Re: Publicly Usable Secure Rooms
Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top: http://cryptome.org/bema-se.htm More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own. Entrepreneurs would offer curb-side service, like food carts, or larger like waste shredders and blood test labs. Yarping and texting on cellphones in the open, believing privacy policies, faith in crypto, wi-fi, ISPs, VPNs, HTTPS, Tor, clouds, IoT, is day-dreaming, making sellers rich. Anything that encourages and supports self-security instead of products, standards, official protectors, is the right direction. Quietly clumsy beats drum-beating authorities ever compromising their users for cohorts. SCIFs leak, sure, rig fixes, test, retest, minimize use of EMR devices, don't bet your life on any security, homebrew or top 10. Have a nice day. At 05:00 PM 6/23/2016, you wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 3:14 AM, Karl Semich <mailto:gmkarl@gmail.comgmkarl@gmail.com> wrote: I would like to index such places, and create motion towards such security being accessible for all people.
Attempting to compile such a list would be laborious and self-defeating. It would invite compromise of the enumerated "secure" locations. Â
It would be more useful to compile characteristics of "secure public spaces", and heuristics for locating them in one's local environs. How can we tell - without special equipment etc - if a given space is monitored? If we land in an unfamiliar city, how can we correctly "guess" where to find a secure public space?
On a recent trip I discovered a little 3' x 4' nook in the outside wall of LA's Bonaventure Hotel. Tho adjacent to areas of high pedestrian traffic, the nook was unspied by any cameras. No microphones or other sensors were visible nearby. A blissful respite from the otherwise panoptic surveillance of urban California. Â
In this case we might speculatively take the hotel's Brutalist architecture as the heuristic for finding similar spaces. Although sometimes described as an aesthetically "fascist" style, Brutalist architects loved to create little difficult-to-surveil nooks & crannies in their buildings. Alas many of these spaces have been fenced up by the buildings' current Centrist owners. For example the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Service_Center_(Boston)#/media/File...contemptible disfigurement of Boston's magnificent Government Service Center building.
What are other heuristics for finding secure less-surveilled spaces?
On 06/23/2016 05:33 PM, John Young wrote:
Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top:
http://cryptome.org/bema-se.htm
More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own.
"I demand the cone of silence!" Sorry about that, Chief.
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 07:19:47PM -0400, Steve Kinney wrote:
On 06/23/2016 05:33 PM, John Young wrote:
Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top:
http://cryptome.org/bema-se.htm
More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own.
"I demand the cone of silence!"
Sorry about that, Chief.
"99, get me that SCIF definition will you?"
"Right away, Max."
On 06/23/2016 09:22 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 07:19:47PM -0400, Steve Kinney wrote:
On 06/23/2016 05:33 PM, John Young wrote:
Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top:
http://cryptome.org/bema-se.htm
More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own.
"I demand the cone of silence!"
Sorry about that, Chief.
"99, get me that SCIF definition will you?"
"Right away, Max."
Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facility. Control had a portable version of the cone of silence - basically two plexiglass fish bowls connected by a tube - but of course it got stuck on the Chief's head then ended up shattered the first time it was deployed. I have come to realize the Agent 86 may have been the greatest intelligence officer of his generation: That is if, as I now suspect, he was working for Kaos all along. Smart wasted vast amounts of Control's money, misdirected 100% of its manpower and resources toward a crew of small time losers who were probably a KGB front set up for the purpose, and completely demoralized Control's Chief and (all but one of) his fellow Agents. And they fell for it. To such an extent that Control went out of business for good just five years after Smart showed up on the record as its "top Agent." :o)
On 06/23/2016 04:19 PM, Steve Kinney wrote:
"I demand the cone of silence!"
What? (that's the joke) Here's something from the same time period as the cone of silence... The OG Selfie: http://i.imgur.com/GW3bhD4.jpg
On 6/24/16, Rayzer
http://i.imgur.com/kdNOe5u.jpg http://hackaday.com/2015/10/19/tempest-a-tin-foil-hat-for-your-electronics-a... http://www.cordsen.com/index.php/services/tempest-certification http://www.thesurvivalistblog.net/converting-microwave-oven-emp-resistant-en... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDjJ6uSYWWc https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-CI_dJ8huDlA/Vr3Vr1mG8BI/AAAAAAAARg0/KAgpdHonHcE/s... https://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&q=scif+tin+foil+room
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 05:33:31PM -0400, John Young wrote:
Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top:
Is cryptome meant to be not accessible over tor? I don't know what SCIFs is.
More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own.
Entrepreneurs would offer curb-side service, like food carts, or larger like waste shredders and blood test labs. Yarping and texting on cellphones in the open, believing privacy policies, faith in crypto, wi-fi, ISPs, VPNs, HTTPS, Tor, clouds, IoT, is day-dreaming, making sellers rich.
Anything that encourages and supports self-security instead of products, standards, official protectors, is the right direction.
+1 this 1+ Same with authority - encouraging, conversational tools etc, for internalising authority, and for identifying where we are schooled in externalising authority. (Sorry, a little offtopic.)
participants (5)
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grarpamp -
John Young -
Rayzer -
Steve Kinney -
Zenaan Harkness