padding traffic would at least
double that, so we would need at least 10 times the normal traffic the
users created.
I propose constant rate: cover traffic reduces as legitimate traffic increases. Would this work, do you think?
And you ned a lot of traffic through your anonymisation network to get
decent anonymity, you need a large anonymity set.
Web traffic is expensive - making it at least ten times more expensive
is not on, especially if nine tenths of it has to be paid for by someone
else.
That's not counting the servers etc - getting a pi to handle 386 kB/s
[1] of anonymity traffic is not trivial, I don't even think it is possible.
Mmm might need good bare metal algorithms. Easier to use the client device which has more CPU.
[...]
> Enforcing TLS is much more reasonable nowadays. (You could add a plugin
> to use http tricks to hide file sizes.). Not what I would focus on once
> it gets nonsimple.
A good proportion of TOR traffic will be protected by TLS anyway,
especially those sites which you might not want other people to know you
are accessing.
Visible file sizes are the main anonymity weakness in TOR.
If you suspect someone you compare the file sizes of the traffic through
their system with traffic through the exit nodes.
Wouldn't using chaff to make your transfer rate relatively constant close almost all of this anonymity attack surface?
In the UK at least it is legally fairly easy for the cops to demand that
info (and most ISPs are legally required to obtain and store that data
anyway) - getting everyone's traffic info where the cops have no suspect
is a little harder, but not impossible.
Of course the ordinary cops don't use that power, and the people who do
use it don't want it known that they can do it, so you will find that
they make up stories about reused passwords and the like being the
source of their information.
Peter Fairbrother
[1] 1TB/month divided by 2,592,000s/month