----- Forwarded message from Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> ----- Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 16:20:18 -0400 From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> To: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry@govirtual.tv> Cc: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, ianG <iang@iang.org> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry@govirtual.tv>wrote:

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If so, then the domain owner can deliver a public key with authenticity using the DNS. This strikes a deathblow to the CA industry. This threat is enough for CAs to spend a significant amount of money slowing down its development [0].

How much more obvious does it get [1] ?

The PKI industry has been a sham since day one, and several root certs have been compromised by the proverbial "bad guys" over the years (for example, the "Flame" malware incident used to sign emergency Windows Update packages which mysteriously only affected users in Iran and the Middle East, or the Diginotar debacle, or the Tunisian "Ammar" MITM attacks etc). This of course is assuming that the FBI doesn't already have access to all of the root CAs so that on domestic soil they can sign updates and perform silent MITM interception of SSL and IPSEC-encrypted traffic using transparent inline layer-2 bridging devices that are at every major Internet peering point and interconnect, because that would be crazy talk.

Before you make silly accusations go read the VeriSign Certificate Practices Statement and then work out how many people it takes to gain access to one of the roots. The Key Ceremonies are all videotaped from start to finish and the auditors have reviewed at least some of the ceremonies. So while it is not beyond the realms of possibility that such a large number of people were suborned, I think it drastically unlikely. Add to which Jim Bizdos is not exactly known for being well disposed to the NSA or key escrow. Hacking CAs is a poor approach because it is a very visible attack. Certificate Transparency is merely automating and generalizing controls that already exist. But we can certainly add them to S/MIME, why not. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5