On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 21:48:45 +0000 Peter Fairbrother wrote:

The Tor rationale for requiring low latency was to make it more user-friendly and also thereby increase (innocent) traffic. Unfortunately that came at the cost of easier traffic analysis, as only the traffic passed within the last 4-5 seconds need be considered. They tried to balance that out - more traffic plus greater usability vs easier analysis - and came up with a system which had some perhaps-useful properties.

I don't think they balanced anything. The connections go as fast as possible - there's no reclocking of packets, no mixing, no nothing.

I don't know whether Paul would have worked on a public system which was impervious to NSA and USN - but the question never arose.

well, they worked on mixing networks for email. There are tons of 'papers' on that. But I guess they never set up/promoted a 'high latency' public network. So arguably syverson at least 'worked' on the theory of a system that could resist attacks from his accomplices (nsa).

Tor would be good enough to defeat third-world governments, which was both his and Tor's stated goal,

stated where?

and Tor could never defeat The Man.

openly acknowledges it...in papers that no-one reads, while advertising tor as a means to

...

"Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis."

Is that a quote from Paul?

that's the slogan that appeared on tor's site for 10 years maybe? They changed it some months ago though. 2007 http://web.archive.org/web/20071011223019/http://www.torproject.org:80/ "Tor aims to defend against traffic analysis, " 2008 http://web.archive.org/web/20081231081100/http://www.torproject.org:80/ "Tor is a software project that helps you defend against traffic analysis" 2011 http://web.archive.org/web/20110101111624/http://www.torproject.org:80/ "Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis." 2018 http://web.archive.org/web/20181231204724/https://www.torproject.org/ "Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis." etc

It doesn't sound like the chap I knew. Who wasn't a scum-master, except perhaps to the swabbies?

Heck, Roger and Nick were wanna-be-heroes.

Peter Fairbrother

On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 15:39:55 -0700 Mirimir wrote:

The villains here are writers of the Tor Project website. They bullshit users, overselling Tor. Why, I don't know. Maybe it's all a honeypot. Or maybe they're just idiots.

Notice that they get paid as long as tor exists. So even if tor was not a honeypot, and they are not idiots, they still have a fundamental incentive to oversell it. Their paychecks. Also, syverson and co. are complicit in overselling tor, despite the fact that their papers for the 'technical intelligentsia' spell out the limitations.

I've wondered whether it's just that they need lots of users for cover traffic. That _was_ a major factor in opening Tor to the public, instead of restricting it to government users. But that seems unlikely, now, given that the NSA etc could easily run enough bots on hacked servers.

My guess is that the main reason for them to get as many users as they can is to justify funding. Hell, maybe they even get a percentage of funding directly proportional to number of users/network size.

Critique of Tor applies equally, perhaps moreso, to the whole Internet for monetization, technology, personnel, administration, operation, funding, seducing the public, NGOs, dissent. So too, to crypto, anonymization, cypherpunks. Perennial question is how to sort through the tsunami of claims and counterclaims, sponsored hacks, slyly appealing "free" SM, search engines, FOIA enterprises, Wayback and Wikipedia, paid and volunteer informants and agents, hot shit mail lists and get-it-now podcasts, star-studded conferences and outlaw-celebrity lectures, incarcerated Julians and Jeremys, fans and evermore fans of unexamined underwriters. Has there ever been more people eagerly declaring in public their likes and hatreds, convictions and doubts, hoping to gain advantage over other people by pretense and deception. Actually, yes, there has been since talking, singing, dancing, education, civilization was invented to entrap prey. Prey quickly learned from predators to reverse the panopticon. Usually by offering their gullible, edible kids, cohorts and mates as irresistable bait to fatten the enemy into overconfidence, sloth, braggrdy, imagined supremacy. Tor, like Trump, is hardly novel in this suicidalism, nor the crusading, diabolical internet of everything data. At 06:39 PM 11/23/2019, you wrote:

On 11/23/2019 04:23 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

...

On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 15:39:55 -0700 Mirimir wrote:

...

The villains here are writers of the Tor Project website. They bullshit users, overselling Tor. Why, I don't know. Maybe it's all a honeypot. Or maybe they're just idiots.

Notice that they get paid as long as tor exists. So even if tor was not a honeypot, and they are not idiots, they still have a fundamental incentive to oversell it. Their paychecks.

Yeah, good point.

After those FOIA documents came out, I lost all respect for the Tor Project. I get how conflicted they were. Needing government support. Keeping the cops happy. Maybe having their jobs threatened. But selling out is selling out, no matter how many excuses one has.

...

Also, syverson and co. are complicit in overselling tor,

despite the fact that their papers for the 'technical intelligentsia' spell out the limitations.

Agreed.

...

...

I've wondered whether it's just that they need lots of users for cover traffic. That _was_ a major factor in opening Tor to the public, instead of restricting it to government users. But that seems unlikely, now, given that the NSA etc could easily run enough bots on hacked servers.

My guess is that the main reason for them to get as many users as they can is to justify funding. Hell, maybe they even get a percentage of funding directly proportional to number of users/network size.

Makes sense.

On Sun, Nov 24, 2019 at 03:25:03PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:

On 11/24/2019 04:00 AM, John Young wrote:

...

Critique of Tor applies equally, perhaps moreso, to the whole Internet for monetization, technology, personnel, administration, operation, funding, seducing the public, NGOs, dissent. So too, to crypto, anonymization, cypherpunks.

Perennial question is how to sort through the tsunami of claims and counterclaims, sponsored hacks, slyly appealing "free" SM, search engines, FOIA enterprises, Wayback and Wikipedia, paid and volunteer informants and agents, hot shit mail lists and get-it-now podcasts, star-studded conferences and outlaw-celebrity lectures, incarcerated Julians and Jeremys, fans and evermore fans of unexamined underwriters.

Has there ever been more people eagerly declaring in public their likes and hatreds, convictions and doubts, hoping to gain advantage over other people by pretense and deception. Actually, yes, there has been since talking, singing, dancing, education, civilization was invented to entrap prey.

Prey quickly learned from predators to reverse the panopticon. Usually by offering their gullible, edible kids, cohorts and mates as irresistable bait to fatten the enemy into overconfidence, sloth, braggrdy, imagined supremacy. Tor, like Trump, is hardly novel in this suicidalism, nor the crusading, diabolical internet of everything data.

For sure.

Figuring out who/what one can trust is arguably impossible. Or at least, it's far too unreliable.

Bottom line, I think, it's foolish to trust anyone/anything.

So the challenge is prudently using whatever resources are available.

Trusting no one - a life in effective if not physical, isolation. Those granite walls admitting as their entry price no tests of loyalty, yet "protecting" from betrayal, may leave barren the heart, a dry, lifeless, stony courtyard of certainty. "The baffled king, composing Hellelujah.." Technology is no succour for the Soul. Our messy and oh so human journey of discovery discloses fragility, insecurity, and leaps of faith sometimes crushed under a steamroller, at others elevated to the heavens in moments one might live this whole life again just for a fleeting repeat Our tapestry is woven not only of those pre ordained molecular interactions, the nurture of our parents, schooling and acquaintances, but also of those choices and actions wrought from our individual suffering, yet lying within the bounds of our capacity to express that freedom which is our birth right, brought forth by will and bearing the fruit of each consequence. Would you have your life a crystalline never changing ever unshakable certainty of known dominoes? Go well fellow travellers, and may we each find that which Soul seeks for us and for those we love,

...

At 06:39 PM 11/23/2019, you [Mirimir] wrote:

...

On 11/23/2019 04:23 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

...

On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 15:39:55 -0700 Mirimir wrote:

...

The villains here are writers of the Tor Project website. They

bullshit

...

users, overselling Tor. Why, I don't know. Maybe it's all a honeypot. Or maybe they're just idiots.

       Notice that they get paid as long as tor exists. So even if tor was not a honeypot, and they are not idiots, they still have a fundamental incentive to oversell it. Their paychecks.

Yeah, good point.

After those FOIA documents came out, I lost all respect for the Tor Project. I get how conflicted they were. Needing government support. Keeping the cops happy. Maybe having their jobs threatened. But selling out is selling out, no matter how many excuses one has.

...

       Also, syverson and co. are complicit in overselling tor, despite the fact that their papers for the 'technical intelligentsia' spell out the limitations.

Agreed.

...

...

I've wondered whether it's just that they need lots of users for cover traffic. That _was_ a major factor in opening Tor to the public, instead of restricting it to government users. But that seems unlikely, now, given that the NSA etc could easily run enough bots on hacked servers.

       My guess is that the main reason for them to get as many users as they can is to justify funding. Hell, maybe they even get a percentage of funding directly proportional to number of users/network size.

Makes sense.

On Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:58:09 +0000 Peter Fairbrother wrote:

On 23/11/2019 23:23, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

...

My guess is that the main reason for them to get as many users as they can is to justify funding.

Initially the main reason was to increase traffic, in order to make traffic analysis harder. Really.

Obviously if only a bunch of child murderers from the english military and the US military (tor's intended audience) use tor, then tor would be kinda pointless. That's why they want civilian users, to be used as human shields. But even syverson and co. state that beyond a certain point more users don't improve 'anonimity'. So I fully stand by what I said. It's obvious that the current hysterical focus on more users without any regard to the system's quality is just self-serving, self-interest. They are just a cancer, grabbing as much resources as they can. Also, another important function of tor is to spread war propaganda in countries that the anglo-american nazis want to invade and destroy. Again, that means the tor mafia is not really interested in protecting any kind of 'anonimity', only in breaking the firewalls around iran, china and the like.

I was around when the idea was first being discussed - Roger, Lucky, Paul (in a smaller role than often stated), Len, Nick, a few others - Matt dropped in occasionally, Ian and Caspar gave their 2c worth. For some reason George and Andrei (mixmaster/mixminion math gurus) weren't much involved.

Justifying funding is just a nice side-effect.

It's more than a side-effect.

On 25/11/2019 11:03, grarpamp wrote:

...

...

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it.

I thought I wrote that quite carefully, but perhaps I should rephrase it: "Any practical likely-to-be-successful low-latency web onion router cannot defeat The Man."

While a proof of that is not available, I do not know how to do it - do you? Please tell.

That was certainly the general conclusion of the crypto privacy/anonymity community at the time TOR was developed.

No, that's just the self-serving conclusion of the US-military-tor-mafia.

My conclusion also, and I haven't seen anything since to make me change my mind.

So the inference here is that you have some sort of connection to the american-english nazi military. /usual tor propaganda trimmed.

It should be noted that NSA do not say they can break TOR in practice, and afaik there is no evidence that they have.

WOW. HILARIOUS. Are you fucking reading this thread or what. I quoted your pal syverson explicitly stating that tor is broken.

In all the "Dark Web" busts I have read about there has been no evidence presented as part of a general break in TOR. Maybe they can't (or just don't) break it.

You're trolling, right?

Of course, if they have broken TOR that is optimal for NSA - don't tell anyone it is broken, so people keep using it. Remember Coventry/Enigma (which never happened, but it is a good story).

Never Say Anything.

Peter Fairbrother

On 11/25/2019 08:07 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

On Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:58:09 +0000 Peter Fairbrother wrote:

...

It should be noted that NSA do not say they can break TOR in practice, and afaik there is no evidence that they have.

yeah, the NSA can't break tor but some random university can

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d7yp5a/carnegie-mellon-university-attacke...

That bug was patched. But there obviously could be others. And the NSA does tend to stockpile 0days. Also, one wonders how long the NSA etc had used the bug that CMU exploited.

On 11/25/2019 09:45 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 20:56:09 -0700 Mirimir wrote:

...

On 11/25/2019 08:07 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

...

On Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:58:09 +0000 Peter Fairbrother wrote:

...

It should be noted that NSA do not say they can break TOR in practice, and afaik there is no evidence that they have.

yeah, the NSA can't break tor but some random university can

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d7yp5a/carnegie-mellon-university-attacke...

That bug was patched. But there obviously could be others. And the NSA does tend to stockpile 0days.

Also, one wonders how long the NSA etc had used the bug that CMU exploited.

here, yet another attack

https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/circuit-fingerprinting2015.pdf Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services

and the introduction to that article states

"over the past few years, hidden services have witnessed various active attacks in the wild [12, 28], resulting in several takedowns [28]"

but hey, the nsa can't break tor..

That's why it's prudent for users and onion sites to hit Tor via nested VPN chains.

On Sat, December 14, 2019 2:36 am, grarpamp wrote:

...

...

...

snowden also said that the NSA can't break tor. Such blanket context is unlikely.

[.....]

Also unfortunate that, today, one of the few places still propagating such blankets, in reverse via false advertising, downplaying, failing to mention, etc... is the Tor project itself, not least where is on its very own front page.

Snowden smells like a CIA limited hangout operation. Quid pro quo between CIA and FSB/GRU ... it works like this: Obama the MI56 cutout, promote animus toward defecting poster-child. You host him as pin-up whistleblower hero, Vladimir, because in your country everyone knows not to ask too many questions. Then when moles and snitches in USA and Russia contact Snowden's "trusted resources" to spill beans, we quickly identify and silence them. Obama was a clear intelligence asset from early on. The intel community knows no national boundaries. They are ever a renegade state within the states with no national loyalties. Any pretense to national loyalty or patriotism is kabuki theatre for the peons and soldiers. Snowden also looks like one of the Greenberg brothers. Nikopol

I think the most common tech term is "depreciation". Tor should be o marked on their boot page but that assumes there is a practical replacement. On Sat, Dec 14, 2019, 2:38 AM grarpamp wrote:

...

...

...

snowden also said that the NSA can't break tor. Such blanket context is unlikely. was

Also unfortunate that, today, one of the few places still propagating such blankets, in reverse via false advertising, downplaying, failing to mention, etc... is the Tor project itself, not least where is on its very own front page.

Attacks on today's overlays may not be exactly cheap fast easy or wholesale, but they do exist and are in use.

There is no project today that should not at least be putting a link to such warnings and docs... on the front page, download page, in the app, etc.

And no reason that when designs and efforts thought to make existing attacks a significant factor harder... upon their startup 10, 15, 20 years ago at that time... whose fundamental underlying technology is now matured to point of diminishing returns on investment against continuously advancing attacks... should not be marked and understood as such by the entire overlay community, so that new fundamental treatise are naturally encouraged.

HI MIRIMIR -------- Original Message -------- On Nov 25, 2019, 7:56 PM, Mirimir wrote:

On 11/25/2019 08:07 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

...

On Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:58:09 +0000 Peter Fairbrother wrote:

...

It should be noted that NSA do not say they can break TOR in practice, and afaik there is no evidence that they have.

yeah, the NSA can't break tor but some random university can

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d7yp5a/carnegie-mellon-university-attacke...

That bug was patched. But there obviously could be others. And the NSA does tend to stockpile 0days.

Also, one wonders how long the NSA etc had used the bug that CMU exploited.

Low latency means that only a few seconds of traffic need be considered. Web means that users have lots of traffic repeats in time-defined patterns. These make traffic analysis resistance hard.

Without constant fill upon which they ride hiding within that... yes of course there's little resistance there. Yes, "seconds of traffic" refers to the global buffer space and time required for *PA find a solution within it. That seems to become much harder when, instead of watching discrete mouse clicks propagate around pulsing bumps in TCP like a rat through a snake, your vampire buffer is filled with normalized cell traffic.

Adding dummy cover traffic does not help until you use impractical levels of cover traffic ... better to spend limited spare traffic resources on padding

Adding fill is different from yielding existing background of fill on demand of wheat for carriage.

does not help until you use impractical levels of cover traffic

This is steeped in "OMG won't someone think of the bandwidth", they assume nodes don't manage their own ability to keep their CPU and pipe to ISP above water, that an intelligent and well configured net is not possible whether automatically or manually, that nodes can't contract links among themselves to ensure processing headroom, that it's just balls to the wall until it congests itself into packet loss and the whole thing melts down. When trying to design new things, coming at it with OMG oldtalk tends to limit those areas from being freshly explored anew.

padding to make files the same size

That assumes trying to build yet another network arbitrarily restricting itself to file transfer application. Instead of first trying to create a general purpose transport network that will serve many applications.

Dithering timing doesn't really help much against The Man's computing resources, at least until you get to something that is not low latency.

Dithering, reclocking, jitter... on every link regardless of designed latency... may serve to help reduce or eliminate ability to follow a packeting problem observed or injected upon one link... from being repeatered node to node across the net to the other side. It's finer grained complement to the overall background fill that masks out bigger problems and observables.

It should be noted that NSA do not say they can break TOR in practice

Yes they do, it is the very subject of this thread, search the net... pdf was think and process dating pre 2007... while Tor's design didn't change since then, it's without question that NSA's did to the tune of $Billions... people are utterly fucktarded if they don't think NSA and the rest can point-click that shit 12 years later in 2019... "don't tell anyone it is broken, so people keep using it"... https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/tor-stinks-presentation...

In all the "Dark Web" busts I have read about there has been no evidence presented as part of a general break in TOR. Maybe they can't (or just don't) break it.

Parallel construction is well known available tactic to preserve valuable tools and clean up faulty evidence and illegal practice. So is sharing tips out to other entities. It's TOP SECRET so don't expect to see it on it's face. Though I definitely remember a leaked slide deck where a form of PC tipping was indicated as being used in drug cases. Someone else will have to link to that one.

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

Crackheaded visions are hard to articulate, but here are some nodes, more or less randomly pathed through as needed by the communicating endpoints... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGfr-KgWiiQ amongst which bucket brigades are constantly carrying things (though the brigade should probably span each link entirely, such that no segment of track is left entirely unoccupied between nodes)... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qDXcQcj1fc capacities vary and can integrate, switch in/out/on/off, and route around problem track as needed and to enforce negotiated contracts and expectations... https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sdh+atm

On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 05:46:32 -0500 grarpamp wrote:

...

FOIA documents came out

?

...

villians

Various things people have mentioned, conspiracy or not, that people can decide...

People don't get to decide about facts.

...

Is that a quote from X... advertising tor as a means to "Defend yourself against network surveillance and traffic analysis."

Posted that problem on tor-talk some times over years,

You mean you did? I think I pointed out their 'little problem' before you did. Furthermore, I think you were a vocal tor apologist when I started commenting on what kind of piece of shit tor and its authors are.

last was probably in the thread announcing new webdesign. Worse, the original version of the sentence many years before was not as blanket superlative and or with some disclaimer... that was removed. After which the problem sentence above has remained through today. See post there, or simply see Wayback, for some of its history.

I'm not fully following. I just posted the history, you trimmed it, and now are telling people to look at it...? "See post there" which post exactly?

...

maybe they're just

Appears more than a few have spent Tor time distracted mushing their brains in drunk sex orgies, revolving circles of sordid relations,

...do you have any objection to drunk sex orgies? Apart from the fact that in this case they were funded by taxpayers.

on SJW and other hysterics, figuring out and inventing new pronouns, sorting all that, etc. Origins of all those would be research project itself.

that's the feminazi takeover of society that started a few years ago. It's just another facet of the pentagon's PSYOP wars. It's no surprise that technocratic fascist scum from silicon valley (ayn rand's 'heroes') fully subscribe to it.

On 11/25/2019 03:46 AM, grarpamp wrote:

...

FOIA documents came out

?

https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/fact-checking-the-tor-projects-governmen... https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4379303-Bbg-Tor-Emails-Stack-21.html <snip>

https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/fact-checking-the-tor-projects-governmen... https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4379303-Bbg-Tor-Emails-Stack-21.html https://www.documentcloud.org/public/search/Account:%2019359-yasha-levine

https://www.documentcloud.org/public/search/projectid:37206-The-Tor-Files-Tr... Thx. Someone should mirror that whole series of articles and dataset. Here's one copy of the book... Surveillance Valley - Yasha Levine infohash:6440FAC0D1D9D8EBE3FF24B084B58551CF5BC3B5

I'm convinced there are too many security issues for high privacy communication over networks that eventually utilize or terminate on commercial facilities. Only specially designed, ptp, wireless comms using OTP or other trusted keying, combined with appropriate tradecraft are likely to be effective against nation state resources. Recall WW IIs wireless warriors. On Mon, Nov 25, 2019, 11:04 AM grarpamp wrote:

...

by 'low latency' they mean two things :

1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e. whether

chaff is

...

sent(expensive) or not.

Chaff might be really only "expensive" if 1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan, or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks. 2) Bandwidth, if chaff does not get out of the way upon demand by wheat for carriage. 3) Footshoot, user attempted to feed a higher committed rate to their CPU or internet than either can handle.

...

2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks, packets

need to

...

be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher 'latency'.

While reclocking is likely necessary part of TA defence, many CPUs and NICs can handle line rate processing, and the committed rate to an overlay network can be set below both the physical link speed, and the rate bought from the ISP within which the overlay rides. User or overlay can create its own processing headroom by choosing a lesser rate. Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets and gaps between them might be simply normalized. randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum. Sure maybe due to variety of hardware making up an actual overlay network and users paths in it, and other processing demands, latency may be higher than non chaff network, but maybe not by enough to actually preclude use of low latency apps such as voice chat, IRC, etc.

...

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it.

On Mon, Nov 25, 2019 at 07:11:48PM +0000, jim bell wrote:

I can think of what might be a disproof of this:   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem     

...

...

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

...

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it. A message (or a dummy) could be automatically sent to a large number ("N") recipients, who are instructed to return an answer (or a dummy) within a random or pseudorandom time less than a specific value.  This system would still be "low latency", although perhaps not particularly efficient. Also, as for: Chaff might be really only "expensive" if 1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan, Some internet services (1 gbit/second Centurylink) are already unlimited-data, or at least the limit (1 terabyte/month?) is sufficiently high so that it is irrelevant.  The latter is about 386,000 bytes per second.  

~400KiB/s is fine for many uses. Some will still want to work outside this envelope - say 4MiB/s for a day, then 10KiB/s for the rest of the month. And in this case any "interesting" bulk data up/download must of course have occurred within that 1 day window, so the privacy/ hiding characteristics of this link set up may not be overly useful "in certain circumstances", but it is counter productive to not facilitate whatever connection modes users might ultimately find useful and/ or in their interest to use. (I hope I'm just stating the obvious here.)

             Jim Bell

On Monday, November 25, 2019, 09:52:44 AM PST, Steven Schear wrote:

I'm convinced there are too many security issues for high privacy communication over networks that eventually utilize or terminate on commercial facilities. Only specially designed, ptp, wireless comms using OTP or other trusted keying, combined with appropriate tradecraft are likely to be effective against nation state resources. Recall WW IIs wireless warriors.  On Mon, Nov 25, 2019, 11:04 AM grarpamp wrote:

...

       by 'low latency' they mean two things :

       1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e. whether chaff is sent(expensive)  or not.

Chaff might be really only "expensive" if 1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,

or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks. 2) Bandwidth, if chaff does not get out of the way upon demand by wheat for carriage. 3) Footshoot, user attempted to feed a higher committed rate to their CPU or internet than either can handle.

...

       2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks, packets need to be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher 'latency'.

While reclocking is likely necessary part of TA defence, many CPUs and NICs can handle line rate processing, and the committed rate to an overlay network can be set below both the physical link speed, and the rate bought from the ISP within which the overlay rides. User or overlay can create its own processing headroom by choosing a lesser rate. Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets and gaps between them might be simply normalized. randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum. Sure maybe due to variety of hardware making up an actual overlay network and users paths in it, and other processing demands, latency may be higher than non chaff network, but maybe not by enough to actually preclude use of low latency apps such as voice chat, IRC, etc.

...

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it.

On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 06:03:38 -0500 grarpamp wrote:

...

by 'low latency' they mean two things :

1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e. whether chaff is sent(expensive) or not.

Chaff might be really only "expensive" if 1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,

except, unmetered plans are a scam. And that's the whole point. I think it's safe to assume that 'backbones' can't carry chaff traffic. If a substantial number of ppl tried to use their 'unmetered' plans to transmit chaff the nsa-network would grind to a halt.

or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks.

...yeah chaff wouldn't be a problem in a network with no backbones. Too bad such mesh network doesn't exist.

...

2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks, packets need to be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher 'latency'.

Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets and gaps between them might be simply normalized. randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum.

the only way to do that is by introducing more delay. Which is fine as far I'm concerned. Because the biggest problem is fucktards who want to download 100mbs in 2 seconds with no 'latency'. Such assholes need re-education.

...

any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it.

That's not what I quoted from scum-master syverson. As to how much 'latency' would a better system introduce, that's an 'open question'. Also, I forgot to mention the obvious fact that using 3 chained proxies aka 'onion routing' instead of a direct connection generates an amount of 'latency' that can't be avoided.

On Mon, Nov 25, 2019 at 03:27:30PM -0300, Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote:

On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 06:03:38 -0500 grarpamp wrote:

...

...

by 'low latency' they mean two things :

1) 'efficient' use of data transmission capacity, i.e. whether chaff is sent(expensive) or not.

Chaff might be really only "expensive" if 1) Monetary, user chose to pay for it under metered plan,

except, unmetered plans are a scam. And that's the whole point. I think it's safe to assume that 'backbones' can't carry chaff traffic. If a substantial number of ppl tried to use their 'unmetered' plans to transmit chaff the nsa-network would grind to a halt.

This sounds correct to a degree. "At purchased capacity, for 'unmetered' plans." In other words under utilized long-duration chaff filled links, ought be incentivized against. This is natural for a friend to friend link - I know my friend by name/nick, and holler at him if his usage pattern is causing me to burn significant chaff which he simply does not use. Remember, we're attempting to create at least somewhat of a switch based overlay net - so the primary connection is a link between 2 peer nodes A and B. Of course, onion routing is onion routing, and so the p2p node link is just a first hop - a 2nd hop must onion across B, e.g. A B C, but now C receives packets "from B" which are really from A, and C is still going to get annoyed if the B C link is "significantly" under utilized. (In practice of course "get annoyed" is a misnomer - only tech folks even bother to look at e.g. wheat/chaff utilization stats, and so the incentivization algos must be (as far as possible) built into link bandwidth management, i.e., automatically shape up and down as needed yet according to "user specified + random" hysteresis conf. May still have a "You might want to get annoyed at peer X" dialog too :) )

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or refuses to buildout free p2p, guerilla, mesh networks.

...yeah chaff wouldn't be a problem in a network with no backbones. Too bad such mesh network doesn't exist.

Steve Schear - perhaps you are inclined to include some links and possibly a write up, into text files in the iqnets/doc/ dir (or new git proj if you think that's better)? Some of us see an alt phys net as foundational to our goals here ... and to this end intend iqnets to use and facilitate such links at core protocol... permanent ("stable" "backhaul") dark links, as well as ephemeral temporary e.g. mobile phone ad hoc wireless meshe links. Steve, in these early (design, info gathering) days, a big part of our work is scouring the webs for possibly useful info and dumping such into a links file (e.g. urls-alt-phys-net.txt), and, as inspiration grabs you, write up that which needs to be written up.

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2) actual low latency. In order to prevent timing attacks, packets need to be reclocked, which means adding delay, which results in higher 'latency'.

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Also, depending on nature of input, reclocking may not necessarily imply additional average delay, as packets and gaps between them might be simply normalized. randomized and or distributed within the same overall sum.

the only way to do that is by introducing more delay. Which is fine as far I'm concerned. Because the biggest problem is fucktards who want to download 100mbs in 2 seconds with no 'latency'. Such assholes need re-education.

It's not a binary - any type of link that two peer nodes agree to establish, within the bounds of their config, is just fine. Depending on my utilitization of a link to a peer, I may then hand out portions of that link for T time period etc...

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any low-latency web onion router - could not defeat The Man

This seems yet to be lacking proof and perhaps cannot actually be said without it.

That's not what I quoted from scum-master syverson. As to how much 'latency' would a better system introduce, that's an 'open question'.

You and grarpamp appear to be saying the same thing...

Also, I forgot to mention the obvious fact that using 3 chained proxies aka 'onion routing' instead of a direct connection generates an amount of 'latency' that can't be avoided.

Yes, every extra hop is extra inherent latency. The only challenge I've seen to that is certain fibre optic repeater kit which simply aplifies and repeats an incoming signal - due to their funky excitation block, which is analog, there is either actually no introduced latency, or it's so small as to be not measurable or something... been a while since I read about that.

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Friday, November 29, 2019 8:25 PM, grarpamp wrote:

https://medium.com/@virgilgr/tors-branding-pivot-is-going-to-get-someone-kil... ... 1. Theory for the Pivot

In discussing this post, one of my colleagues opined that, from a management perspective, the pivot towards human rights is actually great for fundraising in the West. With modern Tor Project placing getting off defense-industrial funding at top priority, new funding must come in.

lesser of two evils? funding frustration rears its head again.

2. Keep using Tor? Yes please.

uh oh, this is contentious in cypherpunks land... ;) best regards,

On Mon, Dec 02, 2019 at 07:01:55PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:

http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/categories/19-Tor

That article links to another article which some may find much more interesting (same author apparently): https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/789-Cyber-Goat.html (Don't worry, that's not goatse!)

Tor vs VPN podcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qE4J-7Iwzc https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjr2bPAyPV7t35MvcgT3W8Q/videos