----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu> ----- Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2013 22:10:56 -0400 From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] New paper : Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 11:35:22AM +1000, Erik de Castro Lopo wrote:

Hi all,

Heads up on a new paper suggesting that its possible to unmask Tor users using traffic correlation:

http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf

Code here:

http://torps.github.io/

Would be interested in hearing the opinions of the core Tor develpoment team on this stuff.

Yep. They're part of the Tor research community. I have plans for writing a blog post about the paper, to explain what it means, what it doesn't mean, what we should do about it, and what research questions remain open. Stuff keeps catching fire with bigger flames though. The extremely short answer is "Yes, a big enough adversary can screw Tor users. But we knew that. I think it's great that the paper presents the dual risks of relay adversaries and link adversaries, since most of the time when people are freaking out about one of them they're forgetting the other one. And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months, they look way different." https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8240 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9321 --Roger -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5