Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite@riseup.net> wrote:
Mike Hearn, Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it is ... then I will block any connection of your relays to mine ... Freedom isn't free unless it is totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping. ... As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0
so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I can avoid them.
router riker 207.12.89.16 9001 0 0 fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD contact Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> accept *:8333 reject *:* Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking?
Bitcoin's consensus algorithm is weight of computing power, which is OK as long as weight of computing power aligns with interest in bitcoin being a useful currency. Weight of stake would be better, but so far I am unaware of any satisfactory proposals for weight of stake. Ripples consensus algorithm is weight of club members, and the process for getting into the club is opaque, as are the interests and incentives of the existing club members. I would suppose one gets into the club if no existing member blackballs you, which would be fine if there is already sufficient diversity of interests within the club. It is not obvious to me how well the ripple consensus algorithm would work in the event of substantial conflicts between club members, or bad behavior by club members, or bad things happening to the network. Has it been analyzed for performance in the event of bad behavior by some club members?
Dnia poniedziałek, 11 sierpnia 2014 08:42:20 James A. Donald pisze:
Bitcoin's consensus algorithm is weight of computing power, which is OK as long as weight of computing power aligns with interest in bitcoin being a useful currency.
Aye.
Weight of stake would be better, but so far I am unaware of any satisfactory proposals for weight of stake.
Aye².
Ripples consensus algorithm is weight of club members, and the process for getting into the club is opaque, as are the interests and incentives of the existing club members.
Aye³.
I would suppose one gets into the club if no existing member blackballs you, which would be fine if there is already sufficient diversity of interests within the club.
If the rule is "you can get in as long as nobody blackballs you", the more members and the more diversity there is "in", the larger chance you will get blackballed. Which means, the more members, the harder to get in.
It is not obvious to me how well the ripple consensus algorithm would work in the event of substantial conflicts between club members, or bad behavior by club members, or bad things happening to the network.
Has it been analyzed for performance in the event of bad behavior by some club members?
Good question. -- Pozdr rysiek
participants (3)
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grarpamp
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James A. Donald
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rysiek