"the ability of the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present"
see also: http://www.reddit.com/user/ellsbergd from thread: http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1vahsi/i_am_pentagon_papers_leaker_dan... --- PulvisEtUmbraSumus When did you first become aware that there had been an attempt to seize your medical files from Lewis Fielding's office, and what was your reaction to the administration going that far? In general, how aware were you of surveillance and character assassination attempts against your person, such as the attempts to tie you to communist groups in Minnesota as per this conversation between Nixon and John Mitchell? --- ellsbergd WOW! That link is absolutely fascinating! (Even though I don't have the time just now to go through it in detail, as I will shortly). Thank you for the link! I have to ask, where is it from, where did you get it (on the White House transcripts)? Well, in answer to your question, I just became aware of some surveillance on me (BEFORE the Pentagon papers came out) ten minutes ago, from your link. I was being surveilled because I was a witness in a criminal trial of draft resisters, some of the Minnesota Eight. Their very good lawyer has been accused, I don't know on what basis, of having been a Communist. And that allegation was not of particular significance to the DOJ UNTIL, months later, he was associated with me, after the Papers came out. Likewise, the president is heard discussing with Haldeman on these transcripts the need to go back over earlier (illegal, warrantless) wiretaps--of journalists and White House officials, on which I was overheard--to see what might look significant now, in light of the release of the Pentagon Papers. That's what I've been talking about in earlier answers: the ability of the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present. (See their interest in the allegation that the wife of one journalist may have been accused of shoplifting in her past). So people who have "nothing to hide" should ask themselves if that is equally true of their spouses or children, or neighbors, who could possibly be turned into informants by threat of their private lives being revealed. (The Cuban CIA assets who burglarized my psychoanalyst's office were interested in my children and wife as much as me, a reporter who interviewed them was told; they had been told of the precedent of Alger Hiss' step-son who was crucially deterred, at Hiss' insistence, from testifying in his defense at his trial on a crucial point, because he would have been questioned about his alleged homosexuality). My analyst later apologized to me for not telling me about the break-in--which he was sure was aimed at me, by the White House--because his lawyer had advised him not to "get involved." So I didn't know about it until it came out in my courtroom, thanks to John Dean's revelation. All for the best. If he had told me and we had raised it in the court-room, the plumbers would not have been kept on the White House payroll (via CREEP) and would not have been ordered into the Watergate. Nixon would have stayed in office, and the war would have continued for years.
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
... That's what I've been talking about in earlier answers: the ability of the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present.
i noticed in the new sigint memo there were a few justifications for bulk collection: """ In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; [ED: WTF???] (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section. """ half of these could be argued law enforcement domain; why is the power of the IC applied to potential crimes of "cybersecurity threat", "transnational criminal threats", and "illicit finance"? this is looking less like reigning in and more like white wash with retroactive indemnification... 0. "PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-28 : Signals Intelligence Activities" http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006318/2014sigint-mem-ppd-rel.pdf
On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 9:14 AM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
... (4) cybersecurity threats; [ED: WTF???]
i should have noted: this is not so unusual after all! seems DITU trying to get their ducks in a row since May 2011 administration efforts to expand CFAA with a modification which “Clarifies that both conspiracy and attempt to commit a computer hacking offense are subject to the same penalties as completed, substantive offenses.” most recently trotted out again this month by Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont). IC doesn't delay until after the bad happens to intervene, why can't FBI have this courtesy? (parallel construction cumbersome!)
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coderman