DoJ is required to cloak NSA-CIA capabilities by pretending full sharing does not take place. Redacted and excluded filings and decisions by DoJ, district, appeal, SCOTUS and FISA courts along with open and classified executive orders by and POTUS, and best of all, classified contracts, implements this. In olden days there was a fairy-land time when NSA-CIA were required to cull, select and "minimize" (except in wartime and emergencies) their take and capabilities with FBI and law enforcement, but no longer, the Patriot Act Dr Zeuss loosened the ties that never bound. Going to court melodramatizes and sanitizes the bung-holing (like USG v. Apple) with in camera, withholding, stonewalling and denying. It should be understood, Dear Dummies, that lawyers, security clearance holders, corporations, NGOs and and greeders who assist and abet spying understand how to play this rigged game to keep the public "safe and secure" in blissful passivity. Encryption, necessarily quietly compromised for dependable marketability, has always been a formulaic-algorithmic Faustian character in the comsec-infosec charade where official secrecy triumphs over chaotic rabble-empowering democracy. This big-budget high-profit Broadway performance is called "The Natseckers." At 08:06 PM 2/27/2016, you wrote:

isn't there supposed to be "sharing" when it comes to terrorism. patriot act & such.

Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 at 2:15 PM From: "John Young" <jya@pipeline.com> To: "Henry Baker" <hbaker1@pipeline.com>, cypherpunks@cpunks.org, cryptome@freelists.org, cryptography@metzdowd.com, cryptography@randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order At 11:13 AM 2/26/2016, Henry Baker wrote: >If this interpretation of the All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ >will have to consult with the intelligence community prior to >compelling companies like Apple to decrypt phones. It would be quite >interesting for DOJ to publicly stipulate that NSA could (or could >not) break into iOS 8 or 9. This is truly a sticky wicket, since the >intelligence community is generally prohibited from working on >domestic issues. We asked for an opinion of Michael Froomkin, Law Professor at University of Miami, on Henry Baker's comments: <https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net <http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography>http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography