Re: [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
Please stop this suicidal, treacherous discussion. You're undermining the global industry of weak crypto and comsec. That counts as economic terrorism in all the countries who abide arms control, export control, copyright, capitalism, heirarchical rule, suppression of dissent, lawful spying, breaking and entering black jobs, ubiquitous spying on each other and everybody else, in particular what NRO terms "unobservable and unknown phenomena," and a lot of other secret stuff which can only be revealed by low-ranked knobheads sure to be burned at the stake by their cowardly protectors for the irresistable allure of IPO millions based on government contracts to keep this shit among us. Got that? This is a place to share fudging how it should work, and does now and then. You think this is bullshit, dontcha? Well, it aint. Why look at the rising use of Tor, PFS, TLS, those rat-infested private keyservers and millions of eaters of Symantec back-doored dookie-pie. You seen any US producers of comsec go under yet? No, and you wont, for they are locked into surefire global success when failure is built into their products. Screwing customers and citizens with faulty comsec, what's wrong with that, where you been, that's patriotic, and damn profitable. Sure, call for outraged dissent, fine, great, if that moves the ponzi, balloons those bitcoins. At 09:08 AM 12/12/2013, coderman wrote:
i see your skepticism, and i raise you a retort! ;)
also, this year by end of year, in 2013 you expect to: - Make gains in enabling decryption and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) access to fourth generation/Long Term Evolution (4GL/LTE) networks by inserting vulnerabilities. - Complete enabling for [well recognized name] encryption chips used in Virtual Private Network and Web encryption devices. and last but not least, - Shape the worldwide commercial cryptography marketplace to make it more tractable to advanced cryptanalytic capabilities being developed by NSA/CSS.
Ok, given those requirements. Who fits the bill?
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 7:08 AM, John Young <jya@pipeline.com> wrote:
Please stop this suicidal, treacherous discussion. You're undermining the global industry of weak crypto and comsec. That counts as economic terrorism in all the countries who abide arms control, export control, copyright, capitalism, heirarchical rule, suppression of dissent, lawful spying, breaking and entering black jobs, ubiquitous spying on each other and everybody else, ... ... Sure, call for outraged dissent, fine, great, if that moves the ponzi, balloons those bitcoins.
let it be known: in the event of my untimely demise under suspicious circumstances, i will my coins to JYA so he may bless my passing with grand oration and strong tale as he is so adept at providing. *grin* on a serious note, the useful steps are clear: 1. Intel releases raw access to noise samples 2. NIST defining and mandating a design that also supports raw sample access, (we could change subject here to discuss something pleasant like on-line checks and continuous checks,) 3. OS distributions include userspace entropy scavenging daemons (haveged, dakarand, etc) to complement properly vetted hardware entropy sources run in a conservative fashion. default is set safe, not fast. is that so much to ask?
participants (2)
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coderman
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John Young