On 02/03/2017 04:47 AM, Georgi Guninski wrote:

Why are Tor deleting their own pages on blog.torproject.org?

They have something to hide, lol?

...

From @Kinney's domain, near end: http://pilobilus.net/comsec-101.html |See How to handle millions of new Tor clients on the TOR Blog. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-to-handle-millions-new-tor-clients

This returns Page Not Found for me.

Try here: https://blog.torproject.org/blogs/arma?page=3.

Still alive on archive.org: http://web.archive.org/web/20131010204046/https://blog.torproject.org/blog/h...

Other pages from 2013 are alive on Tor's blog.

IIRC there was similar issue with a page about Appelbaum, not sure.

Well, that's simple. They nuked it. There's nothing at https://blog.torproject.org/blogs/ioerror. And the last capture at https://web.archive.org/web/20160610002952/https://blog.torproject.org/blogs... was on 2016-06-10.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 02/03/2017 06:47 AM, Georgi Guninski wrote:

Why are Tor deleting their own pages on blog.torproject.org?

They have something to hide, lol?

From @Kinney's domain, near end: http://pilobilus.net/comsec-101.html |See How to handle millions of new Tor clients on the TOR Blog. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-to-handle-millions-new-tor-client s

This returns Page Not Found for me. Well isn't that nice? Dropping content relevant to the TOR Project's hostile and abusive workplace environment is one thing. It indicates grossly incompetent management, defending itself by bold malfeasance. The project's commitments to supporting "human rights" and "transparency" stand exposed as empty posturing. If the TOR Project was going to correct deficiencies in its corporate culture, they would have at least made a start by now, but nope, that's off the table.

Still alive on archive.org: http://web.archive.org/web/20131010204046/https://blog.torproject.org/ blog/how-to-handle-millions-new-tor-clients

I

heard tell that the Archive is getting a mirror site in Canada. That's a Good Thing. So I just updated the article in question. The bits relevant to the security and otherwise of the TOR network now say: TOR SECURITY ISSUE - Posted September 6, 2013: The TOR Network is apparently under attack from a large scale actor who presently owns 3/4 of the client nodes in the TOR network. Until proven otherwise - or the attack stops - it must be assumed that a major State actor (most likely the U.S., Israel, China or Russia) may be able to identify nearly all TOR users and match their IP addresses to their exit node traffic. The TOR Project believes that this attack is the work of an ordinary Windows botnet, and they may be right. See [hyperlink] How to handle millions of new Tor clients [/link] on the TOR Blog. [ begin new content ] TOR SECURITY ISSUE II: On 2/3/2017 I learned that the article describing the above security issue has been removed from the TOR Project's website. A copy of the missing page is avaialble at archive.org, follow [ hyperlink ]this link [/link ]. The TOR Project maintains that "transparency" is one of its greatest strengths, so the disappearance of important technical information with a direct bearing on the security or otherwise of the TOR network is cause for grave concern. Is the missing page a result of a random error by a person working in a toxic, abusive corporate environment? Very possibly. Public statements from the TOR Project, and dissenting statements from individuls inside the TOR Project, paint a picture of gross malfeasance in personnel management and vicious personal vendettas run rampant: See The Crucifixion of IOError for an introduction to the can of worms that ate the TOR Project. But disappearance of vital historical information relevant to the security and otherwise of the Onion Routing network could also be something worse: An attempt to remove data necessary to accurately estimate the Onion Routing network's baseline security. Any way I look at it, I come to the same conclusion: It's time to downgrade estimates of the security provided by TOR - again. [ end new content ] Even if one makes the most pessimistic assumptions, TOR remains useful. It will continue to punch through school, corporate and even national network firewalls. TOR negates surveillance by network service providers and makes users effectively invisible to surveillance and profiling by corporate actors. TOR will continue to reliably protect wireless connections at public venues from eavesdropping or manipulation by J. Random Hacker. But TOR users who have reason to believe that the NSA or another State actor would ever actually do anything with information collected about their TOR-cloaked activities, such as share it with a law enforcement agency or hostile government, or deny/revoke a security clearance, should adjust their security model accordingly. https://www.torproject.org by -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJYlKewAAoJEECU6c5XzmuqJi4IALIvXanF3lPy91fEFg2vYimp iX93DHCHIl7UF3WtHMXwVUGTJcZs4pW4W1vZnG4IOS8Ka2hfm4oj9QRNZkw57vC/ Js0oNz8CxhpKkZU7qjWmaay/3O4HHwsoinj5lYfX8D1H6CG581olZmzdjx+GfuWK v7+gRc2fTTGRxQ+iGUBRM2RtyvumhpKfPh+t9OzkZMF4IAmzSLNPuTn6PVkNprJl fFQma+cKG5mW08deGCwL7VjRnkkc3IGbqS0AISiJV0e5cTqfLEc4XiykKguOv30G insMTy2AbDXH16ppEsCxREV7GyxwjJQ4DoDhRE+ptP5iJIo0E1IdlTJAIVmU7no= =V/ye -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----