On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 3:18 AM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
a modest and proportionate proposal, ... finding someone with strong reputation and good judgement to publicly validate and speak to the efforts of the equally reputable but absolutely anonymous service operator? ... now that's a hard sell ... *grin*
if finding said operators for a dedicated service is hard then finding a quorum to run mixmasterminions as intake to hidden list likely just as peril fraught. note that a local only (hidden only) mailer would be easy enough to extend to link to incoming mix messages, if/when desired, in addition to Usenet intake, as also mentioned. a persistent and available store of disclosures (late comers seeking archives) is a critical requirement. your threat model is the nation state intelligence community tailored operations teams. [see also: malware list DoS on orig Stuxnet payload xmit, belgian cyptographers blowing up bullruns, etc.] - every other adversary is a cake walk in comparison.** --- in a sense, the robust full-disclosure replacement problem is fundamentally the secure whistleblower leak site problem is fundamentally the "user friendly, fails safe, default always anon" communication problem. "this is a global problem" "you are the firefighters", "..." --- ** so, what happened at DEF CON 22 was, ...