Question about the FBI vs Apple case
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I've got a question about the FBI vs Apple case that I don't think has been discussed before here (or at least I haven't seen it). It pertains to reverse engineering and the FBI's seeming helplessness. Software is software and we reverse engineer software all the time. I'd assume that the government has some fairly competent programmers on staff so why don't they just figure out what they need to change in iOS that would allow them to disable the passcode entry count and just /do it/. Similar to what malware writers do all the time. I'd imagine that, somewhere in iOS code, there is a block of code similar to if(passwordEntryCount == 10){ destroyPhoneAndKey(); } Wouldn't this be trivial to spot in assembly code and get around it? Isn't this really just a game the FBI is playing to make us think they just can't get around Apple's 'oh so clever' schemes? Or am I missing something here? Thanks, Anthony - -- Anthony Papillion Phone: (918) 533-9699 PGP: 0x53B04B15 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWzgOUAAoJEAKK33RTsEsVxAMP/0wdsJF9+2e84Hy1uE8uu8dr y9iz1YG30VKU9b6CMDwWdoz2bX/kC3fn8lrbhdSqd9P37/mvYOcAmsE1DXV40JdF MlEzBGtk0HSCTYe1r/YtN6Ox13uuYhXyYUoaZVltBiuP4vs2rX/ywLetcg5MRwe6 ehQjXhq4wQ5JmQDNEmHY+xbhcaF1UCIx30R1mr7n+V/SciR3ssLNxzYUpNnoaWG/ gQ5+Yv8GGqp9IXrN5tYLyNlrjmPRGtQdwoBPv+bkHQgHMsZt9GXL7voZ6t61NPlg K4RSf5ZCJO1589t6k9vkvSI4jgiKtrtRs+AGhnk4A8unGNEfLkbWxyBjEAmR1fNl dKYCZIi264QvPf8jT0QE2Nz7UfZa3UaJ3FjfwpSu1BKShd7L7Mw2Qgs6VGgJpKrV vGhcIwCwQVlgJqIykL1+BKT2olrokmAjjuN1UXEUa0F3kTGUVGMWYqBVYdoJv3OO Vl9ynQyMjZis7JpoRC+U3jcfr88NtXvRTh23sHhjWg8s0xRpBdELIagjF2mtipGg StO3iW6QNHTQdJ2V1fVQHhdcp6DrJMlaB1RbaoBBvvcwSQLa/ec4CgzBsJ5R5ex4 Ws/6H8k6BQN2TZ1xmSkVeM3B+clLD1E6cQR7Cw30Q12yH7clNnVqtkd8DQE4mB4l ZUMLwO13Fplpe9yMYIba =iohF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ "When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it." "We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good." I imagine that reading the whole thing (I just browsed it) might yield a few more nuggets.
its not a game it is a war boys often conflate the two On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 7:14 PM, juan <juan.g71@gmail.com> wrote:
-- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet@gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited.
The Australian battalion fires their next imperial shot across the bow of the good ship freedom: http://politics.slashdot.org/story/16/02/24/0310213/australias-major-parties... Australia's Major Parties Vote Against Encryption In Wake of Apple FBI Case If you're counting on Apple to keep your digital information safe, you may want to think again ... at least if you live in Australia. Yesterday the country's two major political parties — Labor and the Coalition — voted down a motion in Federal Parliament calling for strong encryption to be supported in the wake of the FBI's demands that Apple unlock iOS. It appears that implementing comprehensive telephone and email retention in Australia may not have been the end of demands by law enforcement in the country. https://delimiter.com.au/2016/02/24/labor-coalition-vote-against-strong-encr... http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/data-retention-and-the-end-... The war continues... On 2/25/16, Cari Machet <carimachet@gmail.com> wrote:
participants (4)
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Anthony Papillion -
Cari Machet -
juan -
Zenaan Harkness