UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 11:28:49AM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
So we have various countries banning end to end encryption - Russia, possibly China?, now the UK ... what is stopping America from doing so? The Zimmerman (PGP) case? The CIA's need/use/funding for Tor, and their need for many "average Joes" to use it also, for it to work?
On 07/16/2016 04:49 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 11:28:49AM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
So we have various countries banning end to end encryption - Russia, possibly China?, now the UK ... what is stopping America from doing so?
The Zimmerman (PGP) case?
That just protects writing about it, including code. Not using it.
The CIA's need/use/funding for Tor, and their need for many "average Joes" to use it also, for it to work?
Maybe so. That would be funny :)
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 4:03 AM Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net> wrote:
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 11:28:49AM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
So we have various countries banning end to end encryption - Russia, possibly China?, now the UK ... what is stopping America from doing so?
It's not entirely clear that it's even legal in the US to force backdoors/key escrow/etc. And even if it is, the USG seems to prefer more subtle means of control. Forcing key escrow or backdoors is something of a sledgehammer, and it gets a LOT of attention from civil libertarians. Also, I think Apple has had a hand in keeping it from happening. They have a lot of influence (read: money to pay for lobbyists and donate to political campaigns), and their whole business model is built on not having access to your data, to distinguish themselves from Google, which gets a large fraction of its income from serving targeted ads. Facebook and Google are starting to do end-to-end, but both companies seem a bit more hesitant about it. I suspect WhatsApp did it in part to hold Facebook to their word that they would never scan private messages for ad targeting purposes, and FB Messenger end-to-end is opt-in AIUI. But even if a ban on end-to-end might slightly benefit each company by giving them an excuse for retaining access, the USG seems to prefer key escrow, which doesn't benefit them at all while creating an additional cost. Personally I'm a bit conflicted over the whole thing. Pragmatically, not morally. A ban on end-to-end or even forced key escrow would push the more idealistic people to start working on and using better open source solutions. One should not trust any crypto that can be turned off silently with a remote flag flip.
The Zimmerman (PGP) case?
The CIA's need/use/funding for Tor, and their need for many "average Joes" to use it also, for it to work?
On 16/07/16 09:28, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
Things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. To a very close approximation. Practically speaking, indistinguishable from zero. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act. Which in this case is pretty bad, but not a power to ban end-to-end encryption. In fact, it doesn't affect most in-use forms of end-to-end encryption at all. And it doesn't say anything at all about applying your own encryption. Details below, if interested. -- Peter Fairbrother The ostensible target may be internet/phone service providers, to force backdoors in mobile links and VPNs - but the actual target is "relevant operators". It includes a whole lot of other things apart from internet and phone providers (and Apple and Facebook). "Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system." That would include many commercial sites who use SSL/TLS. If you put a "contact me" link on your web pages, you are a "relevant operator". Gimme your SSL keys! That's what the Bill actually says, if you read it carefully. Like RIPA, it is opaque beyond the point of obscurity, and it takes a lot of reading. Good points? Only encryption which has been applied by a "relevant operator" is affected - at least until the Home Secretary makes regulations otherwise (which under the Bill she can do). Bad points? It doesn't do anything at all against the clued-up terrorist or criminal. It decreases security for legitimate actors and businesses. BTW, things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 06:02:57PM +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 16/07/16 09:28, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
First part:
Things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. To a very close approximation. Practically speaking, indistinguishable from zero.
What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Which in this case is pretty bad, but not a power to ban end-to-end encryption.
In fact, it doesn't affect most in-use forms of end-to-end encryption at all.
Second part:
"Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system."
That would include many commercial sites who use SSL/TLS. If you put a "contact me" link on your web pages, you are a "relevant operator". Gimme your SSL keys!
I'm not sure how you can say the first part above, in the face of quoting and saying what you do in the second part.
That's what the Bill actually says, if you read it carefully. Like RIPA, it is opaque beyond the point of obscurity, and it takes a lot of reading.
You quoted the relevant part, thank you. That part does not take much reading to see how bad it truly is, even though the rest (unquoted) of the bill may be massively opaque.
Good points? Only encryption which has been applied by a "relevant operator" is affected -
So something is good, or potentially good - let's find out what:
at least until the Home Secretary makes regulations otherwise (which under the Bill she can do).
In other words, the bill doesn't automatically affect the status quo of existing websites (website certificates?) because, well who knows, that's the current interpretation but tomorrow's interpretation can just as well be "hand over your keys bitch, or you're going to jail" even if you are Facebook or Google (though the "going to jail" bit, if it were possible, would be a good outcome for Facebook for example ... alas, I dream)! And the determination of who has to hand over keys (i.e. who is a "relevant operator") is nothing more than whatever the Home Secretary (currently female it seems) says! Perhaps next week is her bad week of the month and your free speech website (nicely TLSed with personally issued and in person verified certificate provider keys etc) happens to have a discussion which pushes her (the Home Secretary's) trigger word buttons. And you say this is GOOD?! WTF? Am I misunderstanding something here? Sounds as good as North America's endless extra-judicial drone killings (that's murder, and despotic, in case it's not otherwise obvious to you).
Bad points? It doesn't do anything at all against the clued-up terrorist or criminal. It decreases security for legitimate actors and businesses.
You say that as though there are good points, see above.
BTW, things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Thanks for quoting the relevant part of the act, and letting us know that the definitions for "relevant operator"s will be handed down extra- judicially by the Home Secretary. How very, democratic we might as well call it..
A very good example of a Lie (by Peter Fairbrother) and a further precise exposure of the contradictions within the Lie (by Zenaan). P.s For future attempts by liars: So apparent contradictions in the lie itself... you know, Peter/mr. X... it doesn't add too much authenticity to it. However, there is still a chance that a superficial sheeple will swallow it. But thanks God, we've got Zenaan :) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Zenaan Harkness <zen@freedbms.net> Date: 2016-07-17 4:42 GMT+03:00 Subject: Re: UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption To: cypherpunks@cpunks.org On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 06:02:57PM +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 16/07/16 09:28, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
First part:
Things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. To a very close approximation. Practically speaking, indistinguishable from zero.
What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Which in this case is pretty bad, but not a power to ban end-to-end encryption.
In fact, it doesn't affect most in-use forms of end-to-end encryption at all.
Second part:
"Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system."
That would include many commercial sites who use SSL/TLS. If you put a "contact me" link on your web pages, you are a "relevant operator". Gimme your SSL keys!
I'm not sure how you can say the first part above, in the face of quoting and saying what you do in the second part.
That's what the Bill actually says, if you read it carefully. Like RIPA, it is opaque beyond the point of obscurity, and it takes a lot of reading.
You quoted the relevant part, thank you. That part does not take much reading to see how bad it truly is, even though the rest (unquoted) of the bill may be massively opaque.
Good points? Only encryption which has been applied by a "relevant operator" is affected -
So something is good, or potentially good - let's find out what:
at least until the Home Secretary makes regulations otherwise (which under the Bill she can do).
In other words, the bill doesn't automatically affect the status quo of existing websites (website certificates?) because, well who knows, that's the current interpretation but tomorrow's interpretation can just as well be "hand over your keys bitch, or you're going to jail" even if you are Facebook or Google (though the "going to jail" bit, if it were possible, would be a good outcome for Facebook for example ... alas, I dream)! And the determination of who has to hand over keys (i.e. who is a "relevant operator") is nothing more than whatever the Home Secretary (currently female it seems) says! Perhaps next week is her bad week of the month and your free speech website (nicely TLSed with personally issued and in person verified certificate provider keys etc) happens to have a discussion which pushes her (the Home Secretary's) trigger word buttons. And you say this is GOOD?! WTF? Am I misunderstanding something here? Sounds as good as North America's endless extra-judicial drone killings (that's murder, and despotic, in case it's not otherwise obvious to you).
Bad points? It doesn't do anything at all against the clued-up terrorist or criminal. It decreases security for legitimate actors and businesses.
You say that as though there are good points, see above.
BTW, things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Thanks for quoting the relevant part of the act, and letting us know that the definitions for "relevant operator"s will be handed down extra- judicially by the Home Secretary. How very, democratic we might as well call it..
You flatter me too much; I give thanks for my existence - these bodies and this world are just amazing. And I ask my fellow humans for patience, tolerance and forgiveness for my many failings. I am certainly glad when able to share a moment of clarity, and grateful to those who clearly point out any failings as I present such... it's a long journey being human, and we share this little old world together. Kind regards, Zen On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 07:50:20AM +0300, Александр wrote:
A very good example of a Lie (by Peter Fairbrother) and a further precise exposure of the contradictions within the Lie (by Zenaan).
P.s For future attempts by liars: So apparent contradictions in the lie itself... you know, Peter/mr. X... it doesn't add too much authenticity to it. However, there is still a chance that a superficial sheeple will swallow it. But thanks God, we've got Zenaan :)
On 17/07/16 02:42, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 06:02:57PM +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 16/07/16 09:28, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
First part:
Things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. To a very close approximation. Practically speaking, indistinguishable from zero.
What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Which in this case is pretty bad, but not a power to ban end-to-end encryption.
In fact, it doesn't affect most in-use forms of end-to-end encryption at all.
Second part:
"Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system."
That would include many commercial sites who use SSL/TLS. If you put a "contact me" link on your web pages, you are a "relevant operator". Gimme your SSL keys!
I'm not sure how you can say the first part above, in the face of quoting and saying what you do in the second part.
That's what the Bill actually says, if you read it carefully. Like RIPA, it is opaque beyond the point of obscurity, and it takes a lot of reading.
You quoted the relevant part, thank you. That part does not take much reading to see how bad it truly is, even though the rest (unquoted) of the bill may be massively opaque.
Actually, just finding that in the Bill wasn't easy - and it isn't a single part, it's taken from at least five different places in the Bill. If it seems clear, then I did a good job putting them together. Thing is, while the Bill isn't good, it doesn't have anything at all to do with banning end-to-end encryption. Or banning any sort of encryption. It can require "relevant operators" to maintain some backdoors, most obviously in mobile link encryption and some VPNs and other encrypted links which are operated by "relevant operators". Less obviously, it can be applied to some websites and the like. But there is no power to ban encryption anywhere in the Bill. If you as a private person apply the encryption yourself, there is no power in the Bill to make you backdoor it (though there have been powers in RIPA to enforce demands for keys in some circumstances since 2001), and there is no power to prevent you from using encryption.
Good points? Only encryption which has been applied by a "relevant operator" is affected -
So something is good, or potentially good - let's find out what:
at least until the Home Secretary makes regulations otherwise (which under the Bill she can do).
In other words, the bill doesn't automatically affect the status quo of existing websites (website certificates?) because, well who knows, that's the current interpretation but tomorrow's interpretation can just as well be "hand over your keys bitch, or you're going to jail" even if you are Facebook or Google (though the "going to jail" bit, if it were possible, would be a good outcome for Facebook for example ... alas, I dream)!
And the determination of who has to hand over keys (i.e. who is a "relevant operator") is nothing more than whatever the Home Secretary (currently female it seems)
Yep, we have a brand new female Home Secretary. The old one is now Prime Minister ... (and she's madder than Mad Maggy Thatcher ever was 8-( says! Perhaps next week is her bad week of
the month and your free speech website (nicely TLSed with personally issued and in person verified certificate provider keys etc) happens to have a discussion which pushes her (the Home Secretary's) trigger word buttons.
And you say this is GOOD?!
WTF? Am I misunderstanding something here?
I was not clear - while the HS can extend the notices to eg include other forms of encryption not applied by "relevant operators", she cannot serve notices on, or force any other obligation on, anyone except "relevant operators". If you are a private citizen and you aren't providing a service, she can't prevent you from doing any encryption you like, nor can she make you backdoor it. PGP is okay, and there's not a thing in the Bill which says she can do anything to ban it. Neither can she stop people using SSL/TLS, or except in the case of some UK-based servers, mandate backdoors in it. She could in theory serve a notice on Google, Apple or Facebook - but in practice, none of these would actually be obligated to obey it.
Sounds as good as North America's endless extra-judicial drone killings (that's murder, and despotic, in case it's not otherwise obvious to you).
Bad points? It doesn't do anything at all against the clued-up terrorist or criminal. It decreases security for legitimate actors and businesses.
You say that as though there are good points, see above.
BTW, things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Thanks for quoting the relevant part of the act, and letting us know that the definitions for "relevant operator"s will be handed down extra- judicially by the Home Secretary.
err, no - that one is defined in the Bill, she can't change the meaning of "relevant operator". She can change some of the things she requires "relevant operators" to do - but if you aren't a "relevant operator" she can't require you to do anything.
How very, democratic we might as well call it..
hmmm -- Peter Fairbrother
On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 09:28:49AM +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 17/07/16 02:42, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 06:02:57PM +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 16/07/16 09:28, Georgi Guninski wrote:
Hope this is not duplicate, the personal drivels were quite noisy.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_po...
UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-end encryption
Very sound, nice and democratic...
First part:
Things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. To a very close approximation. Practically speaking, indistinguishable from zero.
What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Which in this case is pretty bad, but not a power to ban end-to-end encryption.
In fact, it doesn't affect most in-use forms of end-to-end encryption at all.
Second part:
"Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system."
That would include many commercial sites who use SSL/TLS. If you put a "contact me" link on your web pages, you are a "relevant operator". Gimme your SSL keys!
I'm not sure how you can say the first part above, in the face of quoting and saying what you do in the second part.
That's what the Bill actually says, if you read it carefully. Like RIPA, it is opaque beyond the point of obscurity, and it takes a lot of reading.
You quoted the relevant part, thank you. That part does not take much reading to see how bad it truly is, even though the rest (unquoted) of the bill may be massively opaque.
Actually, just finding that in the Bill wasn't easy - and it isn't a single part, it's taken from at least five different places in the Bill. If it seems clear, then I did a good job putting them together.
Jolly good show ole chap! Jolly good show... Listen up everyone, we have a humble servent of thee who doth provide copious work products for thy glory and satisfaction. Please, do think of the humble! Here we go round the mulberry bush, the muleberyy bush, da mulled bree bush, here we go ... ahem, ok, ok, I'll stop there. Here we go again - now watch closely, I'll only do this once; it's a magic trick see, so if I do it twice, it spoils the fun. Now: First part:
Thing is, while the Bill isn't good, it doesn't have anything at all to do with banning end-to-end encryption. Or banning any sort of encryption.
Second part:
It can require "relevant operators" to maintain some backdoors, most obviously in mobile link encryption and some VPNs and other encrypted links which are operated by "relevant operators".
Less obviously, it can be applied to some websites and the like.
Third part, which is really the first part repeated, for kicks:
But there is no power to ban encryption anywhere in the Bill.
TADAAA!!! And the winner is - no one! This is sad. The bill is sad. Your interpretation is self contradictory. Your quotes are clear. The clarity iluciferdated is appreciated. You contra conclusions are a weird kinda magic trick. But hey, feel free to keep saying black is white - at least I'm enjoying it :D
If you as a private person apply the encryption yourself, there is no power in the Bill to make you backdoor it (though there have been powers in RIPA to enforce demands for keys in some circumstances since 2001), and there is no power to prevent you from using encryption.
OK, I'll help out here - read this paragraph just above again, then without blinking (I'm serious now) read the following paragraph three times:
"Relevant operators" are persons who provide "any service that consists in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service) [... including] any case where a service consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a system."
I'm getting lazy, so I'm going to trust you to point out to us, in simple terms, your own contradiction, e.g. how a commieputer program running on my phone, and talking to Juan or Applebaum's phone which is likewise running the same program, how this program for example could be considered to be encompassed by "any service", with me, running that program as the "relevant operator" of my telemaphone, which service so operated consists of provision (to me the operator, likewise to Juan or Appelbaum at the other end as mentioned) of "access to" or at the very least "facilitates for making use of" a certain "telecommuniscations system" provided by my ISP/Telco (and likewise by/for Juan or Applebaum at the other end as previously mentions), and further which program manages the latency of, facilitates the creation of the connection, and optionally stores for the operator the data thereby transmitted, or that may be transmitted next time I operate this sytsem, my means -of- the system. Again, I'll leave it to you to point out such an example for the benefit of our loyal, deserving and patronising readers.
Good points? Only encryption which has been applied by a "relevant operator" is affected -
So something is good, or potentially good - let's find out what:
at least until the Home Secretary makes regulations otherwise (which under the Bill she can do).
In other words, the bill doesn't automatically affect the status quo of existing websites (website certificates?) because, well who knows, that's the current interpretation but tomorrow's interpretation can just as well be "hand over your keys bitch, or you're going to jail" even if you are Facebook or Google (though the "going to jail" bit, if it were possible, would be a good outcome for Facebook for example ... alas, I dream)!
And the determination of who has to hand over keys (i.e. who is a "relevant operator") is nothing more than whatever the Home Secretary (currently female it seems)
Yep, we have a brand new female Home Secretary. The old one is now Prime Minister ...
(and she's madder than Mad Maggy Thatcher ever was 8-(
says! Perhaps next week is her bad week of
the month and your free speech website (nicely TLSed with personally issued and in person verified certificate provider keys etc) happens to have a discussion which pushes her (the Home Secretary's) trigger word buttons.
And you say this is GOOD?!
WTF? Am I misunderstanding something here?
I was not clear - while the HS can extend the notices to eg include other forms of encryption
(I'll assume those particular forms of encryption are those particular forms of encryption not covered by the Act of course, since as you so magnanimously pointed out, the Act does not ban any end to end encryption.)
not applied by "relevant operators", she cannot serve notices on, or force any other obligation on, anyone except "relevant operators".
Ahh ok, so so long as I am not added to her unilaterally designated and completely hidden (for national security purposes of course) "no fly" list, whoops sorry, I mean "may not end to end encrypt" list, i.e. as long as I am not designated as a terrorist, whoops sorry again, I mean "relevant operator", which I am not entitled to know about, and for which, if I were so designated, either individually or as a class, say "those humans who have subscribed to cypherpunks list, made a phone call to Iraq or Syria, made any donation to Greenpeace (those bloody terrorists), or used the Tor Browser Bundle, attended a Communist Party event, participated in an Occupy protest, or have any family member who protested against Vietnam war, Falklands war, Afganistan war, the cold war or any other way, then I should be ok to keep using end to end encryption?
If you are a private citizen and you aren't providing a service,
Which for example if I am running Linphone in a VM on CyanogenMod on my mobile handset, I could never be "considered to be providing or operating or managing and potentially providing access to" any "telecommunications service" to myself, with or without "conference room" audio facility to connect a few Libyans in a conference call, or ... Can you see the picture?
she can't prevent you from doing any encryption you like, nor can she make you backdoor it.
As long as ALL of the above conditions are met, and ALL of the conditions we have not yet thought of are met, by me, then I should be A-OK, she'll be right mate, just end to end encrypt right on brother... right?
PGP is okay,
Woah! Awesome. Thanks Peter for your legal interpretation of that Act and its exemption for PGP! Come on guys, now swap out libtorcrypt.so and plug in libgpgcrypt.so instead - Peter tells us that'll be A-OK and we'll all get a free ticket for facilitating our end to end voice, text, chat and video calls to any and all, right around the world! Jump on the Free Train - We live in a dee-mock-crass see? Sing it brother, we are SAVED! Sing it from the hill tops!
and there's not a thing in the Bill which says she can do anything to ban it.
Phew! Pete, brother, you really had me going there for a while I really thought we were all fucked..
Neither can she stop people using SSL/TLS, or except in the case of some UK-based servers, mandate backdoors in it.
Ahh ok, so as long as Juan or Applebaum don't run their phone directory and voice service daemon on their mobile handset, in the geographic territory called UK, only THEN are we all ok. Shit, I dunno WHAT to believe. Peter, you make it so confusing?
She could in theory serve a notice on Google, Apple or Facebook - but in practice, none of these would actually be obligated to obey it.
Because they could never be classified by her as relevant operators - only terrorist would ever be so classified. Ladies, and, Gentlemen! We have conclusion!
Sounds as good as North America's endless extra-judicial drone killings (that's murder, and despotic, in case it's not otherwise obvious to you).
Bad points? It doesn't do anything at all against the clued-up terrorist or criminal. It decreases security for legitimate actors and businesses.
You say that as though there are good points, see above.
BTW, things said in the Lords (or Commons), even by Government spokesmen, have approximately zero legal significance. What the Courts look at is the wording of the Act.
Thanks for quoting the relevant part of the act, and letting us know that the definitions for "relevant operator"s will be handed down extra- judicially by the Home Secretary.
err, no - that one is defined in the Bill, she can't change the meaning of "relevant operator".
She can change some of the things she requires "relevant operators" to do - but if you aren't a "relevant operator" she can't require you to do anything.
Wellllll ... Peter ... you certainly cleared all that up. The bill only applies to relevant operators, which could never be Facebook or Google, probably could never be end user operators, unless possibly their bodies are physically located in the UK, but it's likely the new Act would apply to terrorist, but we're not sure, we do no it will likely harm Facebook and Google, but it doesn't apply to them because no court would ever uphold that they are relevant operators. Peter, we mere humans are eternally grateful. Please, do come again...
I was not clear - while the HS can extend the notices to eg include other forms of encryption not applied by "relevant operators", she cannot serve notices on, or force any other obligation on, anyone except "relevant operators".
If you are a private citizen and you aren't providing a service, she can't prevent you from doing any encryption you like, nor can she make you backdoor it.
PGP is okay, and there's not a thing in the Bill which says she can do anything to ban it.
Neither can she stop people using SSL/TLS, or except in the case of some UK-based servers, mandate backdoors in it.
She could in theory serve a notice on Google, Apple or Facebook - but in practice, none of these would actually be obligated to obey it.
You sir, receive the award from The Ministry of Truth! In all seriousness, you need to read, re-read, and read again, that which you write. I will assume for now that you are well intentioned, but take notice, as the old saying goes "the road to hell is paved with good intentions". Please, if you want to contribute to comprehending this new UK act, you will need to slow it waaay down, because you are writing conclusions, assumptions, with minimal quotes from the act, and making assertions based on these foundation things, and these foundation things are contradictory, and your conclusions are contradictory. Perhaps it's the British way, or perhaps the intention behind the passing of this Act is so nefarious, that the only way they could pass it was to be as obtuse, opaque and contradictory as it is, so that, ultimately, they (the parliament and those behind it - "the Lords spiritual and the Lods temporal") can wreak their mischief on the 'unsuspecting' people. Peter, if your intention be genuinely "pro" the people and "pro" human rights or at least "pro" understanding/comprehending, my assessment is that so far, you are diving into the trap this Act sets and intends for you - i.e. that you be "unsuspecting" of evil intentions behind it, trusting in the government, trusting in those who drafted it, trusting in your "Lords temporal" - I urge you to be not so trusting, and you may find it easier to home in on the keys, finding that clarity which is implied in your attempt to bring to others the meaning, intentions and consequences of this Act of the UK parliament. Colloquially (again) - FFS WAKE UP!
participants (6)
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Georgi Guninski -
Mirimir -
Peter Fairbrother -
Sean Lynch -
Zenaan Harkness -
Александр