>$5000 to just enter not guilty and likely pay an attorney to defend
>it / accept dismissal may seem realistic. Thing is, that doesn't
>leave much payout to defendant. And a fair number of those pleas
>will be going to trial. That entails conviction risk, and regardless
>of time dealt, that risk will carry a higher price.

You are looking at this idea from the standpoint of a single defendant.  I am looking at this from the standpoint of the entire (U.S. federal) court system.  I am aware that most defendants will, in fact, be guilty of the crime charged.  Ordinarily, what happens is that the prosecution offers a plea deal that they consider realistic, and the defendant eventually agrees to some deal, with no trial involved.  That is why about 70,000 new defendants get convicted in the Federal system each year:   As I recall reading, about 3,500 demand, and receive, jury trials.  The remainder, 66,500, are convicted through plea deals.  Currently, many and in fact most of these defendants consider themselves fated to be convicted, and they see no 'upside' to pleading not-guilty and receiving a trial.  But I propose that an amount, for purposes of argument $5,000, be offered.  It will be paid after the defendant enters a not-guilty plea to a Federal felony,  and is sentenced (if he is convicted) or after he is acquitted.  Further, the defendant may direct that the money be paid to a third party, but NOT any government agency, court, or otherwise.
    Many defendants who are already resigned to being convicted may have little or no money:  To them, an offer of $5,000 is an amazing windfall.  A person who is facing a (current average) sentence of 3 years (36 months) would get $5000/36 months, or $139 dollars per month, which buys a substantial amount of commissary.  (In prison, they have a store called a 'commissary', where they sell food, clothing, shoes, electronics, OTC medicine, etc.  Prisoners who have this much money live much happier lives in prison, compared to those who don't.)  He has a powerful motivation to accept the money.  Moreover, he knows that every other defendant is being offered the same deal.  He knows that if he pleads not guilty and demands and receives a jury trial, which is his right, he will receive the money.    He will get the money...AFTER he receives the trial.   He will, if necessary, be defended by a 'Federal Public Defender', who is paid by the government. 


>Nonprofits, NGO's and crowdfunding appear to be a hot ticket these
>days. Set one up, pick some jurisdiction somewhere, camp out on the
>courthouse steps with your cash and attorneys in hand and see what
>works.

Well, that's the general idea.  But most of the work will be done by mail:  New cases can be discovered using a system called PACER  (www.pacer.gov) which allows anyone to identify new criminal (or civil, which is irrelevant here) cases.  Form-letters can be sent to defendants, and their attorneys. 

>Also, no figures were presented regarding cost per case in court
>system. That matters too. You might be initially faster to jam it,
>but don't be too sure they won't deputize and set up courts on the
>front lawn in response.

    Cost-per-case won't be especially relevant.  While the number of physical courtrooms is one limitation, more important is the fact that it is very hard to put on a jury trial.  There is a lot of paperwork, witnesses must be corralled, jurors must be selected.  It ties up a lot of people for days.  Further, the Federal courts are already clogged with civil cases:  There simply is not a lot of 'give' in the current Federal Court system to add a flood of new cases.  Even if, hypothetically, the number of trials could be doubled, from 3,500 to 7,000, that would still be a reduction of a factor of 10 from today's 70,000 defendants.   While it is still conceivable that some defendants will take deals anyway, those deals will probably have to be much better than would have previously been given.
    There is also an addition 'attack' that can be added, if it turns out to be desirable.  Regrettably, there are many homeless people who, for one reason or another, would actually be better off if they got sentenced to a few months or years in prison.  "Three hots and a cot", so the saying goes.  Doubtless some substantial proportion of prisoners are exactly such people.  But what if it were publicized that a person could do a 'note-robbery' of a bank, collect the money, and either flee or stay right there, in the bank.  They will get $5,000 after a Federal felony trial.  For some of these people (tens of thousands?) this would amount to a very attractive offer.  It would even more thoroughly flood the Federal 'justice' system.

>You might have better success paying that $5k to vote however you
>want them to for the next decade (say defunding things) after their
>case/time as it might currently go is up. Or as someone said, run
>nullification TV ads and mailing campaigns. Etc.

>Not sure what this has to do with cypherpunks, unless you count
>anonymous bitcoin donations from these CEO's, etc to your project.

    If you had made this claim 8 months ago, you would have been widely seen as having a valid point.  The problem is, a lot has happened since then, primarily flowing from Snowden's leaks.  Storage of most/all emails, backdoors in encryption systems, cell-phone metadata collection and (possibly) cell-site location monitoring, as well.  Ultimately, most of the stories contain a 'then X was served with a subpoena', or 'somebody was leaned on by the Feds', or 'the ISP was convinced to turn over secret information'.   These events had their negative consequences because some government had the power to extort cooperation.   Even if the public doesn't hear about these details, they exist.  The power of government is the ability to threaten people or companies with compliance, sometimes (but not always) because they did something illegal, even if they did nothing wrong.  See, for example, Joseph Nacchio, Quest CEO who was victimized apparently for refusal to turn over phone data. 
    We don't advocate encryption simply because it's fun:  We advocate encryption because it has a tendency to either defeat, or make it harder for, the enemy.  And 'the enemy', more times than not, is a government.  And if that 'enemy' has the ability to threaten, to strongarm, to 'rubber-hose' either our allies or the people we turn to for services, our positions are vastly more tenuous.