Interpreting Data About ISIS Online (Center for Public Diplomacy)
Interpreting Data About ISIS Online Oct 6, 2016 Challenging ISIS has little to do with their number of followers, or the decline in their number of messages. This type of tactical-level data can indicate success, but genuine impact can only occur with robust interpretation of data at the strategic level. Recent studies have been used to claim success in reducing the number of followers and volume of ISIS content on social media. Reports which appear to show decline are seized on and used by many of the Public Diplomacy and Information Operations strategies deployed against ISIS, which seek opportunities to highlight failures and losses of the group. Yet it is equally clear that, despite increasing efforts by western governments and social media providers to counter ISIS online, ISIS continues to produce and disseminate large quantities of ideologically-inspired audio visual content and information. Equally, individuals who have never had direct contact with the group commit acts of violence in their name. As such, it is often the case that the detail tells a different story than some of the claims made about the data, specifically that ISIS is experiencing a decline in followers and content on Twitter.< Decline in the Number of Twitter Followers The decline in the number of followers is frequently cited by those seeking to emphasize success against ISIS. I’ve written previously about the significant problems in the data collection and analysis in one of the frequently cited studies. Even so, this study is cited as showing a decline in follower numbers, despite actually concluding that “suspensions held the size and reach of the overall network flat, while devastating the reach of specific users who have been repeatedly targeted.” Claims of success against an adversary must account for fluctuations in said adversary’s tactics. Social media platforms are fundamentally social networks. The metrics about followers which Twitter produces are accurate for an individual account, but cannot simply be aggregated to show the total number of followers in a specific network. If number of followers is aggregated, it will likely produce wildly inflated numbers for reach, and equally overstate the decline in ISIS social media. The falling follower fallacy is demonstrated in the image below. In it, the same nodes are shown connected in different configurations, similar to the three types or topologies John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt highlighted in their discussion of Netwar. [Chart] Reading left to right, the different layouts demonstrate that: Aggregating follower numbers inflates the number of accounts that appear to be in the network. The decline in aggregated follower numbers cannot be read as showing decline in the number of accounts in the network. The decline in aggregated follower numbers cannot be used to show that the network is being disrupted. Ultimately, the Twitter strategy is to disseminate content, not gather followers. In fact, distributing content rather than gaining followers is the stated objective within ISIS networks, and as shown here, this is entirely possible despite declining aggregate follower numbers..." More, with links: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/interpreting-data-about-isis-online
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