On 10/12/20, Dr Gerard Bulger <gerard@bulger.co.uk> wrote:

Torrc allows you to exit from a different IP. I thought it a good idea to stop arbitrary blocking of the advertised Tor exit IP, the captchas and blacklists that tor users suffer.

Relay operators are free to do that for those reasons. Any overlay network that has an exit function should have some percentage of its exits unpublished, else there is zero chance for its users to route around that form of censorship. NAT, VPN, tunnels, etc also allow to do the same thing without torrc.

When IPv6 implemented fully we have a wide range of IPs to send from on each server.

Perhaps it is not considered good form to do so as the internet should know who is using Tor.

The internet should not know who is using tor. Nor should Tor particularly subjugate itself to the random wishes of the internet, much of which and the global powers that be, would love to have tor (and all the other overlay networks, cryptocurrency, encryption) simply comply themselves off the internet according to such wishes. The internet already has ability to enumerate all the exit nodes. Whether internet does so to satisfy its own wishes or not is not tor's problem. Making tor easy to block only makes the censors job easier.

So what is the problems for TOR security when exits set up to send from a different IP? Is it that we do not know what the second IP is up to in dealing with the IP4 traffic from the exit?

There is no tech "security" problem herein, only a "political" problem. Paths to actual freedom always see political spin and action against them. Fight back, more in the political they use, less in falling to complying the tech. -- The Tor lists, blog, etc are all actively censored. Your messages for people to read may not be permitted by the Tor Project censors, and Tor Project censors may prevent you from reading peoples messages.