[ot][spam] Partial Book Experience: Robert Lifton, Losing R / Cults, Cultism, Zealotry
Losing Reality On Cults, Cultism, and the Mindset of Political and Religious Zealotry Robert Jay Lifton The New Press, New York, London For my grandchildren Kimberly Lifton Jessica Lifton Lila Lifton Dmitri Itzkovitz We keep coming back and coming back To the real. - Wallace Stevens
Contents Author's Note Introduction: On the Ownership of Reality [Table of Contents elided] Part One: Thought Reform and Cultism Part Two: World-Ending Threats Part Three: Regaining Reality Acknowledgments Notes Index
Author's Note This book consists of excerpts from earlier work together with considerable new material. The excerpts are printed in regular typeface, while new commentaries are printed in italics [I'm likely to put underscores around italics _like this_ if I encounter them]. The introduction and chapters four, eight, and ten are new material but are in regular type because in each case they constitute a full chapter. The excerpts weave together material from various parts of their respective books, and have been edited for clarity as well as for gender inclusiveness. I provide endnotes for new commentaries, while citations for excerpts can be found in the original work. In the use of Chinese words, I have changed the original Wade-Giles romanization to contemporary Pinyin.
Introduction: On the Ownership of Reality I have long been concerned with those who claim ownership of the minds of others. And also with those who come to offer their minds to such would-be owners through whatever combination of voluntary self-surrender and psychological and physical coercion. I've come to recognize that the mental predators are concerned not only with individual minds but with the ownership of reality itself. I've been able to study a number of such mental predators, whether as leaders of extremist political movements or fanatical religious cults, or as purveyors of self-generated or solipsistic reality, as is the case with Donald Trump. The general tendency among observers has been to identify two separate groups of mental predators. The first group is characterized by ideological totalism, an all-or-none set of ideas that claim nothing less than absolute truth and equally absolute virtue. A clear example here is Chinese Communist thought reform. The second group consists of what we generally call cults, which form sealed-off communities where reality can be dispensed and controlled. Ideological totalism suggests a system of ideas projected outward with the claim of providing solutions to all human problems. Cults, in contrast, turn inward as they follow a sacralized omniscient guru whose extreme version of reality dominates the minds of individual followers. I myself held to that dichotomy until I encountered much that called it into question. I came to realize that ideological totalism and cultlike behavior not only blend with each other but tend to be part of a single entity. I was jolted into that recognition by members of cults (such as the Unification Church) who embraced a particular chapter in my book on Chinese thought reform that described the psychological themes of ideological totalism. Beginning in the late 1970s[1], "Chapter 22" became a kind of underground documnt for many who were questioning or leaving cults because it seemed to express quite specifically what they had been subjected to in their own extremist environment. This strongly suggested that totalism and cultlike behavior are not separate entities but part of a common constellation. Thus, totalistic movements like the Maoist version of Communism can include powerful gurus like Mao himself as well as sealed-off communities; and cults like Aum Shinrikyō -- the fanatical Japanese group that released deadly sarin gas in Tokyo subways trains in 1995 -- can become notably totalistic and seek to impose their bizarre view of reality on the outside world. That is, totalistic movements are cultlike and cults are totalistic. In this book I will refer to that totalistic/cultlike constellation as cultist or cultism. For instance, Chinese Communist thought reform, in its many versions including its violent extension into the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, is a systematic effort at political purification of individual minds and a quintessential example of ideological totalism. But it also has included a deification of the person and words of Mao Zedong as not only a political but an all-enveloping guru. During the 1950s, and in the late 1960s, thought reform was applied everywhere in Chinese society as part of a vast inward turning in an attempt to form a purified national community of hundreds of millions of people. I was fortunate to encounter thought reform early in my work because it sensitized me to a particularly dangerous proclivity of the human mind for extremism, or what I now would call cultism. I have repeatedly encountered that proclivity in the destructive behavior I studied over the course of a lifetime of research. Aum Shinrikyō, with its religious fanaticism and closed, guru-dominated community bent on spiritual purification, is the quintessential version of a cult. Yet from its beginnings, Aum's actions and behavior were intensely totalistic, and over time the guru and his followers sought to impose the cult's bizarre communal reality onto the larger society. Thus, divergent groups can be closely related psychologically in their shared cultism, their combination of the totalistic and cultic. The excerpts in this book come from my earlier research and include work on Chinese Communist thought reform, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Aum Shinrikyō, the "eight deadly sins" of ideological totalism, the Nazi movement and the overall psychology of genocide, and Donald Trump and his followers. The destructiveness and violence described in these excerpts are fueled by intense cultism. A final excerpt on what I call the "protean self" and "proteanism" suggests an alternative to cultism. I will discuss some of the history of the word "cult" in a later chapter, but there is no doubt that in our time it has become pejorative. So much so that there has been a contemporary battle over terminology: "cult" versus "new religion." One can understand the insistence of many that, since "cult" is a derogatory term, the more neutral (though I would say, not entirely neutral) term "new religion" should be used instead. From as far back as the 1970s, I could hear the most articulate version of each position from two of my friends, each of whom I greatly respected. Harvey Cox, the venturesome[2] and creative theologian, had considerable sympathy for many of the groups, even to the point of trying out their methods of worship, and insisted that fair treatment required calling them "new religions." Margaret Singer, the talented psychologist[3] I'd also known for decades, wrote extensively about "cults" and their dangers. She had worked with hundreds of former cult members until her death in 2003, had become a leading figure in the anti-cult movement, and had to have special security arrangements at her home because of threats she had received from cultic fanatics. I have insisted upon retaining the word "cult" for groups that meet three criteria: first, a shift in worship from broad spiritual ideas to the person of a charismatic guru; second, the active pursuit of a thought reform-like process that frequently stresses some kind of merger with the guru; and third, extensive exploitation from above (by the guru and leading disciples) -- whether economic, sexual, or psychological -- of the idealism of ordinary followers from below. Apocalypticism In my work on cultism I have been struck by the significance of end-of-the-world visions[4], of apocalypse in the service of all-encompassing purification. That sense of apocalypse turns out to be present in extremist political movements no less than in extremist religious cults. Indeed, much of the fuel for the cultist engine is provided by a strong emotional commitment to apocalyptic world purification. At the forefront of such all-encompassing purification is a survivor remnant consisting mainly of members of the particular group, religious or political, making the apocalyptic claim. When Mao Zedong anticipated a nuclear war brought about by the "imperialists," the Maoist survivors would create a new civilization "thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves[5]." With Aum Shinrikyō, members' "mystical experiences" included images of the world ending and of a remnant of survivors consisting of the guru and a few followers. Aum also practiced a form of apocalyptic activism: of joining in the violence thought necessary to bring about an Armageddon that would usher in a purified world. That kind of "proactive" violence is always possible in a group strongly focused on a world-ending narrative. Recent cultist expressions are a modern phenomenon that makes use of very modern components. Aum Shinrikyō, for instance, directly connected its vision of Armageddon with a strategy of recruiting scientists to construct the weaponry necessary to help bring it about. The assumption was that science could be enlisted to carry out the group's ultimate spiritual project. Similarly, political movements such as fascism and communism call forth their cultism by mobilizing their elaborate state apparatus and making use of trained professionals. Jeffrey Herf, a historian[6] of the Nazi movement, has referred to the phenomenon of "reactionary modernism," by which he means the embrace of modern structures and techniques for conducting an anti-modern crusade. This could involve "great enthusiasm for modern technology and a rejection of the Enlightenment and the values and institutions of liberal democracy." With the Nazi movement, the scientific claim was so intense and hyperbolic that a Nazi doctor I interviewed told me how he joined the Party immediately after hearing one of its leaders declare: "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology." That ostensibly scientific claim was, at its root, an expression of deep Nazi cultism, of the most deadly form of biological mysticism ever brought into practice. There are striking parallels among the political purification of Chinese Communist thought reform, the spiritual purification of Aum Shinrikyō, and the biological purification of Nazi ideology and behavior. That biological purification, the essence of Nazi cultism, rendered the Nazis a genocidal regime. Genocide itself can be understood as the purification of the world by means of eliminating a racial, ethnic, or political contaminant. In Aum Shinrikyō, the central mission was that of overcoming universal "defilement," and since the guru alone was completely pure, followers could only purify themselves by merging with him or becoming his "clones." In this way the guru assumes the role of a tyrant who has to be, in effect, "the last man to remain alive[7]." Owning Reality That kind of purification is at the heart of the cultist phenomenon and is central to the quest for ownership of reality. As part of the imposed reality, the guru becomes the ultimate bastion against the evil of defilement, the central figure in the world-purifying apocalyptic narrative. That narrative is considered the only certainty in an otherwise unknowable future. That is, the guru becomes the sacred agent of a divine plan for all-encompassing purification. Moreover, a guru can also claim to be the incarnation of a mystified "people." Mao Zedong, for instance, found another source of purity in his evocation of the always-pure "Chinese People." Similarly, the Nazis embraced a related concept of _Volk_ that denoted not only the German people but their mystical essence. With the Nazis, the mysticism was biological: the sense of a great world mission to reclaim the purity of the Nordic race by eliminating racial threats to Nordic health and natural dominance. Mental predators preside over these matters as part of their claim to ownership of reality. But what is the reality they would own? Reality is a concept that, despite centuries of psychological and philosophical investigation, defies precise definition. This is largely because reality is inherently paradoxical. On the one hand, what we call reality can be largely constructed by dominant social and political beliefs, as held by influential groups and leaders -- the belief that democracy is the best political system, or that God exists or does not exist, or that human beings are weak and require dictatorial leadership. In any society such claims to reality can change and give way to competing and even contrary claims put forward by newly influential voices. Yet at the same time there are more immediate, factual components of reality, which in no way depend upon such theoretical constructions. For instance, my father's name was Harold Lifton, and I am a Jewish American psychiatrist preparing a book of excerpts and commentaries. Reality always contains these two contrasting dimensions -- the changeable/constructed reality that strongly influences our worldview, and the immediate/factual reality on which so much of our everyday lives depend. We consider a person to be psychotic when he or she "breaks" with immediate reality in the form of delusions, hallucinations, and extreme paranoia. And we require a shared sense of reality, consistent with experience and evidence, for our collective function in a democracy. But we have learned that immediate/factual reality can be ignored or contested by people who may not be psychotic but who do so as participants in a cultist narrative of owned reality. The Influence of Nuclear Weapons The development of nuclear weapons radically altered the apocalyptic discourse. Now, we humans could make use of our own technology to do what in the past only God could do -- destroy the world. This was the beginning of an era of human-caused technological apocalypticism. There has also been the fantasy that, since the weapons could do God's destructive work, they could also carry out his tasks of recreating the world and keeping it going. Here we enter the terrain of nuclearism[8]: the exaggerated embrace of and dependence upon nuclear weapons, whether for "national security," keeping the peace, or otherwise enhancing the human future. Nuclearism takes us to the worship of ultimate destructive power as a kind of deity. Various forms of nuclearism have been widespread among possessors of the weapons and those who aspire to such possession. The cultist mind is particularly sensitive to nuclear weapons and to the global destruction associated with them. Mao and Maoists were preoccupied with the weapons and expressed a wide variety of passionate concerns in relation to them: from the idea that all weapons, including atomic bombs, were insignificant in relation to the Thought of Mao Zedong, and that nuclear weapons were a "paper tiger"; to the celebration of the Chinese detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1967 with dancing in the streets and waving of little red books of quotations from Mao; to the apocalyptic fantasy of a Maoist remnant. Even as the bomb was negated by Mao's words, it became part of a secular apocalyptic vision of political purification. With Aum Shinrikyō, the nuclearism was more consistent. Its guru, Shōkō Asahara, was obsessed with Hiroshima and with the prominent apocalyptic influences of post-Hiroshima Japanese culture. He sought to make Aum itself a military power, by manufacturing chemical and biological weapons (which his cult produced, however crudely) and attempting to acquire nuclear weapons (in which Aum was fortunately unsuccessful). Both guru and disciples frequently invoked nuclear weapons in connection with the pervasive theme of the end of the world. They persistently spoke about Aum's great task of purifying the world following the nuclear devastation they anticipated. Participation in Armageddon-seeking military action was necessary for this highest of spiritual missions. As president, Donald Trump manifested his extreme solipsism -- his self-contained reality -- in the form of a literal threat of annihilation when he spoke of attacking North Kore with "fire and fury like the world has never seen."[9] As with everything else, Trump has been inconsistent and contradictory[10], declaring, after his meeting with Kim Jonh-un in 2018, that the nuclear threat between the two countries was over. In the past Trump has repeatedly spoken of resorting to the weapons in various circumstances, asking why we would make them if we don't plan to use them. Nuclearism in any form is dangerous, all the more so when combined with erratic, solipsistic views and confusing changes in attitude. More than that, nuclear weapons create a cultism of their own. From the beginning there has been a nuclear elite in charge of their construction, stockpiling, and potential use. This elite is often referred to as the "nuclear priesthood,"[11] which suggests that its members possess arcane knowledge and mystical authority over the rest of us. Significantly, a number of people have emerged from this priesthood late in life and revealed to the world many of its secrets. No longer "responsible" participants in draconian nuclear planning, they could now give expression to suppressed doubts and guilt concerning longstanding advocacy of potentially world-ending policies. We will also see that climate change has its cultism (chapter eight), much of it evolving around biblical accounts of apocalyptic weather events. There has emerged a cult of climate rejection resembling an actual flat-earth cult, and we are likely to encounter a great deal of additional cultism in connection with the extremity of the climate threat. Zealotry or Proteanism In this book, I look mainly at cultist behavior in groups and gurus claiming the ownership of reality. Groups led by gurus who claim omniscience can be particularly prone to cultist behavior. Where there is openness to the world on the part of a group, its leader may be more accurately termed a mentor. Mentors teach and guide and can provide followers with lasting truths without divesting them of their autonomy. But when a mentor creates a closed relationship with disciples that excludes all other truth -- that is, seeks to own reality -- he or she enters the realm of the omniscient guru. I have also been concerned with psychological alternatives to zealotry, and particularly with the mindset of proteanism. The protean self is characterized by openness, change, and new beginnings, and strongly resists ownership by others. While proteanism is most evident during periods of major social change, there is a sense in which it is inherent ot the human condition. It has a special connection to the historical experience of modernity and postmodernity. I will say more toward the end of this book about the emergence of the contemporary protean self and of our capcaity to resist attempts to own the human mind. Cultism -- like all totalism and fundamentalism -- is a reaction against the potential confusions of protean openness. In that sense cultism is reactionary not only in its constraints on the self but on its efforts to stop the flower of history. Expressions of collective proteanism, one of which Václav Havel called "living in truth,"[12] can be viewed as a return to the resilience of the self and its dynamic relationship to the historical process. 1: Beginning in the late 1970s: Personal communication from the psychologist Steven Hassan, now an authority on cults, who made use of "Chapter 22" in being "deprogrammed" in 1976 from his membership in the Unification Church. 2: Harvey Cox, the venturesome: Harvey Cox, _Turning East: The Promise and the Peril of the New Orientalism_ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977). 3: Margaret Singer, the talented psychologist: Margaret Thaler Singer, _Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight against Their Hidden Menace_ (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass [1995], 2003). 4: end-of-the-world visions: Robert Jay Lifton, "The image of 'The End of the World': A Psychohistorical View" in _Facing Apocalypse_, ed. Valerie Andrews, Robert Bosnak, and Karen Walter Goodwin (Dallas, Texas: Spring Publications, Inc., 1987). 5: "truly beautiful future for themselves": Stuart R. Schram, _Mao Tse-tung_ (London: Penguin [1963], 1967). 6: "Jeffrey Herf, a historian": Jeffery Herf, _Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 7: "the last man to remain alive": Elias Canetti, _Crowds and Power_ (New York: Viking, 1962). 8: nuclearism: Robert Jay Lifton, _The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life_ (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press [1979], 1996) 9: "fire and fury like the world has never seen": Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, "Trump Threatens 'Fire and Fury' against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.," _New York Times_, August 8, 2017. 10: Trump has been inconsistent and contradictory: See Michael Lewis, "Why the Scariest Nuclear Threat May Be Coming from inside the White House." _Vanity Fair_, July 26, 2017. 11: "nuclear priesthood": See Steven Lee Myers, "Nuclear Priesthood Gets a New Credo," _New York Times_, December 14, 1997. 12: "living in truth": See Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in _Living in Truth_ (London: Faber and Faber, 1987).
Part One Thought Reform and Cultism Part One Chapter 1 Chinese Communist Thought Reform _ Chinese thought reform was the subject of my first research study, in a sense my initiation into the realm of psychological history. I was fascinated by the process on two levels. The first was the individual experience of each Chinese or Western person I interviewed, which raised questions about the ways minds could be manipulated and altered and about distinctions between coercive and therapeutic approaches to individual change. These were questions at the heart of my profession. _ _ But I was equally impressed by the larger historical spectacle of hundreds of millions of Chinese people subjected to a vast compulsory movement of "re-education" -- universities, schools, special "revolutionary colleges," prisons, business and government offices, labor and peasant organizations, and neighborhood groups. What was the historical significance of such intense political "psychotherapy" applied to citizens of the largest society on earth? I came to recognize thought reform as a project of political purification on a scale never previously attempted anywhere. _ _ Indeed, I have come to view the thought reform process as a form of psychological apocalypticism, of bringing about the "death" of all ideas and ideologies prior to those of Mao Zedong and providing a "reformed" remnant (in this case a very large one) to preside over further Maoist purification -- of China, and perhaps of the world. I was studying not only individual change in worldview and identity but a grandiose and coercive effort at a historical "new beginning." _ _ In that way, thought reform had a cultist element of Chinese society turning inward on itself. From 1948 through the 1950s, several thought reform-driven national campaigns took place, such as the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, Three-Anti, Five-Anti, and Anti-Rightist campaigns. Of particular interest was the "Hundred Flowers Movement" ("Let the hundred flowers bloom[13], let the hundred schools of thought contend"), which encouraged intellectuals to speak frankly about their criticisms of the regime. But authorities were surprised by what they had let loose, and turned the event into a trap. Those who had spoken out critically were subjected to fierce condemnation, with their position in society newly imperiled. Those initial criticisms were significant: one professor, in his response, said, "I find the term _thought reform_ rather repulsive.... I am not aware that there is anything wrong with my thought." And another put it into language I use in this book: "I think a Party leading the nation is not the same as a Party owning the nation." Such critics made it clear that difficulties can occur for those who seek to "own" human minds or reality itself. _ _ Yet, in the mid-1950s, at the same time I was probing these matters in my Hong Kong research, American travelers to Hong Kong told me about McCarthyism back home and its own assault on minds and on reality. Senator Joseph McCarthy and those who followed or were influenced by him were making wild accusations of Communist association against public figures, teachers, and writers. Subscribing to the wrong magazine might result in being fired from one's job. _ _ That message, when combined with my everyday experience of thought reform's punitive distortions, gave me the sense that the whole world had gone mad, that there was a pandemic of assault on mind and reality. _ _ Thought reform, then, is an extreme version of ever-present human tendencies to contrast one's own purity with the impurity of all else; and on that basis to justify one's claim to the ownership of reality. _ Chinese Communist Thought Reform _First published in 1961_ When confronted with the endless discussion on the general subject of "brainwashing," I am sometimes reminded of the Zen Buddhist maxim: "The more we talk about it, the less we understand it." Behind this web of semantic (and more than semantic) confusion lies an image of "brainwashing" as an all-powerful, irresistible, unfathomable, and magical method of achieving total control over the human mind. It is of course none of these things, and this loose usage makes the word a rallying point for fear, resentment, urges toward submission, justification for failure, irresponsible accusation, and for a wide gamut of emotional extremism. One may justly conclude that the term has a far from precise and a questionable usefulness; one may even be tempted to forget about the whole subject. Yet to do so would be to overlook one of the major problems of our era -- the psychology and the ethics of directed attempts at changing human beings. For despite the vicissitudes of brainwashing, the process that gave rise to the name is very much a reality: the official Chinese Communist program of _sixiang gaizao_ (variously translated as "ideological remolding," "ideological reform," or as we shall refer to it here, "thought reform") has in fact emerged as one of the most powerful efforts at human manipulation ever undertaken. To be sure, such a program is by no means completely new: imposed dogmas, inquisitions, and mass conversion movements have existed in every country and during every historical epoch. But the Chinese Communists brought to theirs a more organized, comprehensive, and deliberate -- a more total -- character, as well as a unique blend of energetic and ingenious psychological techniques. When I began my study of Chinese Communist thought reform in the 1950s, the Western world had heard mostly about "thought reform" as applied in a military setting: the coerced bacteriological warfare confessions[14] and the collaboration obtained from American (and other United Nations) prisoners during the Korean War. However, these were merely export versions of a thought reform program aimed not primarily at Westerners, but at the Chinese people themselves, and vigorously applied in universities, schools, special "revolutionary collages," prisons, business and government offices, and labor and peasant organizations. Thought reform combined this impressively widespread distribution with a focused emotional power. Not only did it reach one-fourth of the people in the world, but it sought to bring about in everyone it touched a significant personal upheaval. Whatever its setting, thought reform consists of two basic elements: _confession_, the exposure and renunciation of past and present "evil"; and _re-education_, the remaking of a man in the Communist image. These elements are closely related and overlapping, since they both bring into play a series of pressures and appeals -- intellectual, emotional, and physical -- aimed at social control and individual change. When I arrived in Hong Kong in late January 1954, I soon found out that those who had undergone this experience fell into two broad groups: Western civilians reformed in prisons, and Chinese intellectuals who had undergone their reform in universities or in "revolutionary colleges." As I immersed myself in interviews with both groups, I was fascinated on two levels. The first was the nitty-gritty experience I studied with each Chinese or Western person I talked to, which led immediately to fundamental psychological questions about ways in which minds can be manipulated and changed, and about capacities to resist such manipulation. Also involved were important distinctions between coercive and therapeutic approaches to bringing about change. These questions are at the heart of my profession and have significance for the way we live in general. But there was another level to thought reform: its visionary or transcendent characteristic, the specter of hundreds of millions of Chinese people -- in their neighborhoods, schools, and places of work -- caught up in a compulsory movement of purification and renewal. What did it mean for such an extreme ethos to dominate an entire vast society? As I proceeded with the work, I realized that one of the main causes for confusion about thought reform lay in the complexity of the process itself. Some people considered it a relentless means of undermining the human personality; others saw it as a profoundly "moral" -- even religious -- attempt to instill new ethics into the Chinese people. Both of these views were partially correct, and yet each, insofar as it ignored the other, was greatly misleading. For it was the combination of external force or coercion with an appeal to the inner enthusiasm through evangelistic exhortation which gave thought reform its emotional scope and power. Coercion and breakdown were, of course, more prominent in the prisons, where brutal treatment that constituted torture was frequent, while exhortation and ethical appeal were especially stressed with the rest of the Chinese population; and it becomes extremely difficulty to determine just where exhortation ends and coercion begins. I could observe that thought reform was by no means a casual undertaking but rather a systematic and widespread program that penetrated deeply into people's psyches. I found it very important to consider what was behind thought reform, what impelled the Chinese Communists to carry out such extreme measures on such an extensive scale. The complexities of their motivations will be discussed later on; but it is necessary for us now -- before getting to the prison experiences of Westerners -- to know something about the Chinese Communist philosophy or rationale for their program. The leading Chinese political theorists, although reticent about technical details, have written extensively on general principles. Mao Zedong himself, in a well-known speech originally delivered to party members in 1942, laid down the basic principles of punishment and cure that are always quoted by later writers. To overcome undesirable and "unorthodox" trends, he specified that
two principles must be observed. The first is, "punish the past to warn the future" and the second, "save men by curing their diseases." Past errors must be exposed with no thought of personal feelings or face. We must use a scientific attitude to analyze and criticize what has been undesirable in the past ... this is the meaning of "punish the past to warn the future." But our object in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings is like that of a doctor in curing a disease.
The argument continues as follows: the "old society" in China (or any non-Communist society anywhere) was (and is) evil and corrupt; this is true because of the domination of the "exploiting classes" -- the landowners and capitalists and bourgeoisie; everyone has been exposed to this type of society and therefore retains from it "evil remnants" or "ideological poisons"; only thought reform can rid him of these and make him a "new man" in a "new society." And long philosophical treatises emphasize the need to bring the "ideology of all classes" into harmony with "objective material conditions" -- or in other words, to blend personal beliefs with Communist-implemented social realities. In prison environments, Western civilians (and their Chinese cellmates) encountered a special penal version of these principles:
All crimes have definite sociological roots. The evil ideology and evil habits left behind by the old society ... still remain in the minds of some people to a marked degree. Thus if we are to wipe all crimes from their roots, in addition to inflicting on the criminal the punishment due, we must also carry out various effective measures to transform the various evil ideological conceptions in the minds of the people so that they may be educated and reformed into new people.
Penal institutions were referred to as "re-education centers," "meditation houses," or even "hospitals for ideological reform." Westerners spent most of their time -- one to five years of imprisonment -- essentially devoted to "solving their cases"; and they were not tried or sentenced until just before their release. The large-scale policy of "reform through labor" -- the use of prisoners in labor battalions -- was mostly reserved for the Chinese themselves. In the penal institutions it was made clear that the "reactionary spy" who entered the prison must perish, and that in his place must arise a "new man," resurrected in the Communist mold. The environment did not permit any sidestepping: the prisoners were forced to participate, drawn into the forces around them until they themselves began to feel the need to confess and to reform. In all of this it is most important to realize that what might be seen as a set of coercive maneuvers, the Chinese Communists viewed as a morally uplifting, harmonizing, and scientifically therapeutic experience. This penetration by the psychological forces of the environment into the inner emotions of the individual person is perhaps the outstanding psychiatric fact of thought reform. The milieu brings to bear upon the prisoner a series of overwhelming pressures, at the same time allowing only a very limited set of alternatives for adapting to them. In the interplay between person and environment, a sequence of steps or operations -- of combinations of manipulation and response -- takes place. All of these steps revolved around two policies and two demands: the fluctuation between assault and leniency, and the requirements of confession and re-education. [left off page 29] [this is as far as i got before the next book started, which is “opening our minds” by jon atack. 2023-08-28] 13: "Let the hundred flowers bloom": See the pamphlets "Contradiction" and "The Storm" (China Viewpoints: Hong Kong, 1958); Benjamin Schwartz, "New Trends in Maoism," _Problems of Communism_ 6 (1957):1-8. 14: the coerced bacteriological warfare confessions: A later study argued that America actually engaged in experimental biological warfare. Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, _The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea_ (Bloomington and Indianapolis Indiana University Press, 1998).
participants (1)
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Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many