So, if I understand this right; x and k are pairs of 32-bit numbers, as Red Pike is a 64-bit block system and 32 is the maximum int size on most platforms. k is key material, x is a pointer to the data. No state is preserved when encrypting x with k, so to encrypt lots of data, you must string it into a series of "x" and apply the cipher to each block. Am I mistaken? Is this any better than AES-ECB, then, if no cipher state is preserved between encrypted blocks? On 27/02/14 13:08, Anonymous Remailer (austria) wrote:

/* Red Pike cipher source code */

#include <stdint.h>

typedef uint32_t word;

#define CONST 0x9E3779B9 #define ROUNDS 16

#define ROTL(X, R) (((X) << ((R) & 31)) | ((X) >> (32 - ((R) & 31)))) #define ROTR(X, R) (((X) >> ((R) & 31)) | ((X) << (32 - ((R) & 31))))

void encrypt(word * x, const word * k) { unsigned int i; word rk0 = k[0]; word rk1 = k[1];

for (i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) { rk0 += CONST; rk1 -= CONST;

x[0] ^= rk0; x[0] += x[1]; x[0] = ROTL(x[0], x[1]);

x[1] = ROTR(x[1], x[0]); x[1] -= x[0]; x[1] ^= rk1; }

rk0 = x[0]; x[0] = x[1]; x[1] = rk0; }

void decrypt(word * x, const word * k) { word dk[2] = { k[1] - CONST * (ROUNDS + 1), k[0] + CONST * (ROUNDS + 1) };

encrypt(x, dk); }

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Le limited information available on the Red Pike cipher are quite consistent with the code below: an ARX block cipher, no look-up tables, virtually no key schedule, and requiring only few lines of code [1]. With a 64 bit key size the Alleged Red Pike (ARP) is insecure by modern standards. But it was possibly insecure also in the 1990s. ARP suffers from a large number of semi-weak keys. Actually, each key is a semi-weak key. A pair of ARP keys (K1, K2) is said to be semi-weak if E_K1(E_K2(M)) = M (i.e., encryption with K1 operates as does decryption with K2). With ARP Feistel structure and its key schedule,there are 2^63 such pairs, reducing the size of the key space to 2^63. The relationship between each semi-weak pairs is: K2_L = K1_R - 2^32/phi * 17 K2_R = K1_L + 2^32/phi * 17 where phi is the golden ratio. Being semi-weak keys a large fraction of the ARP key space, implementations cannot apply the standard countermeasures against this undesirable property. Picking a semi-weak key is inevitable. The question remains: Is the Alleged Red Pike the cipher designed by the GCHQ? [1] Anderson, Ross; Kuhn, Markus, "Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices", in M. Lomas et al. (ed.), Security Protocols, 5th International Workshop, Paris, France, April 7{9, 1997, Proceedings, Springer LNCS 1361, pp 125-136, ISBN 3-540-64040-1, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/tamper2.pdf On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 1:08 PM, Anonymous Remailer (austria) <mixmaster@remailer.privacy.at> wrote:

/* Red Pike cipher source code */

#include <stdint.h>

typedef uint32_t word;

#define CONST 0x9E3779B9 #define ROUNDS 16

#define ROTL(X, R) (((X) << ((R) & 31)) | ((X) >> (32 - ((R) & 31)))) #define ROTR(X, R) (((X) >> ((R) & 31)) | ((X) << (32 - ((R) & 31))))

void encrypt(word * x, const word * k) { unsigned int i; word rk0 = k[0]; word rk1 = k[1];

for (i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) { rk0 += CONST; rk1 -= CONST;

x[0] ^= rk0; x[0] += x[1]; x[0] = ROTL(x[0], x[1]);

x[1] = ROTR(x[1], x[0]); x[1] -= x[0]; x[1] ^= rk1; }

rk0 = x[0]; x[0] = x[1]; x[1] = rk0; }

void decrypt(word * x, const word * k) { word dk[2] = { k[1] - CONST * (ROUNDS + 1), k[0] + CONST * (ROUNDS + 1) };

encrypt(x, dk); }