Can I use zk-proofs this way?
Hi, I would like to ask concerning zk-proofs, I would like to know whether most of the proving can be side-stepped/cut-down given that an entity does not want to prove to a verifier that some execution is done correctly, but rather the result of some execution is tied to their identity (key pair) without revealing any other secret about it. So basically we don't care about the correctness of the execution, only that the prover can prove that its identity is tied to the execution result without revealing any other secret. Full context: So I'm building a project, and in this system are a secretly chosen committee that executes some computational work secretly after being chosen secretly using VDF + VRF, this committee then send their result to the network, for which any node can then listen, compile and check that >2/3 of chosen nodes (committee) agreed on the result to conclude that the execution is correct. But a chosen committee node can wait for other committee nodes to expose their results before taking that result and submitting it as their own claiming part of whatever reward is shared for the execution. My goal is then to have each chosen committee node use zk-proofs to prove that their identity is connected to execution, or at least it spent the necessary gas in that execution, without having to prove execution correctness, as the network can do that. Thank you.
On Fri, May 22, 2026 at 09:49:50AM +0100, Joseph Oyinkan via cypherpunks wrote:
Hi, I would like to ask concerning zk-proofs,
I would like to know whether most of the proving can be side-stepped/cut-down given that an entity does not want to prove to a verifier that some execution is done correctly, but rather the result of some execution is tied to their identity (key pair) without revealing any other secret about it.
So basically we don't care about the correctness of the execution, only that the prover can prove that its identity is tied to the execution result without revealing any other secret.
Full context:
So I'm building a project, and in this system are a secretly chosen committee that executes some computational work secretly after being chosen secretly using VDF + VRF, this committee then send their result to the network, for which any node can then listen, compile and check that >2/3 of chosen nodes (committee) agreed on the result to conclude that the execution is correct.
But a chosen committee node can wait for other committee nodes to expose their results before taking that result and submitting it as their own claiming part of whatever reward is shared for the execution.
My goal is then to have each chosen committee node use zk-proofs to prove that their identity is connected to execution, or at least it spent the necessary gas in that execution, without having to prove execution correctness, as the network can do that.
Thank you.
Hi, I want to share that I read your post and found it pleasant, but do not know the best answer myself and have sadly not yet worked with zksnarks nor recieved a cryptography certification of any kind. The below should be considered confused ramblings for inspiration: I might fall back on signing network relations to assert who produced data before a time threshold, for example. But I think your problem might be the same as the proof-of-work problem solved diversely by blockchains. For example, you could take inspiration from storage chains proving holding of large data, and have the node's key and a nonce be used to sample from the computation steps into a hash, then have a second phase where nodes all confirm everybody else's work hashes are correct. You could look at storage chains to see how to do this robustly different ways. Or you could take inspiration from hash brute forcing chains and require a hash brute force be included in the work that uses the node's public key. This could make it computationally expensive to copy. It seems a similar problem to the general mining problem. Thanks for your post. https://ar.anyone.tech/Z0cnxR4oE3O1rNS13hIucKSKQVGBpQNBThPVN9XqBvQ#dNf1bd6Co... https://ar.anyone.tech/Hd4wc89N6KoV6n--uwn6xPyN6671ttsPXOFn1dTbvGk I am not affiliated with https://ar.anyone.tech .
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Joseph Oyinkan