Why MAC Address Randomization is not Enough: An Analysis of Wi-Fi Network Discovery Mechanisms
On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 05:20:23PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
http://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/asiaccs2016.pdf -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
--- ABSTRACT We present several novel techniques to track (unassociated) mobile devices by abusing features of the Wi-Fi standard. This shows that using random MAC addresses, on its own, does not guarantee privacy. First, we show that information elements in probe requests can be used to fingerprint devices. We then combine these fingerprints with incremental sequence numbers, to create a tracking algorithm that does not rely on unique identi- fiers such as MAC addresses. Based on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that our algorithm can correctly track as much as 50% of devices for at least 20 minutes. We also show that commodity Wi-Fi devices use predictable scram- bler seeds. These can be used to improve the performance of our tracking algorithm. Finally, we present two attacks that reveal the real MAC address of a device, even if MAC ad- dress randomization is used. In the first one, we create fake hotspots to induce clients to connect using their real MAC address. The second technique relies on the new 802.11u standard, commonly referred to as Hotspot 2.0, where we show that Linux and Windows send Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP) requests using their real MAC address. --- Sad state of "security" in the world today. We know we need open source -everything-, including network stacks, firmware, and even chip/ hardware designs, not to mention manufacturing to end user chain of physical trust.. A long way to go.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/06/2016 05:20 PM, grarpamp wrote:
Good read. Major insights into device fingerprinting. :o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXf4XuAAoJEECU6c5Xzmuqo+MIAKqZgsAFc+t6wftJ1Yp+8YhV mAGTyqpigU/IvHlVfh4t5p3gioEwHd/C30ppJEAV+LYvGPDP2w/QlmvrVqirzT87 RDTBbZizcpj5+YRmRHw9MVREzJ5VbzXjSR3QHNbSfWG9SL5kIiNIep6IQsj7kjCl L9/N5gPDlvx9PiRsAM27sDldzsG6wYYaQyfnxpvvtP+DahDs8TijczN7hRiVQyNK ZcaKiMds0/CibAP0bJ9Cy1qo/tb9n0+jKShqwyWpmtgWzbaXIQ64llDBgmpsKkSE mrGJDoz+E0hLBdpNswdRn9mUkzg0tmoan+/rZKovhYQ0uLAsDzb1ZBQgwm6mCCw= =Lu2I -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
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grarpamp
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Steve Kinney
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Zenaan Harkness