or, "keeping the 0day hopper full of candidates to weaponize" (you red or blue team? ;) http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/01/ffmpeg-and-thousand-fixes.h... """ FFmpeg and a thousand fixes Friday, January 10, 2014 9:06 AM Posted by Mateusz Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind, Information Security Engineers At Google, security is a top priority - not only for our own products, but across the entire Internet. That’s why members of the Google Security Team and other Googlers frequently perform audits of software and report the resulting findings to the respective vendors or maintainers, as shown in the official “Vulnerabilities - Application Security” list. We also try to employ the extensive computing power of our data centers in order to solve some of the security challenges by performing large-scale automated testing, commonly known as fuzzing. One internal fuzzing effort we have been running continuously for the past two years is the testing process of FFmpeg, a large cross-platform solution to record, convert and stream audio and video written in C. It is used in multiple applications and software libraries such as Google Chrome, MPlayer, VLC or xine. We started relatively small by making use of trivial mutation algorithms, some 500 cores and input media samples gathered from readily available sources such as the samples.mplayerhq.hu sample base and FFmpeg FATE regression testing suite. Later on, we grew to more complex and effective mutation methods, 2000 cores and an input corpus supported by sample files improving the overall code coverage. Following more than two years of work, we are happy to announce that the FFmpeg project has incorporated more than a thousand fixes to bugs (including some security issues) that we have discovered in the project so far: $ git log | grep Jurczyk | grep -c Coldwind 1120 ... we have carried out several dozen fuzzing iterations (each typically resulting in less crashes than the previous ones) over the last two years, identifying bugs of a number of different classes: NULL pointer dereferences, Invalid pointer arithmetic leading to SIGSEGV due to unmapped memory access, Out-of-bounds reads and writes to stack, heap and static-based arrays, Invalid free() calls, Double free() calls over the same pointer, Division errors, Assertion failures, Use of uninitialized memory. We have simultaneously worked with the developers of Libav, an independent fork of FFmpeg, in order to have both projects represent an equal, high level of robustness and security posture. Today, Libav is at 413 fixes and the library is slowly but surely catching up with FFmpeg. """