Free Advice for FBI/OPM/NSA/DOE: full-disclosure hardware
Okay, so apparently the CIA pulled a fast one on you, and now everyone with a security clearance is (probably) getting doxed[1]. "Outsiders must be deputized to audit the systems, brutally assess their failings, and put together an aggressive plan to both find existing breaches (who knows what’s still lurking in OPM’s systems right now?) and prevent further ones. Every government agency should be subject to an outside cybersecurity audit, and I include the NSA in that" So since I'm a nice guy (or maybe just a guy with an open-source hardware business plan) the first thing I want to audit is the PCB layout of the server(s) that got hacked. I'll even do it for free if you publish the schematic and board layout under a license compatible with the Debian Free Software guidelines. Now, on the other hand, if your hardware vendor is going to whine like a child who got caught with their hand in the candy jar about 'IP' and such, I will be happy to start reviewing how broken Intel/AMD/etc chips and motherboards are with a confidentiality agreement if you agree to pay my retainer. (which is approximately the amount I need to buy some farmland and wind turbines.) [1] http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/06/opm_hack_it_s_... So if anyone is actually serious about security, then I'll know because there will be more than just me talking about why we need full-disclosure hardware that you can X-ray and compare to an image signed and hosted by multiple independent and competing nation-state or multinational-corporate level security agencies. If your Intel motherboard matches the image signed by IBM, China Telcom, and Iran, than it's probably safe for Democrats to use, and good for Republicans if Saudi Arabia signs it. Any politician using an image signed only by an agency they supervise should be immediately impeached.
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Troy Benjegerdes <hozer@hozed.org> wrote:
PCB layout of the server(s) that got hacked.
The gate counts in the chips moots the PCB.
'IP' and such ... because there will be more than just me talking about why we need full-disclosure hardware that you can X-ray and compare to an image signed and hosted by multiple independent and competing nation-state or multinational-corporate level security agencies. ... If your Intel motherboard matches the image signed by IBM,
Private xraying to validate an individual chip is fine, but does nothing for everyone else. If you already have and are validating the [somehow open] image, you might as well open-source and open-up the entire fab. That way you know everything rolling off the line is good. While you may trust the chip to image in your hand, do you trust Intel, Huawei, Qualcomm, TSMC? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundry_model
Has anyone ever established or tried building trust model with any of these producers? It's rather hard to invent that wheel. I've heard that setting up a foundry is quite a bit of work. And in today's environment it is a significant advantage to produce community vetted hardware. So we might be able to get a solid business model behind this. On 6/17/2015 3:27 AM, grarpamp wrote:
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Troy Benjegerdes <hozer@hozed.org> wrote:
PCB layout of the server(s) that got hacked. The gate counts in the chips moots the PCB.
'IP' and such ... because there will be more than just me talking about why we need full-disclosure hardware that you can X-ray and compare to an image signed and hosted by multiple independent and competing nation-state or multinational-corporate level security agencies. ... If your Intel motherboard matches the image signed by IBM, Private xraying to validate an individual chip is fine, but does nothing for everyone else. If you already have and are validating the [somehow open] image, you might as well open-source and open-up the entire fab. That way you know everything rolling off the line is good. While you may trust the chip to image in your hand, do you trust Intel, Huawei, Qualcomm, TSMC?
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Tim Beelen <tim@diffalt.com> wrote:
Has anyone ever established or tried building trust model with any of these producers? It's rather hard to invent that wheel. I've heard that setting up a foundry is quite a bit of work. And in today's environment it is a significant advantage to produce community vetted hardware. So we might be able to get a solid business model behind this.
On 6/17/2015 3:27 AM, grarpamp wrote:
On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Troy Benjegerdes <hozer@hozed.org> wrote:
PCB layout of the server(s) that got hacked.
The gate counts in the chips moots the PCB.
'IP' and such
... because there will be more than just me talking about why we need full-disclosure hardware that you can X-ray and compare to an image signed and hosted by multiple independent and competing nation-state or multinational-corporate level security agencies. ... If your Intel motherboard matches the image signed by IBM,
Private xraying to validate an individual chip is fine, but does nothing for everyone else. If you already have and are validating the [somehow open] image, you might as well open-source and open-up the entire fab. That way you know everything rolling off the line is good. While you may trust the chip to image in your hand, do you trust Intel, Huawei, Qualcomm, TSMC?
OK, yes - being able to verify first and foremost that the PCB you have matches some reference is an important first step for guaranteed hardware security. Perhaps building an accessible verifier might be the logical first step. How effective is this X-Ray method for detecting hardware modifications [what is the resolution?] How do you process two different X-Ray images, remove the noise (normalize) to compare two different documents? -Travis -- Twitter <https://twitter.com/tbiehn> | LinkedIn <http://www.linkedin.com/in/travisbiehn> | GitHub <http://github.com/tbiehn> | TravisBiehn.com <http://www.travisbiehn.com> | Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/+TravisBiehn>
participants (4)
-
grarpamp -
Tim Beelen -
Travis Biehn -
Troy Benjegerdes