On 05/14/2018 06:05 PM, Marina Brown wrote:
On 05/14/2018 07:49 PM, Mirimir wrote:
On 05/14/2018 06:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
https://efail.de/ https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060315.html https://efail.de/efail-attack-paper.pdf https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/995989254143606789 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17064129 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/attention-pgp-users-new-vulnerabilitie...
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/critical-pgp-and-smim...
The EFAIL attacks break PGP and S/MIME email encryption by coercing clients into sending the full plaintext of the emails to the attacker. In a nutshell, EFAIL abuses active content of HTML emails, for example externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through requested URLs. To create these exfiltration channels, the attacker first needs access to the encrypted emails, for example, by eavesdropping on network traffic, compromising email accounts, email servers, backup systems or client computers. The emails could even have been collected years ago.
Thanks. That's the clearest explanation I've seen.
Remember the campaign against HTML email ? I do. We were right.
--- Marina
Right, and its evil child, remote content. I always disable HTML. And fetching of remote content. And I have since the 90s. I got that from this list :) It's funny that these exploits depend on both. And that some on HN put it all on pgp/gpg, arguing that one can't expect users to know this stuff. By default, Thunderbird does render HTML. But at least it doesn't fetch remote content. So Thunderbird+Enigmail users should be safe.