, and has shown itself unlikely to pursue such violations that were not disclosed. This fine dramatically increases the compliance stakes for software companies — a message that BIS seemed intent upon making in its announcement. """
fuck BIS!
- -- http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJURKrsAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CLzIH/Anztm0IN6wLOtj4KthxJv7s DZzbregs9UpE3CdAFs10oLJo2HCX/91gUBUNRRDdgk5ZotQey5gDMPBlO5Q3oOX2 WUMT+l3yznLOut6TDVXyXp06vtkyvXKzoqhuU3+PmGMbJKtqDhYCnKCxwGK92O9V 3vhJYS1Z8rCDDpcLLnL2BATbtc5zlOasB4KnPsmwFAvAWq+C/exGKFfJwc0XqUVK vz2ZTKm9OUD6oZd2kbEbJRL66egbvkPZP7Jd7RYBcUGDQpEjSD1dF/pecwLX4Or4 rvy3pC7o/fEaGjFQ5QAlsoW+orh7ouoOUbZvnW0XgeKjyLfi5O+46tUFaQGI14U= =OCc5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (2)
-
coderman -
odinn