-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 01/17/2015 01:34 PM, rysiek wrote:
Dnia sobota, 17 stycznia 2015 11:22:02 Mirimir pisze:
On 01/17/2015 03:52 AM, rysiek wrote:
So,
Mirmir wrote:
| 13. Targeted attacks against PGP key ids are possible
This is an advantage of Keybase. Then we're not depending on the KeyID, or even on the fingerprint, but rather on an identity that's multiply and independently authenticated.
I keep hearing more and more about keybase, and I have a problem with it. It's a centralised service, owned and controlled by a single entity; moreover, the keys are tied to online identities controlled by corporate third parties (Twitter, Facebook, et al). I don't see a Diaspora/The Federation support, for instance.
As I understand it, Keybase is an API. The website/service is merely a demonstration. The developers are aiming for mass adoption, and so they've targeted the most popular sites. With some coding, arbitrary sites could be used, with two requirements. First, it must be possible for users to post persistent signed proofs. Second, it must be possible for the API to access those signed proofs, in order to verify them.
My problem with this is two-fold:
1. It might allow abuse, esp. MITM attacks. If Keybase becomes a /de facto/ standard of acquiring keys, it seems trivial to me for them to replace a valued target's key with something a LEA would provide.
That's the value of trackers. Those tracking such a comprised target would see that various public signed proofs are no longer valid for the target's key on Keybase. The adversary could alter all of the target's public signed proofs. But even that wouldn't suffice, because trackers have independent snapshot histories of public proofs. And furthermore, snapshot histories are embedded in the Bitcoin blockchain.
Wait, how/where does Bitcoin come into this? Did I miss it somehow? I admit I didn't dive into keybase increadibly deep, but still...
See https://keybase.io/docs/server_security and re the blockchain https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitcoin_blockchain. | Every public announcement you make on Keybase is now verifiably | signed by Keybase and hashed into the Bitcoin blockchain. To be | specific, all of these: | | o announcing your Keybase username and your public key | o identity proofs (twitter, github, your website, etc.) | o public bitcoin address announcements | o public tracking statements | o revocations of any of these
2. It still promotes the closed, walled-gardens. Diaspora or GNU Social support would not be that hard to implement.
Signed proofs could be placed anywhere that's accessible to the API. But that takes coding, and developers have priorities. One can request.
Right.
Anyway, I've created a test identity: https://keybase.io/Proba. Once I've added enough proofs, and have enough trackers, I plan to mess with it by replacing the public key held by Keybase, altering some of the proofs, and so on. Then we can see how that shows up for its trackers, and for other users. I'll also explore impacts of malicious trackers.
Oh, great, I really appreciate that effort. Please keep me posted!
Thanks. If you join, you can play :) I'm https://keybase.io/mirimir and the test account is https://keybase.io/proba. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJUut40AAoJEGINZVEXwuQ+3zAH/A7f9GqRi3T3P+viT6M46pXw 4TcxxWGmWtqGz6fbtkYN5AMuedG1hgSRSaqoznpdVhC82kzv6oljC5DyGDJ96Rqv UH0d3xAtiDHO2xN8v7nzE8NmQj7MPRHD0/dZouVaryEAmlFxmsEm0EUGYWhNyIr8 6r6aSCpLgfQi26AhdUdc2PhGf+bAnLnWVQHmpFVaEddi6Vws8MCEeCqhtRmNsoGJ E9wDxhciVcMQKthATgo7K9a8yfEY5jglyFlK38qMrcGrE0TZ/f3wmShQGQqI7B4E aQ4AXCc1X09DwuzEoCiYZQpCixkteH9ZKOMXCWR834SHYcEUNu7lV2eMowXv6OM= =1QmD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----