EFF to Support Apple in Encryption Battle [ or, WTF EFF!? ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The bizarre propaganda narrative about a locked iPhone that belonged to a dead criminal suspect just keeps growing. Now the Electronic Frontiers Foundation has boarded the disinformation train, via its latest EFFEctor newsletter and an amicus brief. EFF to Support Apple in Encryption Battle https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/eff-support-apple-encryption-b attle I can maybe forgive EFF's casual assertion that Syed Rizwan Farook was "one of the perpetrators of December’s San Bernardino shootings" - since they used three names he /must/ be an assassin; the FBI says he is, what more proof could one ask? But in the same press release, EFF endorses absurd non sequiturs that demonstrate painful ignorance of the subject matter at hand. The EFF endorses the assertations that the only way to obtain access to encrypted data stored on an iPhone is to manually key in a password on the device itself, that removing a software function that deletes a stored key hash after n. failed decryption attempts voids the security of the encrypted data stored on that device, and that doing this to one iPhone would affect the security of all iPhone users. Either people without the slightest understanding of how cryptography works /or/ how computer forensics works are calling the shots at EFF, or someone there has deliberately stood up strawmen for the FBI'a attorneys to knock down, or... damn if I know . -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWzaUtAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0L+50P/06rr0wSkPFDvtAwYscCO4Kr zRMg0f1mDoc8zB4TeOyKSsA47J5uJigd1i1EhQtk3HjQCCFQNAtWjMjcvQ7Kpw1f 27vTlbBkAi20civwsQ6KBvVtzgSsD3sgJeUddjV9O66Km3KEGnzx/ImwnALuTx9D oRG1QFg+i4/6eWiL9e4k+b7KGcZ+WyxHjyLbYP5sR6NQOb3si8iPS2ySwcvQbiFE qlR1dDGimaLf36MJKukhzrHSJuaIVbK3TgILGgDFw9QED9b/w4Ly0OMh69Tf23Fl MJPn2pCcuAqip4n1ABnIbJuhZvO84yUZnB32tPzhPvC0Qso3Nf11qDjgo6/mjmA5 uTHtRPD5pCD6phoepi1tsAnlW0gqh0gENCuFvzg/vStLxg6xmqFy6V1t2Tj2w9Tk 3oJW7TOYcpXutWFma/nQ34axpqqk1yzKIGVZ5mrVe+2LTiA/qEnWD/ZBOmbM57pT fRLfSpxefUFH5oog9UhEnkLpFmdGHyVZKjMV5UYcke361aWn2XcZsWSkU8cqfFY+ dKX5yukRXklJKW5W5XwQsg5erS4wkKAOMuDqiw+XGyDasOAiBVcXo3dxs9+e6qhu ATK2tz3t3u7kB95MFEQCpPj00NgmO8KzB0yppUFNZYprWuYA8wueANndR7YwVlWP OlWswTw7xNjgPkOaHOWh =Exoy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On 2/24/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
... But in the same press release, EFF endorses absurd non sequiturs that demonstrate painful ignorance of the subject matter at hand. The EFF endorses the assertations that the only way to obtain access to encrypted data stored on an iPhone is to manually key in a password on the device itself,
not the *only* way...
that removing a software function that deletes a stored key hash after n. failed decryption attempts voids the security of the encrypted data stored on that device,
not voids, but weakens. Apple creating and signing and deploying said feature is certainly a measurably more significant risk than if they did not, right? the FBI would like such a weakening to exist in a vacuum, yet reality insists otherwise.
and that doing this to one iPhone would affect the security of all iPhone users.
it does, the question is by how much. (remember the OPM? :)
Either people without the slightest understanding of how cryptography works /or/ how computer forensics works are calling the shots at EFF, or someone there has deliberately stood up strawmen for the FBI'a attorneys to knock down, or... damn if I know
plenty of fail all around! no need to prune sets so preemptively... ;) best regards,
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 02/24/2016 07:55 AM, coderman wrote:
Either people without the slightest understanding of how cryptography works /or/ how computer forensics works are calling the shots at EFF, or someone there has deliberately stood up strawmen for the FBI'a attorneys to knock down, or... damn if I know
plenty of fail all around! no need to prune sets so preemptively... ;)
Yeah well, they caught me in a grumpy mood. Like I said, damn if I know. :o) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWzihqAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0LoIAP/315J6ArQ4gkT+05MApyRapL XLAq1iNeNTzuXKnLPwJ+6V/GjysFp0ZyhSrCeQOC7aY3oY4rIw89jyQZIWaOEv4E VPqRgg0Lb1ORSnNaZ92TbECAV2aMlhzDIIDWhFirVSYbzZGPChVWBkQU745LDPUq mn2/shCTzfh19vN+NA8UXpD4d3GBduZ2Q+cm5TNvdnzBghfoVUzXrYneY0rz8JR8 cjijiP+UZsp0UU3B5Y40OJVhqO7hAIi25y5gI8sp3M0a++r6w+PRKgEPOFxfHqMs A6USApPSsGFUO/nZXMk80cbIZoNQh2CUBPFmCd1ZeOWeqJmdZNHJbW7hN8xVS6BR ZNg+QQhvPES70dFoO8P7pRo8Mnv6cc3iFQXA/kCQQOwtB1KjE+0NBs+6NAqZLi74 6MukTwg4Gl6XXw1obZLQ390JvDI5Fq+W48zezj4XW27qhZHL7LLpLw6YaRx/utO/ 5OD8B8dl3ux7IzOLQHXm2focEGBURfGy4bKYKqXCCBrI8hPkSaeE40uVYhTY4Gxk s4xszfrZJn+BAnZYINzXE5+tak7FshB9OMMl413bdd3cYOar78Pr2tiM6CEdR/I8 l3wftktwipI3/hE6I/ld3JJebDVFse19Rg4edIwjOzqdgVNEUcc2OReRLRXw5rEZ eXULbPU3A2bF2MFfC4zn =qwus -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (2)
-
coderman -
Steve Kinney