----- Forwarded message from Ray Dillinger
Well, we do know they created things like the (not very usable) seLinux MAC (Multilevel Access Control) system, so clearly they do some hacking on security infrastructure.
SeLinux seems to be targeted mostly at organizational security, whereas the primary need these days is not organizational, but uniform. That is to say, we don't in practice see many situations where different levels and departments of an organization have complex and different rules for how and whether they can access each other's information and complex requirements for audit trails. What we see is simpler; we see systems used by people who have more or less uniform requirements and don't much need routine auditing, except for one or two administrators. More useful than the complexity of SeLinux would be a relatively simple system in which ordinary Unix file permissions were cryptographically enforced. If for example read permissions on a file are exclusive to some user or some group, then that file should be encrypted so that no one else, even if the bytes are accessible to them by some means, should be able to make sense of it, and the configuration options should include not storing the key to it anywhere in the system -- let the user plug a USB stick in to give the key for his session, and let the user remove it to take that key away again whenever he's not using it, rather than leave it around on the hard drive somewhere potentially to be accessed by someone else at some other time. We have spent years learning to protect the operating system from damage by casual mistakes and even from most actual attacks, because for years control of the computer itself was the only notable asset that needed to be protected. It is still true that control of the computer is always at least as valuable as everything else that it could be used to compromise, but with unencrypted files it can compromise far too much. And the value of what is stored in individual accounts has gotten far too high to *NOT* give protecting them at least as much thought as protecting root's access rights. Photographs, banking records, schedules, archived mail going back for years, browser histories, "wallets" that contain many other keys, etc, etc. This is far different from old days when what was on a user's account was basically a few programs the user used and some text or code that the user had written. We need to catch up. Bear _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5