Re: [tor-talk] Dishonest tor relay attack math question
On 9/28/21, PrivacyArms via tor-talk <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
Dear Tor community,
I came across a post on the Whonix forum recently. Since I am also interested in this question I copied it here: https://forums.whonix.org/t/math-behind-honest-tor-nodes/12464 http://forums.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion... The question (edited): How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have? Is it better to calculate with bandwidth consumed (250Gbps), despite the number of relays (~7000)?
Basically, I want to get the mathematical equation to this statement: I run X Tor relays at Y Mb/s each and by doing so I secure Z % of the Tor network! Starting thoughts: - Each “normal” route has three nodes involved: Guard, Middle, Exit - I am aware of guard pinning and vanguard protection for middle relay pinning - Maybe it is easier to assume an infinite usage time of the network to eliminate guard and vanguard pinning - I guess the best is to assume a scenario with 1%, 5%, 10%, etc. dishonest relays
I would love to hear your thoughts about it and a concrete math equation would be amazing.
Too many approach reality from the wrong direction. Instead, try calculating how much impact X dishonest tor relays have.... And try to understand reasons why the NSA says "Tor Stinks" some of the time, and that was over 10 years ago, attack methods and actors are improved and more prevalent since then, tor is still same since 20+ years... Then consider what "adding more relays" under that design really does, and or cannot do... Security product advertisements tend to be quite polished affairs, yet those products often as full of holes as any other.
On 10/3/21, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
On 9/28/21, PrivacyArms via tor-talk <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org> wrote:
Hello PA https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/ Tor Project staffers didn't reply in over a week to your list post. And via the three day mailman expiry period, Tor Project has again cowardly and silently censored my reply to list, that was cc: you. Maybe it contained some embarassing things, Tor Project does not answer, so who knows. But they are launching a censored "forum" soon so that those who don't like censored "lists" can freely choose another way to be censored. Perhaps try the uncensored cypherpunks list here... https://lists.cpunks.org/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks There may be some mathematicians there who might like to help with your math question, and some crazy people too. I left the math question off since it was sent only to me. It's a good question so just repost it there if you like :) Note that a timing attack exposing the two communicators endpoints can be done from just two vantage points, and as such may potentially imply discovery of content passing through (or terminating on) the far one. There are other node based attacks but are more beyond the context posed in your question. Maybe with better Fermi Estimates of the possible ratios of dishonest to honest nodes [achievable] with tor, a better and uncensored understanding of the risks and security of tor network can be made, and a better assessment of any possibility to fix tor, or to start fresh a new overlay project, or to contribute to another existing project.
But they are launching a censored "forum" soon so that those who don't like censored "lists" can freely choose another way to be censored.
Here is the new place to go if you want to be censored by these freespeech hypocrites and whitewashers of user risk, corporate embarassment, and design weaknesses... https://forum.torproject.net/
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grarpamp