This new Ethereum-based “assassination market” platform could cause Napster-size legal headaches MIT Technology Review Article
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassination-market-platform-could-cause-napster-size-legal/\× Connectivity This new Ethereum-based “assassination market” platform could cause Napster-size legal headaches Augur lets people bet on events and pays whoever gets it right—so of course they’re wagering on the deaths of Donald Trump and Jeff Bezos. * by Mike Orcutt * August 2, 2018 Augur, a new blockchain-based prediction market platform, is getting a lot of media attention because people are using it to predict the deaths of celebrities. But despite fears that the rise of “assassination markets” could inspire real killings, the more urgent problem Augur presents is something else entirely. 1. This piece first appeared in our twice-weekly newsletter Chain Letter, which covers the world of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Sign up here—it’s free! Really, people saw these sorts of “death pools” coming decades ago, and blockchains, with their decentralized networks and (potentially) anonymous transactions, serve as an ideal platform. Augur’s open-source software relies on blockchain-based computer programs called smart contracts to let users set up their own prediction markets that automatically pool cryptocurrency bets and distribute winnings without the need for participants to identify themselves. Perfect for ginning up interest in offing someone by guaranteeing a payday to whoever does the deed, at least in theory. Predictably, the protocol, which launched July 10, has already led to markets for forecasting the demise of Donald Trump, Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, Betty White, and others. But these markets have seen very few transactions, and the amounts wagered have been tiny, making it unlikely they’d inspire someone to engage in foul play. Nevertheless, Augur may already be facilitating illegal activity that could prove far more troublesome. In the US, prediction markets are generally not permitted. Federal and state laws prohibit online gambling, and “in many ways the line between prediction markets and gambling is not that clear,” says Aaron Wright, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law in New York City. Further, some Augur contracts allow users to bet on the future value of something, such as Ether cryptocurrency. That sounds a lot like a type of investment called a binary option, which is unlawful to list without approval from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In 2012, the CFTC sued Intrade, an Ireland-based prediction market, accusing it of permitting US users to trade binary options, and eventually a judge blocked Intrade from offering the contracts in the US. Sure enough, Augur already has the CFTC’s attention. But even if the agency decides that Augur is breaking the law, how will it enforce that decision? Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?” When Napster, Limewire, and other peer-to-peer file-sharing networks started slinging music, movies, and other files around the internet two decades ago, they created similar law enforcement headaches. But in each case there was an entity that could be sued for copyright infringement. Software like Augur, which is open-source, freely downloadable, and run on a blockchain, presents genuinely new challenges, says Wright. That doesn’t mean laws can’t be applied—just that they’ll need to be applied in different ways. For instance, if officials were to rule that Augur was facilitating illicit activity, they might try to go after the people who developed the software, much as malware developers have been held liable for their creations, says Wright. That would be likely to set up a fight over First Amendment protections. Prosecutors could also try to target the users who keep the protocol running. Called “reporters,” they use Augur’s tradable crypto-token, REP, to report outcomes and are rewarded with more tokens if their reports are consistent with the larger consensus. There are potentially other avenues, as well, says Wright: “Just because there is no center doesn’t mean there aren’t indirect ways to attack lawless activity.” Keep up with the latest in blockchain at EmTech MIT. Discover where tech, business, and culture converge. September 11-14, 2018 MIT Media Lab
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?” This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature. On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
Connectivity
This new Ethereum-based “assassination market” platform could cause Napster-size legal headaches Augur lets people bet on events and pays whoever gets it right—so of course they’re wagering on the deaths of Donald Trump and Jeff Bezos.
* by Mike Orcutt * August 2, 2018
Augur, a new blockchain-based prediction market platform, is getting a lot of media attention because people are using it to predict the deaths of celebrities. But despite fears that the rise of “assassination markets” could inspire real killings, the more urgent problem Augur presents is something else entirely.
1. This piece first appeared in our twice-weekly newsletter Chain Letter, which covers the world of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Sign up here—it’s free!
Really, people saw these sorts of “death pools” coming decades ago, and blockchains, with their decentralized networks and (potentially) anonymous transactions, serve as an ideal platform. Augur’s open-source software relies on blockchain-based computer programs called smart contracts to let users set up their own prediction markets that automatically pool cryptocurrency bets and distribute winnings without the need for participants to identify themselves. Perfect for ginning up interest in offing someone by guaranteeing a payday to whoever does the deed, at least in theory. Predictably, the protocol, which launched July 10, has already led to markets for forecasting the demise of Donald Trump, Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, Betty White, and others. But these markets have seen very few transactions, and the amounts wagered have been tiny, making it unlikely they’d inspire someone to engage in foul play.
Nevertheless, Augur may already be facilitating illegal activity that could prove far more troublesome.
In the US, prediction markets are generally not permitted. Federal and state laws prohibit online gambling, and “in many ways the line between prediction markets and gambling is not that clear,” says Aaron Wright, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law in New York City. Further, some Augur contracts allow users to bet on the future value of something, such as Ether cryptocurrency. That sounds a lot like a type of investment called a binary option, which is unlawful to list without approval from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In 2012, the CFTC sued Intrade, an Ireland-based prediction market, accusing it of permitting US users to trade binary options, and eventually a judge blocked Intrade from offering the contracts in the US.
Sure enough, Augur already has the CFTC’s attention. But even if the agency decides that Augur is breaking the law, how will it enforce that decision? Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
When Napster, Limewire, and other peer-to-peer file-sharing networks started slinging music, movies, and other files around the internet two decades ago, they created similar law enforcement headaches. But in each case there was an entity that could be sued for copyright infringement. Software like Augur, which is open-source, freely downloadable, and run on a blockchain, presents genuinely new challenges, says Wright.
That doesn’t mean laws can’t be applied—just that they’ll need to be applied in different ways. For instance, if officials were to rule that Augur was facilitating illicit activity, they might try to go after the people who developed the software, much as malware developers have been held liable for their creations, says Wright. That would be likely to set up a fight over First Amendment protections. Prosecutors could also try to target the users who keep the protocol running. Called “reporters,” they use Augur’s tradable crypto-token, REP, to report outcomes and are rewarded with more tokens if their reports are consistent with the larger consensus. There are potentially other avenues, as well, says Wright: “Just because there is no center doesn’t mean there aren’t indirect ways to attack lawless activity.” Keep up with the latest in blockchain at EmTech MIT.
Discover where tech, business, and culture converge.
September 11-14, 2018 MIT Media Lab
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point! But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
Freenet seems to work when you predominantly or solely use private/dark peers. On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:28 PM Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
On 08/02/2018 04:37 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
Freenet seems to work when you predominantly or solely use private/dark peers.
That's what Freenet folks recommend, and I get the argument. However, I can't imagine how having predominantly darknet peers is safe. Because all it takes is one malicious peer, logging all traffic and searching for fingerprints of interest. And yes, I understand the arguments about indeterminate forwarding. The problem is, if you don't adequately obscure your IP address, you can end up in court, charged with pedophilia. Which Freenet is full of. And you'll have prosecution experts testifying that they know that you were sharing illegal images and video. Even though they haven't cracked your FDE. And even though their technical basis is bullshit. And you will be screwed. Unless you have experts who can pick their shit apart. And unless the judge and jury understand enough to be persuaded, which is unlikely. Also, you may end up jailed indeterminately, if you refuse to provide FDE passphrases. Maybe total darknet can be safe. But it could also be bloody boring. Unless some peers can periodically clone content from opennet. Via some mix of VPNs and Tor, perhaps. But even so, you'll be screwed if you let a malicious peer join your darknet. So it's iffy. If anyone's interested, I can probably find notes on a project to hide Freenet use with Tor/OnionCat. The Freenet node was a VPS, exposing user URLs as onion services. And connecting with darknet peers via OnionCat. Another node, on an unassociated VPS, linked with darknet peers via OnionCat, and with opennet peers via its public IP address. And sure, VPS security sucks. And the opennet peer was readily findable. But finding the darknet peers, and my local VM, would have been rather nontrivial. And in any case, it was all unattributable and throwaway.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:28 PM Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:27:53PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
Free speech (free from censorship and arbitrary punishment against 'speech the state does not like') depends on anonymity, which depends on the transport - e.g. localised face to face conversation on the beach (and no sand bugs in your ears), or some form of mesh networking. At the very least, for digital anonymity, trusted entry nodes to a network, some number (math math) of trusted peer nodes (if all your entry node's peers are untrusted and say kill your link simultaneously, or in symmetric semi-rapid succession, they will likely be able to correlate your communication) and chaff fill links. 'Till then... pigs ain't flyin'.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to go into widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn. On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:38 PM Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:27:53PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
Free speech (free from censorship and arbitrary punishment against 'speech the state does not like') depends on anonymity, which depends on the transport - e.g. localised face to face conversation on the beach (and no sand bugs in your ears), or some form of mesh networking.
At the very least, for digital anonymity, trusted entry nodes to a network, some number (math math) of trusted peer nodes (if all your entry node's peers are untrusted and say kill your link simultaneously, or in symmetric semi-rapid succession, they will likely be able to correlate your communication) and chaff fill links.
'Till then... pigs ain't flyin'.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
God, the chaff fill concept is so dang simple - every time period T, send as many packets to PO(outgoing_bandwidth) to link endoint, if insufficient packets to send, send pseudo random chaff fill packets to get up to PO. That's the outgoing side. The incoming side is of course similar: over T, shape down to PI, dropping packets beyond that limit (+/- S 'slack' packets I guess). SIE (incoming packet shortage event): If PI is deficient, lower incoming rate PI (and notify endpoint of course). Rate reliability of endpoints based on SIE counts per time period RT (reliability analysis time period) - which might also be multi-layered (term?) i.e. do SIE analysis over multiple relevant time periods, e.g. 1s, 10s, 1m, 10m, 1hr. Simple (i.e. asynchronous) event/message protocol to request bandwidth, offer bandwidth in response to request, and offer bandwidth pre-emptively, including time parameters of duration (offer to guarantee rate PI/PO for T, or "best effort"). Best effort might be suitable for some requestors, insufficient for others - make the requests you require, offer what you can, meet your contracts when made, rate those endpoints who fail in their contracts, possibly also include "allegations" (i.e. ratings as made by peers about other peers they've had experience - obviously allegations would carry less weight than personal/own-node experiences, yet, as in the torrent world, may well be useful to improve overall network characteristics. The more fundamental issue with Tor is its currently TCP only design. I2P is therefore probably a better starting point for chaff fill - everything else can be layered on top of ethernet, IP and/ or UDP. Good luck, On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:43:20PM -0700, Steven Schear wrote:
I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to go into widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:38 PM Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:27:53PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
Free speech (free from censorship and arbitrary punishment against 'speech the state does not like') depends on anonymity, which depends on the transport - e.g. localised face to face conversation on the beach (and no sand bugs in your ears), or some form of mesh networking.
At the very least, for digital anonymity, trusted entry nodes to a network, some number (math math) of trusted peer nodes (if all your entry node's peers are untrusted and say kill your link simultaneously, or in symmetric semi-rapid succession, they will likely be able to correlate your communication) and chaff fill links.
'Till then... pigs ain't flyin'.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
dude - I'm not sure what you said but your a brain bro - way outta my league didn't understand a thing you said . On that note I'm retiring from this list bye! -------- Original Message -------- On Aug 2, 2018, 8:16 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
God, the chaff fill concept is so dang simple - every time period T, send as many packets to PO(outgoing_bandwidth) to link endoint, if insufficient packets to send, send pseudo random chaff fill packets to get up to PO.
That's the outgoing side.
The incoming side is of course similar: over T, shape down to PI, dropping packets beyond that limit (+/- S 'slack' packets I guess).
SIE (incoming packet shortage event): If PI is deficient, lower incoming rate PI (and notify endpoint of course).
Rate reliability of endpoints based on SIE counts per time period RT (reliability analysis time period) - which might also be multi-layered (term?) i.e. do SIE analysis over multiple relevant time periods, e.g. 1s, 10s, 1m, 10m, 1hr.
Simple (i.e. asynchronous) event/message protocol to request bandwidth, offer bandwidth in response to request, and offer bandwidth pre-emptively, including time parameters of duration (offer to guarantee rate PI/PO for T, or "best effort").
Best effort might be suitable for some requestors, insufficient for others - make the requests you require, offer what you can, meet your contracts when made, rate those endpoints who fail in their contracts, possibly also include "allegations" (i.e. ratings as made by peers about other peers they've had experience - obviously allegations would carry less weight than personal/own-node experiences, yet, as in the torrent world, may well be useful to improve overall network characteristics.
The more fundamental issue with Tor is its currently TCP only design.
I2P is therefore probably a better starting point for chaff fill - everything else can be layered on top of ethernet, IP and/ or UDP.
Good luck,
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:43:20PM -0700, Steven Schear wrote:
I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to go into widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 4:38 PM Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 04:27:53PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 08/02/2018 04:14 PM, Steven Schear wrote:
"Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
This is, as they say in marketing, not a problem but a feature.
Yep. I mean, that's the fucking point!
But I gotta say, they need to work on the anonymity aspect. The argument that participation anonymity doesn't matter, as long as adversaries can't attribute stuff, is weak. Look at Freenet, for example.
Free speech (free from censorship and arbitrary punishment against 'speech the state does not like') depends on anonymity, which depends on the transport - e.g. localised face to face conversation on the beach (and no sand bugs in your ears), or some form of mesh networking.
At the very least, for digital anonymity, trusted entry nodes to a network, some number (math math) of trusted peer nodes (if all your entry node's peers are untrusted and say kill your link simultaneously, or in symmetric semi-rapid succession, they will likely be able to correlate your communication) and chaff fill links.
'Till then... pigs ain't flyin'.
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611757/this-new-ethereum-based-assassinat...
<SNIP>
I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to go into widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/the-loopix-anonymity-system... https://github.com/UCL-InfoSec/loopix There's the paper and code, BSD-2 license, hack and spin er up.
On Fri, Aug 03, 2018 at 03:16:08AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
I've been waiting for Loopix, or a similar, anonymity overlay to go into widespread testing but it's seems to be stillborn.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/the-loopix-anonymity-system...
https://github.com/UCL-InfoSec/loopix
There's the paper and code, BSD-2 license, hack and spin er up.
Anyone able to succinctly compare the key differences with Tor and I2P?
Send list relavant to list not me.
If you'll notice there's been nothing recent from the original group nor source code contributions. I think they were leaned on by the 5-Eyes to discontinue development. A new group announced, under a different name, last year they would carry the torch. Seem to have last the link(s). Can you find them?
Wtf y'all can't search and post links?
In any case, both were academics. I fear that without practical professionals involved the likelihood of something useful and secure resulting is slim.
Academics... remember that school that took Govt "research" money to bust tor users? The only thing immune is code itself. Lots of open papers and source code out there, so evaluate it, remix it, enhance it, code it, check it, run it... make it poppin. Black boy, black boy Turn that shit down Fuck that Now feel the terror in my sound...
Can't see them scaring the developers into submission as its OS and any attempt to change the code and architecture to thwart its intent will simply cause a fork. On Thu, Aug 2, 2018, 3:55 PM jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
Connectivity
This new Ethereum-based “assassination market” platform could cause Napster-size legal headaches Augur lets people bet on events and pays whoever gets it right—so of course they’re wagering on the deaths of Donald Trump and Jeff Bezos.
* by Mike Orcutt * August 2, 2018
Augur, a new blockchain-based prediction market platform, is getting a lot of media attention because people are using it to predict the deaths of celebrities. But despite fears that the rise of “assassination markets” could inspire real killings, the more urgent problem Augur presents is something else entirely.
1. This piece first appeared in our twice-weekly newsletter Chain Letter, which covers the world of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Sign up here—it’s free!
Really, people saw these sorts of “death pools” coming decades ago, and blockchains, with their decentralized networks and (potentially) anonymous transactions, serve as an ideal platform. Augur’s open-source software relies on blockchain-based computer programs called smart contracts to let users set up their own prediction markets that automatically pool cryptocurrency bets and distribute winnings without the need for participants to identify themselves. Perfect for ginning up interest in offing someone by guaranteeing a payday to whoever does the deed, at least in theory. Predictably, the protocol, which launched July 10, has already led to markets for forecasting the demise of Donald Trump, Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, Betty White, and others. But these markets have seen very few transactions, and the amounts wagered have been tiny, making it unlikely they’d inspire someone to engage in foul play.
Nevertheless, Augur may already be facilitating illegal activity that could prove far more troublesome.
In the US, prediction markets are generally not permitted. Federal and state laws prohibit online gambling, and “in many ways the line between prediction markets and gambling is not that clear,” says Aaron Wright, a professor at the Cardozo School of Law in New York City. Further, some Augur contracts allow users to bet on the future value of something, such as Ether cryptocurrency. That sounds a lot like a type of investment called a binary option, which is unlawful to list without approval from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In 2012, the CFTC sued Intrade, an Ireland-based prediction market, accusing it of permitting US users to trade binary options, and eventually a judge blocked Intrade from offering the contracts in the US.
Sure enough, Augur already has the CFTC’s attention. But even if the agency decides that Augur is breaking the law, how will it enforce that decision? Augur’s creators claim they don’t have control over what its users choose to do with the protocol—or the ability to shut it down. This creates a problem that is “endemic” to blockchain technology, says Wright, who recently co-wrote a book on the subject: “If you do not have a very concrete intermediary—i.e., a company or group of people that are running the marketplace—how do you apply laws and prevent that activity from occurring?”
When Napster, Limewire, and other peer-to-peer file-sharing networks started slinging music, movies, and other files around the internet two decades ago, they created similar law enforcement headaches. But in each case there was an entity that could be sued for copyright infringement. Software like Augur, which is open-source, freely downloadable, and run on a blockchain, presents genuinely new challenges, says Wright.
That doesn’t mean laws can’t be applied—just that they’ll need to be applied in different ways. For instance, if officials were to rule that Augur was facilitating illicit activity, they might try to go after the people who developed the software, much as malware developers have been held liable for their creations, says Wright. That would be likely to set up a fight over First Amendment protections. Prosecutors could also try to target the users who keep the protocol running. Called “reporters,” they use Augur’s tradable crypto-token, REP, to report outcomes and are rewarded with more tokens if their reports are consistent with the larger consensus. There are potentially other avenues, as well, says Wright: “Just because there is no center doesn’t mean there aren’t indirect ways to attack lawless activity.” Keep up with the latest in blockchain at EmTech MIT.
Discover where tech, business, and culture converge.
September 11-14, 2018 MIT Media Lab
participants (6)
-
grarpamp -
jim bell -
Mirimir -
rooty -
Steven Schear -
Zenaan Harkness