https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ethical-tor-research-guidelines Interesting problem: to use Tor is to say you trust your ISP less than some pseudorandom person over the internet.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11/11/2015 02:27 PM, Ryan Carboni wrote:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ethical-tor-research-guidelines
Interesting problem: to use Tor is to say you trust your ISP less than some pseudorandom person over the internet.
My ISP is a proven malicious actor, actively cooperating with even more malicious actors. Whether and how this is relevant depends entirely on the threat model I am addressing: Specific assets vs. known classes of adversaries, in the context of my use case. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWQ6dMAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0LpLkP/jIxq2NiNfmyu0DhDrvKDWo3 DdaQFD7ghcsfLn6xU4kt8gS7gaBQmAr9VvvLxxKewr9sBxdIlNI93EeDDzm1Tej0 al6r5pA2ZbNl9Q42v1uZDoUI4XKTzvDolAI8y0/DDPWOAiWVxv9hKxjuoVc7R75U 2dBIxHgs+rvg2NOSrsSOyHDZJ38t1TrH3aohLkLdaqx5qY1BNaepJV/gnqtvTqx/ 6mzCoqQaljc7qLyBU7CepUXyZKbCyWNuzoGIlQ7luPGdusChRSgvL3LBmlO43u+V 30/4x7O0a549SMby4mxG9l7dNH1XXSfnFjhYt8UNZ4mgFzrqduxQDSBKucBdRwS4 dy7FdSiKEErnOtDoKbfwR8vIQvkuzbRzb4LgF+BKH6U3cB+IRW+aQHTVo8TEWC/E FVn0JJhpEiPIA9m4ZkRw9oZ+csO0ntQAvI829JxCh4ChX94Vu5cezopptne4/OBz epgbh38kuo5RNSK+09c56MNE45tusVSAfVRztYYTBwPekc/b5mlrUgWRnpUo1WDp 8bxkASpvvcZoXAjzoIsX2Hwo+TnuKKt/XGxr+oPS8vaJ0R8RH6BVKAgUEb6p7x1W 70lgULVhNU+HZrchhUDNN5B1HfTTAvgj9B3OgJw//jQ8nPyE+cHAlb8OqFBgLzAQ q6UfDLNolvds5IKlU6S+ =r3/W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On 11/11/2015 12:27 PM, Ryan Carboni wrote:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/ethical-tor-research-guidelines
Interesting problem: to use Tor is to say you trust your ISP less than some pseudorandom person over the internet.
Sadly enough, that's often prudent. Some ISPs are honorable, for sure. But many are duplicitous scum. In any case, it's more accurate to say that about your VPN provider. With Tor, you're trusting the system, but system integrity is resilient to malicious nodes. So you're not trusting any one of them fully, even your entry guard, as much as you would have been trusting your ISP.
participants (3)
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Mirimir -
Ryan Carboni -
Steve Kinney