Most Security Assertions Dangerous [Re: YouTube via Onion Services]
In a thread... https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2018-December/044709.html on...
http://kgg2m7yk5aybusll.onion/ http://axqzx4s6s54s32yentfqojs3x5i7faxza6xo3ehd4bzzsg2ii4fv2iid.onion
(noting that all onions can be physically located by determined adversaries, thus failing another commonly sold security assertion)
- Its free software and the code is available for install/checkup.
That assertion is irrelevant in the security context of the thread so far, and it's dangerous advice. As with protonmail and all the other fakeass encrypted email websites... the JS code is loaded by the browser from the web service itself, there is currently NO trusted way for the user to independantly audit that the code they end up executing in real time *from* the service matches the code *in* any repo, or for the user to choose to ignore the service code and load and execute any repo code of their choosing instead.
Youtube is made by a dick company to humanity called Google, which is funding their services by stealing/collecting users data. So the JS
The current code load model is a nasty exploit waiting to happen, does happen (Hushmail, NIT's, etc), and simply should not be trusted, no more than GOOG and FB the dicks, themselves, indeed. Or Java, ActiveX, Flash, and whatever other "secure" crap some scam tries to push into your pathetically insecure and untrusted exec platform. Sure Invidious Onion is fun, probably has some merits and use cases, and even simple html could be an exploit, and users can run it all in a sandbox, etc. But let's not say there's any trusted link between the running and repo codes, nor that any sufficient set of people have looked at, and signed over, most codes, or are even allowed to... [1]. Also, clicking on any video listed on the onion frontpage index initiates at least three connections straight to google instead of the proxy onion. That's not clean.
Plus you can watch the videos without the need to allow any JS.
this particular YouTube frontend/proxy seems to be more focused on offering an alternative viewing experience rather than privacy.
https://github.com/mps-youtube/mps-youtube https://github.com/rg3/youtube-dl ... those and a few others readers can find and post here. [1] You can't even say those for the release iso's of OpenBSD, FreeBSD, the Linux's, etc... back to their claimed source code repos... because either those repos have no internal cryptographic roots or hashes to sign over or with in the first place, or some process in the path from there to the iso's is not reproducible or cryptographically chained. Same goes for Apple, Microsoft, Intel, AMD, ARM, Government, etc... You're all still woefully fucked therein because you keep buying the Kool-Aid, and refusing to demand, fix, ignore, or eliminate them and their issues. #OpenFabs , #OpenHW , #OpenSW , #OpenDev , #OpenBiz , #CryptoCurrency , #Anarchism The list of requisites to even get close to improving the situation grows...
On Thu, Dec 06, 2018 at 03:25:05AM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
[1] You can't even say those for the release iso's of OpenBSD, FreeBSD, the Linux's, etc... back to their claimed source code repos... because either those repos have no internal cryptographic roots or hashes to sign over or with in the first place, or some process in the path from there to the iso's is not reproducible or cryptographically chained.
Git style signed content hash chains and reproducible builds FTW muffaluggerahs! So Debian Buster is over 90%, yay!
From 2015 80%:
Lots of progress for Debian's reproducible builds https://lwn.net/Articles/630074/ To Buster ~92.4%: https://isdebianreproducibleyet.com/ “NO! … but buster on amd64 is 92.4% reproducible right now!” To pretty dang gud bruh!: Debian reproducible builds project update, 2017-07-23, Stretch/amd64 reaching 94% https://lwn.net/Articles/728599/ And some nice summary sheetskis and chartskis: https://tests.reproducible-builds.org/debian/reproducible.html https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds
Same goes for Apple, Microsoft, Intel, AMD, ARM, Government, etc... You're all still woefully fucked therein because you keep buying the Kool-Aid, and refusing to demand, fix, ignore, or eliminate them and their issues.
#OpenFabs , #OpenHW , #OpenSW , #OpenDev , #OpenBiz , #CryptoCurrency , #Anarchism
Indeed.
The list of requisites to even get close to improving the situation grows...
Improvement in problem definition is necessary, and is not an "increase" in the requisites to e.g. security of personal communications, simply a fuller understanding of the problem. Alt: we are rising from ignorance. Painful but necessary awareness. Let's add to the above list another obvious in hindsight: #StackMinimization - including HW - i.e. trust boundaries (nee attack surfaces) must be seriously minimized to reach something we can collectively reason about in its elements (hw/ sw).
participants (2)
-
grarpamp
-
Zenaan Harkness