Snowden ran a major 2 Gbps exit node named “TheSignal”
This may be old news to some but I found it quite remarkable to discover today that prior to fleeing what I like to call "The United State", Ed Snowden apparently ran a major Tor exit node named "TheSignal". http://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/ Furthermore, he helped to organize and throw a freakin' Crypto Party on Oahu (contacting and co-ordinating via email with Runa Sandvik using his legal name!!) about six months prior to bailing for Hong Kong. According to the same Pandodaily article he "was trying to get some of his buddies at “work” to set up additional Tor nodes…". Not exactly a shining example of good OpSec for someone who is also secretly gathering a trove of classified documents to leak.
Dnia środa, 10 grudnia 2014 12:54:39 Seth pisze:
This may be old news to some but I found it quite remarkable to discover today that prior to fleeing what I like to call "The United State", Ed Snowden apparently ran a major Tor exit node named "TheSignal". http://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/
Furthermore, he helped to organize and throw a freakin' Crypto Party on Oahu (contacting and co-ordinating via email with Runa Sandvik using his legal name!!) about six months prior to bailing for Hong Kong.
According to the same Pandodaily article he "was trying to get some of his buddies at “work” to set up additional Tor nodes…".
Not exactly a shining example of good OpSec for someone who is also secretly gathering a trove of classified documents to leak.
Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit node, organises CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;) -- Pozdrawiam, Michał "rysiek" Woźniak
Tor log from Feb 2013 lists hop to "TheSignal," reportedly Snowden's exit node <http://cryptome.org/snowden-the-signal.txt>http://cryptome.org/snowden-the-signal.txt Legit? Others of these?
On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek@hackerspace.pl> wrote:
Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit node, organises CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;)
I'm not sold on the reverse psychology gambit. "As for the timing, Snowden apparently emailed Greenwald for the first time 11 days before the party, and was still waiting for a reply when the party happened..." https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/07124327303/snowden-ran-major-tor... "Cryptome has uncovered a public key for cincinnatus@lavabit.com, which is the same alias he used to contact Glenn Greenwald — and it’s associated with the organizing of an event in Honolulu, Hawaii in December 2012, where the now-famous NSA whistleblower was then living." https://blog.ageispolis.net/snowden-cryptoparty/ Dare I say that it's common knowledge at this point that using Tor, much less being an exit node operator puts you 'on the list' for full data take and retention 'til the end of time, not to mention active Computer Network Exploitation. ------------------------------- "But the German exposé showed Tor providing the opposite of anonymity: it singled out users for total NSA surveillance, potentially sucking up and recording everything they did online." http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html "The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish this, the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts of the internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US telecoms firms under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar and Blarney. The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the Tor network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target does on the internet. Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as Turbulence, Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through the enormous amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for Tor connections" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-an... ---------------------------- Snowden *had* to have known the above, so why would he put himself at risk by using the same email/alias to contact Greenwald, and then establish a connection from that alias to his legal name by using it to organize the cryptoparty eleven days later?!! Why would he not create a fresh and completely separate dedicated-use email account solely for the purposes of establishing contact with Greenwald? On one hand we're supposed to believe that NSA are bumbling idiots that missed the email communication between Snowden and Greenwald using the same email alias he used as a CryptoParty organizer and Tor exit node(s) operator. On the other hand we have malicious (probably state?) actors that are able to decrypt and leak a PGP encrypted email between Snowden and Greenwalk/Radack. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/radack-greenwald.htm as well as leak Tor bugs to the developers? http://www.nsaneforums.com/topic/227563-nsa-and-gchq-agents-leak-tor-bugs-al... Are you fucking kidding me? The story we are being told is not adding up. The tiny tiny fragments of actual source documents that has been published only adds to my suspicion. The more that times goes on, the more that I can't help wonder sometimes if Snowden is part a gambit to frame the debate. The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should even be allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken as a given.
On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 01:31:31PM -0800, Seth wrote:
On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek@hackerspace.pl> wrote:
Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit node, organises CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;)
I'm not sold on the reverse psychology gambit.
"As for the timing, Snowden apparently emailed Greenwald for the first time 11 days before the party, and was still waiting for a reply when the party happened..." https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/07124327303/snowden-ran-major-tor...
"Cryptome has uncovered a public key for cincinnatus@lavabit.com, which is the same alias he used to contact Glenn Greenwald — and it’s associated with the organizing of an event in Honolulu, Hawaii in December 2012, where the now-famous NSA whistleblower was then living." https://blog.ageispolis.net/snowden-cryptoparty/
Dare I say that it's common knowledge at this point that using Tor, much less being an exit node operator puts you 'on the list' for full data take and retention 'til the end of time, not to mention active Computer Network Exploitation.
------------------------------- "But the German exposé showed Tor providing the opposite of anonymity: it singled out users for total NSA surveillance, potentially sucking up and recording everything they did online." http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
"The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish this, the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts of the internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US telecoms firms under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar and Blarney.
The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the Tor network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target does on the internet.
Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as Turbulence, Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through the enormous amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for Tor connections" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-an... ----------------------------
Snowden *had* to have known the above, so why would he put himself at risk by using the same email/alias to contact Greenwald, and then establish a connection from that alias to his legal name by using it to organize the cryptoparty eleven days later?!!
Why would he not create a fresh and completely separate dedicated-use email account solely for the purposes of establishing contact with Greenwald?
On one hand we're supposed to believe that NSA are bumbling idiots that missed the email communication between Snowden and Greenwald using the same email alias he used as a CryptoParty organizer and Tor exit node(s) operator.
On the other hand we have malicious (probably state?) actors that are able to decrypt and leak a PGP encrypted email between Snowden and Greenwalk/Radack. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/radack-greenwald.htm as well as leak Tor bugs to the developers? http://www.nsaneforums.com/topic/227563-nsa-and-gchq-agents-leak-tor-bugs-al...
Are you fucking kidding me?
The story we are being told is not adding up.
The tiny tiny fragments of actual source documents that has been published only adds to my suspicion.
The more that times goes on, the more that I can't help wonder sometimes if Snowden is part a gambit to frame the debate.
The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should even be allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken as a given.
I'd ask the same thing about anonymity. It must always be taken that both the surveillance state, and anonymity must exist, for one cannot exist without the other. But back to things not adding up.. none of us is a superhuman opsec practictioner. We all get tired, sloppy, arrogant, including the spooks and the surveillance state. If I would have been in Snowden's position I probably would have promoted tor just as he was, in the hopes it might weaken the system. As it is, I find the best treatment for paranoia is to give up the illusion of anonymity, and my life is more relaxing and enjoyable if I do not feel obligated to keep secrets.
On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 01:31:31PM -0800, Seth wrote:
On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek@hackerspace.pl> wrote: The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should even be allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken as a given.
this is exploiting the "anchoring bias" of the individuals and thus nicely frames the debate. yes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchoring -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt
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