Re: [tt] How a Crypto ‘Backdoor’ Pitted the Tech World Against the NSA
----- Forwarded message from Christian Weisgerber <naddy@mips.inka.de> ----- Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 16:11:47 +0000 (UTC) From: Christian Weisgerber <naddy@mips.inka.de> To: tt@postbiota.org Subject: Re: [tt] How a Crypto ‘Backdoor’ Pitted the Tech World Against the NSA Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> wrote:
These articles from Matthew Green's Blog offer a better understanding instead of cutesy writing and soundbites: The Many Flaws of Dual_EC_DRBG http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg... RSA warns developers not to use RSA products http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against... -- Christian "naddy" Weisgerber naddy@mips.inka.de _______________________________________________ tt mailing list tt@postbiota.org http://postbiota.org/mailman/listinfo/tt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:08 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> wrote:
----- Forwarded message from Christian Weisgerber <naddy@mips.inka.de> -----
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 16:11:47 +0000 (UTC) From: Christian Weisgerber <naddy@mips.inka.de> To: tt@postbiota.org Subject: Re: [tt] How a Crypto ‘Backdoor’ Pitted the Tech World Against the NSA
Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> wrote:
These articles from Matthew Green's Blog offer a better understanding instead of cutesy writing and soundbites:
The Many Flaws of Dual_EC_DRBG
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg...
I have posted this before in a linkedin group. It is really interesting the Mr, *Blaine Bateman* (also linkedin group member) "Then what happened is some arrogant scientist at NIST (full disclosure--I was formerly a NIST employee, and the terms of my departure still burn as a fire in the pit of my stomach) conveniently "forgot" to put the correct ones in the standard, or did it on purpose since "Anyone of modest skill in cryptography will detect the problem and come up with their own P-Q pair correctly. Anyone who doesn't deserves what they get." There are, in my estimation, people that arrogant employed by NIST." No good. No.
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Eugen Leitl
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yersinia