#FBIvApple: Cellbrite was just a ruse. "The Greys" cracked it.
The FBI hired shady grey digital mercenaries (my apologies if I butthurt anyone on this list or their friends) to crack the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone. Washington Post: The people who helped the U.S. government come from the sometimes shadowy world of hackers and security researchers who profit from finding flaws in companies’ software or systems. Some hackers, known as “white hats,” disclose the vulnerabilities to the firms responsible for the software or to the public so they can be fixed and are generally regarded as ethical. Others, called “black hats,” use the information to hack networks and steal people’s personal information. At least one of the people who helped the FBI in the San Bernardino case falls into a third category, often considered ethically murky: researchers who sell flaws — for instance, to governments or to companies that make surveillance tools. This last group, dubbed “gray hats,” More: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional... -- RR "Through counter-intelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential trouble-makers ... And neutralize them, neutralize them, neutralize them"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/13/2016 12:12 AM, Jack Liddy wrote:
The person in charge of PR at Cellebrite deserves a raise after this.
Ditto the person or persons who found a way to attribute the crack to someone outside the USG. The SanBerdino* iPhone Massacre: A Post Mortem In a case involving "terrorism" and any "Middle Eastern person," the FBI has unlawful legal authority to hand a locked iPhone containing material evidence to the NSA for cracking. NSA hands the phone back, locked up with timestamps undisturbed, along with a pen drive holding the decrypted content of the device. All of this is done under "Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmentalized Information" cover, as befits the work of a Double Nought Spy service with a license to do whatever the fuck they want "to protect and preserve America's Freedom." Apple got a great publicity boost, Uncle got a shot at legalizing all of the above and more, and that's the whole story of the big public controversy. As for the super-duper security sideshow about how Apple uses unique hard coded keys to encrypt iPhone contents, OK fine: It's actually a decent system, and having the details out there will result in a bump in sales to "security conscious" consumers including Apple's /large/ consumer base in the Federal sector. Anybody who doubts that the NSA can routinely crack iPhone encryption - when they have the physical device in hand - haven't thought it through: The problem is to read one number stored on an IC chip. We have the technology to do that, and the NSA has the budget, facilities, mandate, and as many practice iPhones as Apple will sell them. They also have the resources to "borrow" any technical documents they need from Apple, with or without asking permission or telling Apple it happened. iPhones are common and reading out the contents of "locked" devices is one of the reasons why the U.S. has a big budget technical intelligence service. It is more than safe to assume that reading out a locked iPhone is a solved problem at NSA, a documented routine procedure. Processing the paperwork for an FBI request based on the word "terrorism" probably took longer than cracking the iPhone. The pretended "inability" of the FBI to obtain the contents of a "Terrorist iPhone" was Security Theater, pure and simple. Checking out the details of the narrative was necessary to accurately assess the SanBerdino iPhone Massacre as Security Theater, but that does not mean it was ever anything but that: A set piece show, attempting to set a precedent legalizing forced Federal back doors in all digital devices made by vendors under U.S. jurisdiction. [ * See Frank Zappa and the Mothers, Let's Make The Water Turn Black. ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJXDsDIAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0L9CwP/06XPhRyoMKoBLGwoKmcHbhM tg3DtqORMT5DC9b2QcrFEz0/mOfjHtJXzAQ4wAxeBUmUakCGx0t+8nimo1X07CYO bdacIOWN7XYPkXLpHQEI+ge/co5xOci9JjySUOtkgfe9Ul7eX78bQuKO9j0vjOvp 4mXps8/5Jn1//PzHVn0dUKLet8Pb1wuJ24ac5TkfHTLnkmR4yy/LJR9RsNQBdeYF +XiHHWdITNgOepbA6aJ0IRMRIh/tDZGQh89tFHEUatkdIs7XMyC03WBO4glgOEOK HR39fXy+J5HkRiQchdHlG0EMxocUqK3VfnEnzrQH1ghpsHIfB8R5+w6p29JN9G5M Y+gO4Nz6LXoe9/Y6he7ZnNuUJXMK0bCuGjrkxdF3EI4xfEe9pdOib6mEkprm8qc3 57SaCCVCIpdxPMuQ1vPnY31t6gVG7Q/1z/RQKLw3FxKpC8MLromwPXj2QN1zcxLu KGKDcXkJwnTVAz1URaf5NV2wKA8xSh6VXyilMk5FoZjjWup6z2wOoE1itrkTPHh2 h6PR53ug+s0ddiT4oTVtYz2tvcEkpl16EMgesv1FBSH/L05FF7/xr4VZvSFAojRU GtT/mD1Lzk6H6+ZuianYQJcVN9CcvG7LuaMMk+rWbS5dpwp+1od+ioYxG8qZywQT URh7nk7tEFVhclnIAy8M =FKrz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On Apr 14, 2016 1:03 AM, "Steve Kinney"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
On 04/13/2016 12:12 AM, Jack Liddy wrote:
The person in charge of PR at Cellebrite deserves a raise after this.
Ditto the person or persons who found a way to attribute the crack to someone outside the USG.
The SanBerdino* iPhone Massacre: A Post Mortem
In a case involving "terrorism" and any "Middle Eastern person," the FBI has unlawful legal authority to hand a locked iPhone containing material evidence to the NSA for cracking. NSA hands the phone back, locked up with timestamps undisturbed, along with a pen drive holding the decrypted content of the device. All of this is done under "Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmentalized Information" cover, as befits the work of a Double Nought Spy service with a license to do whatever the fuck they want "to protect and preserve America's Freedom."
Apple got a great publicity boost, Uncle got a shot at legalizing all of the above and more,
It is policy from the executive branch from eo 12333 The word "policy" means "law" now At this point with how eo's are working the legal system is just overidden Maybe it is for the build > what can be taken out next etc... but the USG is also stupid ... they fucked up getting access to tye phone in tge 1st place
and that's the whole story of the big public controversy. As for the super-duper security sideshow about how Apple uses unique hard coded keys to encrypt iPhone contents, OK fine: It's actually a decent system, and having the details out there will result in a bump in sales to "security conscious" consumers including Apple's /large/ consumer base in the Federal sector.
Anybody who doubts that the NSA can routinely crack iPhone encryption - when they have the physical device in hand - haven't thought it through: The problem is to read one number stored on an IC chip. We have the technology to do that, and the NSA has the budget, facilities, mandate, and as many practice iPhones as Apple will sell them. They also have the resources to "borrow" any technical documents they need from Apple, with or without asking permission or telling Apple it happened. iPhones are common and reading out the contents of "locked" devices is one of the reasons why the U.S. has a big budget technical intelligence service. It is more than safe to assume that reading out a locked iPhone is a solved problem at NSA, a documented routine procedure. Processing the paperwork for an FBI request based on the word "terrorism" probably took longer than cracking the iPhone.
The pretended "inability" of the FBI to obtain the contents of a "Terrorist iPhone" was Security Theater, pure and simple. Checking out the details of the narrative was necessary to accurately assess the SanBerdino iPhone Massacre as Security Theater, but that does not mean it was ever anything but that: A set piece show, attempting to set a precedent legalizing forced Federal back doors in all digital devices made by vendors under U.S. jurisdiction.
[ * See Frank Zappa and the Mothers, Let's Make The Water Turn Black. ]
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participants (4)
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Cari Machet -
Jack Liddy -
Rayzer -
Steve Kinney