Hash Quantum(Hash Q) for Bitcoin.
Abstract The solution is set Quantum Hash(HashQ) to avoid Quantum Attack. Placing Falcon algorithm after SHA256 to create Private and Public keys safe and strong. I have given this example with the Falcon. You can place the one You decide after due rational consensus, You can place the most compact signature, with robust security and efficiency. Always after SHA256. A parallel option is built on the same Bitcoin network, where there is a Quantum format network so that users can safely and privately migrate their bitcoins to save them from a Quantum attack. A function is built parallel to the current function in the running branch and thus both blockchains coexist: The classic one and the one robust to the Quantum attack. https://c.gmx.com/@1353820301439272152/Tff4B46bSOyzhKBKMZdA9A You do not need a hard fork, just add this parallel option function to create a solution without affecting the current one branch and giving the possibility for users to take refuge in this robust and secure option. In this system, mining incentives must be balanced and greater than current one. What I have proposed gives Bitcoin a Higher Binary level when it reaches the category of Parallel System in execution. This is applicable to any system, what I propose is the birth of Parallel Systems from the same running branch, without altering what was built and what will be built by the branch from which the Parallel System is executed. Both build independently on the same branch. Both co-exist!. https://crypto.unibe.ch/fc25/paper.php/70?cap=hcav70nCzgoMbFzntiotFRNeuiBQPA Satoshi Nakamoto PGP --> DE4E FCA3 E1AB 9E41 CE96 CECB 18C0 9E86 5EC9 48A1
Obviously, he isn't Satoshi. Less obviously, this is garbage, written by a cryptographic moron who has no idea how bitcoin works. Peter Fairbrother On 12/12/2024 16:54, Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
Abstract The solution is set Quantum Hash(HashQ) to avoid Quantum Attack. Placing Falcon algorithm after SHA256 to create Private and Public keys safe and strong.
I have given this example with the Falcon. You can place the one You decide after due rational consensus, You can place the most compact signature, with robust security and efficiency. Always after SHA256.
A parallel option is built on the same Bitcoin network, where there is a Quantum format network so that users can safely and privately migrate their bitcoins to save them from a Quantum attack.
A function is built parallel to the current function in the running branch and thus both blockchains coexist: The classic one and the one robust to the Quantum attack.
https://c.gmx.com/@1353820301439272152/Tff4B46bSOyzhKBKMZdA9A
You do not need a hard fork, just add this parallel option function to create a solution without affecting the current one branch and giving the possibility for users to take refuge in this robust and secure option.
In this system, mining incentives must be balanced and greater than current one.
What I have proposed gives Bitcoin a Higher Binary level when it reaches the category of Parallel System in execution.
This is applicable to any system, what I propose is the birth of Parallel Systems from the same running branch, without altering what was built and what will be built by the branch from which the Parallel System is executed. Both build independently on the same branch. Both co-exist!.
https://crypto.unibe.ch/fc25/paper.php/70?cap=hcav70nCzgoMbFzntiotFRNeuiBQPA
Satoshi Nakamoto PGP --> DE4E FCA3 E1AB 9E41 CE96 CECB 18C0 9E86 5EC9 48A1
On Thursday, December 12th, 2024 at 7:11 PM, Peter Fairbrother <peter@tsto.co.uk> wrote:
Obviously, he isn't Satoshi.
Less obviously, this is garbage, ...
a less trash perspective: "Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks" https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-32701-6 yes, QC is coming. better have a migration path ahead!
On 12/12/2024 21:21, coderman wrote:
On Thursday, December 12th, 2024 at 7:11 PM, Peter Fairbrother <peter@tsto.co.uk> wrote:
Obviously, he isn't Satoshi.
Less obviously, this is garbage, ...
a less trash perspective: "Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks" https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-32701-6
yes, QC is coming.
if you mean cryptographically useful quantum computers are coming, then no. Just no. 10k-qubit entangled arrays with daylong lifetimes are centuries away, not decades. And QEC sucks. And Shor's algorithm isn't as good as we thought it was when that was written, and key and hash lengths are now long enough to make Grover's practically useless. What is coming is over-hyped supposedly-QC-resistant cryptography which we don't need and which hasn't been well analysed. I mean, I'd not use primes where p-1 has 128-bit factors just in case, but then I wouldn't do that anyway, I hate unnecessary structure. Safe 4k primes [*], are likely OK for the lifetimes of everyone now alive. [*] or primes where the smallest factor of p-1 apart from 2 is > 2/3 the bit length of the prime Peter Fairbrother
On 14/12/2024 18:54, coderman wrote:
On Thursday, December 12th, 2024 at 11:20 PM, Peter Fairbrother <peter@tsto.co.uk> wrote: ... 10k-qubit entangled arrays with daylong lifetimes are
centuries away, not decades. And QEC sucks.
you're wrong Peter, you just don't know it yet...
And why is that? There are two algorithms we might be concerned with. Let's take Grover's first. Grover's finds matches on a search. To be cryptographically useful against ciphers the search space will usually only have one correct match. However it isn't any good (=slower than classical overall, even if it uses fewer queries) for random or pseudo-random searches, you need a fast phase oracle - which for cryptographic attacks often doesn't exist. Oooh it looks scary, a quadratic speedup - but only in special circumstances, which do not really occur in cryptography. And it is only a lessening of the number of search operations, while each search takes longer than a classical search, and how much longer depends on how big the search space is - typically ending up slower than classical overall. Look at it from an information perspective. If the search space is random, there are 2^n words of information in the search space. These have to be available somehow, else the algorithm, quantum or not, cannot find the answer (it won't be in there). The exception is where a fast phase oracle can be used - a phase oracle finds the difference between states, but it cannot exist for a random search. It is part of a single Grover quantum search operation, repeated on each qubit for each operation. For ciphers and hash functions, such oracles can be constructed, but eg for AES-128 the best known attack I know of uses 2^77 gates, an implausible number, and an uncorrected error-free DW of 2^85. Not. Going. To. Happen. To do a Grover's search you would need an entangled register of n bits for a search space of size 2^n, so maybe this register might be possible for a 128-bit or 256-bit space, though it hasn't been done yet. The oracle, in practice - with 2^77 quantum gates - nope, not this century. However all this is moot as, as I have said before, keylengths and hash sizes have increased to the point that (even if the time taken by the phase oracle can be ignored) it would take too long, lifetime-of-the-universe-long, to implement Grover's against any cipher or hash. Turning to Shor's algorithm(s), these are some classical math on twin large primes (RSA) or modular exponentiation (DH) plus a cycle length finding quantum algorithm common to both. They look for hidden subgroups in Z*p groups caused by and the size of factors of p-1, so if you use safe primes (p=2q+1. p and q prime) the only subgroups are of size 2 and q, and for a big prime q and thus the cycle length is also big. The bigger the cycle, the harder it is to find using Shor's. So don't use speedup-optimisations where p-1 has a 128 or 256-bit factor, use safe primes (or use primes where p-1 has a factor least 2/3 n bits long). And magically Shor will be slower than classical or not work at all, even assuming "they" have a working quantum computer. Some people say that QEC will make Shor possible despite this, but I don't know of any suitable QEC method which will work on more than single unentangled qubits. The quantum threshold theorem threshold has probably been passed, but that doesn't make QEC practical for Shor's. Of course in practice it doesn't actually work anyway. To factor a 2kbit RSA number Shor needs about a 10k qubit entangled register with a long error-free lifetime; which is much further away than commercial fusion power, if ever. Peter Fairbrother
What do you mean coderman? Zeynep -- Tuta Mail ile güvende: https://tuta.com/free-email 14 Ara 2024 22:00 tarafından coderman@protonmail.com:
On Thursday, December 12th, 2024 at 11:20 PM, Peter Fairbrother <peter@tsto.co.uk> wrote: ... 10k-qubit entangled arrays with daylong lifetimes are
centuries away, not decades. And QEC sucks.
you're wrong Peter, you just don't know it yet...
Adding a quantum hashing (HashQ) functionality and integrating the post-SHA256 Falcon algorithm for Bitcoin involves considering several aspects: ** Quantum Security: The proposal directly addresses the security concern against future quantum attacks, which is visionary. Post-quantum cryptography is a developing field, and the use of algorithms like Falcon, which are already being considered for digital security applications, shows a proactive approach. However, any implementation of post-quantum cryptography would need extensive review by the cryptography community to ensure its robustness. ** Smooth Transition: Proposing a solution without the need for a hard fork is smart. It allows users to opt-in to quantum security without forcing the entire network to adopt the change immediately. This preserves decentralization and user choice, two fundamental principles of Bitcoin. ** Chain Coexistence: The idea of having a classical chain and a quantum-robust chain coexisting is innovative. It allows for a gradual transition and allows time for the technology to mature and be tested in the field. ** Mining Incentives: Adjusting mining incentives to favor the new quantum chain is crucial for its adoption. This could attract miners to the new chain, but must be carefully balanced so as not to discourage mining on the classic chain until the transition is complete or majority. ** Applicability to Other Systems: The idea of parallel systems that arise from the same branch without altering the original is a concept that could have applications beyond Bitcoin. This modular approach allows for evolution and adaptation without breaking existing infrastructure, which is an elegant design principle for decentralized systems. ** Implementation and Consensus: I want the Bitcoin community to evaluate to implement this change. The community must value stability and security, and any changes, even if parallel, must be seen as not detrimental to the existing network. In summary, I have made this technically advanced proposal to show you a deep understanding of the future challenges facing Bitcoin. The key to its success would be technical validation, incentive design, and community acceptance. If achieved, it would not only strengthen Bitcoin's security against quantum threats but would also establish a model for the evolution of blockchain systems in general.
participants (5)
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bbrewer
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coderman
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Peter Fairbrother
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Satoshi Nakamoto
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zeynep@keemail.me