[Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.
----- Forwarded message from Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> ----- Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2013 11:08:00 -0700 From: Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130828 Icedove/17.0.8 More fuel for the fire... http://rt.com/usa/nsa-weak-cryptography-rsa-110/ RSA today declared its own BSAFE toolkit and all versions of its Data Protection Manager insecure, recommending that all customers immediately discontinue use of these products. The issue is apparently the Random Number Generator that these products use, the rather amusingly named "Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator." *1 And according to more of the Snowden Files released to (or by) the New York Times last week, that pseudorandom generator is deliberately flawed in order to allow it to be sod... um, excuse me, I should have said, to permit backdoor penetration. RSA was truly between a rock and a hard place here as I see it. With the deliberate weakness now made public, they took a terrific blow to their business. But failure to follow up with a recommendation against their own products, no matter how much additional financial pain that action entails, would have destroyed all trust in their company and prospects for future business. As best I can tell, they have lost $Millions at least due to the tampering of their products, and American security and software companies taken as a whole are in the process of losing $Billions to foreign competitors for the same reasons. I wonder, would a class action suit seeking compensation for this wholesale sabotage be within the jurisdiction of the FISA court? Bear *1 "Anyone who attempts to generate random numbers by deterministic means is, of course, living in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
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Eugen Leitl