Re: The Unbreakable Cipher (2)
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 9:11 AM, John Young <jya@pipeline.com> wrote:
Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict traffic volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that. Presuming that NSA and cohorts have investigated this effect.
no- not for a multilinear/nonlinear bit set approach. voluminous data exchange and not censoring throughput (given ability to correlate elsewhere, delayed or real-time; thus store+forward) and allowing inaccurate modeling of data via ideological rationalizations turns that limited analysis back against itself as truth is secure, folding the framework via collapsing pseudo-truth and falsity, recontextualizing the shared situation, establishing new zones of interaction and unmapped boundaries that do not coherently correlate within existing models of analysis, instead breaking them. versus propping them up via following their rules and dictates that seek to limit and censor interactions as a basis for secrets or sustaining false-perspectives, seemingly often for self-preservation of legacy systems versus allowing collapse, deterioration or loss of control over what occurs- freedom in relation to governance versus its constriction, choking what can happen, to keep it finite, bound, gagged hypothetical, the massive influx of data (in truth) that is wrongly assessed (as pT) via limited observer established zone of secure interaction by default of its own false framework and incapacity to account for what does not exist in its categorization- any move toward accommodation is ideological weakness and falsifies belief system. it is to overwhelm with data that cannot be grounded in the false framework and its ungrounded evaluation undermines the existing inaccurate view because it yields less and less in the limited perspective. flooding the corrupt oversight with what amounts to pseudo-truth, allowing any and all correlations to fever circuits- it breaks the rationalization model by forcing decision-making that tends towards falsity, as it is ungrounded and the more it decides, the more it persists and expands itself in error. transparency in truth, a shared domain, remains a secret and a secure realm insofar as it cannot be accessed, perceived, or altered in the dimensions it exists- seemingly only censored, stopped, or attacked which forces polarization, ramps up potential dynamics, and creates conditions for extreme actions that can force or break hidden systems via operating beyond their known boundary or losing stealth advantage in some ways it may be like reverse radar, what they see is the entire radar field as the signal, potentially, unable to distinguish its value or meaning or interpret what is happening in vast many different frames simultaneously, keying in and out, leading to massa confusa... (perhaps equivalent to big bang inflation of a paralleled universe) ♃ ♃
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 9:29 PM, brian carroll <electromagnetize@gmail.com> wrote:
... no- not for a multilinear/nonlinear bit set approach. voluminous data exchange...
you're wrong. the key is to re-key so frequently there is never a significant volume transferred under the same symmetric key. in the manually keyed IPsec experiment i mentioned in another thread, we used synchronized key daemons to maintain a rolling pair of SA/AH+ESP associations that rotated on a per second interval. as long as you didn't transfer more than some obtuse number of terabits in a given second the assurance provided by a random key is intact. (and we used VIA C5P dual RNG processors to provide the manual keying material that was kept in sync between a pair of communicating stations over unencrypted 802.11b - there was no IKE or other public key exchange, just synchronized symmetric ciphers and digests)
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:38 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
... the key is to re-key so frequently there is never a significant volume transferred under the same symmetric key.
this also is useful for constraining the duration of an authenticated session. if you must "attest" to the authenticated status of an entity at a frequent interval, the use of a panic button or other key zeroisation / session abort mode becomes much more useful and actionable, denying access to the protected resource within milliseconds of a "panic" event occurring. this is another long tangent for another day...
participants (2)
-
brian carroll
-
coderman