[pfSense] Crypto/RNG Suggestions
----- Forwarded message from Jim Pingle <lists@pingle.org> ----- Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 08:19:40 -0400 From: Jim Pingle <lists@pingle.org> To: pfSense support and discussion <list@lists.pfsense.org> Subject: [pfSense] Crypto/RNG Suggestions Message-ID: <52569B5C.5030804@pingle.org> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 Reply-To: pfSense support and discussion <list@lists.pfsense.org> I'm moving this to a fresh thread so that it will be unencumbered by the other discussion that has strayed a bit. Even if one were to ignore government agency interference, finding the best crypto choices is a good topic, but it can easily get lost in the other discussion when some people have written off the other topic. So lets try to keep this thread solely on the technical topic of cryptographic quality. On 10/10/2013 5:39 AM, Giles Coochey wrote:
1. Which Ciphers & Transforms should we now consider secure (pfsense provides quite a few cipher choices over some other off the shelf hardware.
I haven't yet seen anything conclusive. People have called into question some or all of ECC, NSA's suggested Suite B, and so on. I put some links in a previous message[1]. If anyone knows of some solid research showing specific ciphers have been compromised, I'd love to see it so we can inform users.
2. What hardware / software & configuration changes can we consider to improve RNG and ensure that should we increase the bit size of our encryption, reduce lifetimes of our SAs that we can still ensure we have enough entropy in the RNG on a device that is typically starved of traditional entropy sources.
We use the RNG from FreeBSD so that may be a better question for a FreeBSD-specific forum or list. There may be people here that know, however, you're more likely to get better feedback from FreeBSD directly. Jim 1: http://lists.pfsense.org/pipermail/list/2013-October/004773.html _______________________________________________ List mailing list List@lists.pfsense.org http://lists.pfsense.org/mailman/listinfo/list ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
On 2013-10-10 22:21, Eugen Leitl wrote:
----- Forwarded message from Jim Pingle <lists@pingle.org> -----
I haven't yet seen anything conclusive. People have called into question some or all of ECC, NSA's suggested Suite B, and so on. I put some links in a previous message[1]. If anyone knows of some solid research showing specific ciphers have been compromised, I'd love to see it so we can inform users.
There is a smoking gun on one of random number generators. There is strong circumstantial evidence, reason for suspicion, on suggested Suite B. AES and SHA look to be fine, but using them gives the appearance to end users that you might be playing footsie with NIST. Jon Callas has therefore made Twofish and Skein the default for silent circle.
participants (2)
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Eugen Leitl -
James A. Donald