Re: Brother can you help a fiber?

I look forward to a world without patents, so I'm afraid all that waffle about obtaining a worldwide government-enforced-monopoly merely made me sigh a bit. Jim Bell wrote:

    I don't quite know why I received the message below, but I am answering (including cypherpunks@cpunks.org) since it seems a good time to do so given the humorous connection to my isotopically-modified optical fiber invention.  And, I would like to make a request, indeed an offer.

    A few weeks ago, when I re-appeared on cypherpunks.org, I pointed out that my patent application was recently (mid-July 2013) published by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  See  http://www.freepatentsonline.com/WO2013101261A1.html     This is an invention that I thought of in December 2008, stuck in a prison cell at USP Tucson:  I realized that much of the index of refraction of ordinary silica (which is about 1.46; of that amount above an index of 1.000) was due to the presence of Si-29 atoms.  (Si-29 is the only naturally-existing silicon atom with an 'electromagnetic spin', due to its unpaired neutron circulating in the nucleus.)  I concluded that by dramatically reducing the proportion of Si-29 atoms, which amount to about 4.67% atom/atom in ordinary silicon, it would be possible to make silica with a much-lower index of refraction:   Probably between 1.10 and 1.02, but the amount is uncertain.     One big advantage of this fiber will be a far-higher 'velocity factor', approaching 0.90-0.98 of 'c', where 'c' is physicist-speak for the speed of light in a vacuum, compared with ordinary silicon optical fibers with a velocity factor of 1/1.46, or 0.685 of 'c'.  This will amount to a dramatically-faster signal velocity.   While not quite as fast as line-of-sight microwave, or neutrino-beams piercing the earth, it would be significant.        Other advantages will be a reduction in optical loss by perhaps a factor of 10x (from perhaps 0.19 db/km in existing fibers to 0.019 db/km), a reduction of optical dispersion by a similar factor of 10x, and an increase in useable optical bandwidth from 50 nanometers wavelength (1510-1560 nm) to 800 nm (1000-1800 nm).  (The practical limit on fiber tends to be the limitation on the gain-bandwidth of EDFA's;  Erbium-Doped Fiber Amplifiers  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erbium_doped_fiber_amplifier#Erbium-doped_fiber...   ).

    Shortly I will begin preparing a prototype for this fiber, which will cost between $200-250K.  (USD).  I have received a committment for this amount.  However, having filed for a US Patent (specifically, a PCT or 'Patent Cooperation Treaty' filing), it will be necessary to file for many dozens more 'national-stage' patents:  The way patents work, around the world, is that a person must file for a patent in each nation around the world that he desires to have patent-protection in.  A national-stage patent costs about $10,000.  Generally, the reasoning is that an inventor should file for a patent in any country: 1.    Where a significant amount of the invention will be made. 2.     Where a significant amount of the invention will be used.     If I assume that the royalty per meter of fiber is $0.25/meter (25 American cents per meter), it would be worth filing for a patent if the amount of fiber made or used is $10,000/$0.25, or 40,000 meters of fiber.  This would be about 1.1 kilometers of cable that has 36 fibers in it.  Obviously, even the smallest country would use enough fiber to justify obtaining a patent.

    There are 148 PCT-signatory countries.    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_cooperation_treaty    I would like to obtain, at the very least, national-stage patents in at least 40 nations, probably 80 nations, and possibly as much as 120 nations.  That would cost about $400,000, $800,000, or $1.2 million. (USD).   I have considered raising the money by means of a Kickstarter campaign, but that site is oriented to collecting donations of money:  It is specifically prohibited that a project proponent promise a financial return on such a contribution.  But I'm not looking for a handout:  I'm looking for a loan which will be paid back.   Perhaps that's called a 'bond'?     How would it be paid back?  Corning says that 300 billion meters of fiber were manufactured in about 2012.  If I get a market-share of 10%, that's 30 billion meters per year.  At a royalty of, say, $0.25 per meter of fiber, that would be $7.5 billion per year.  With even a tiny fraction of such a value, I could pay a huge return on a loan to finance these national-stage patent applications.  I see nothing wrong with a 3x return:   $3 returned for each dollar loaned, probably within 1-2 years.  Does this sound interesting?      Jim Bell

________________________________ From: Peter Todd To: Ittay Cc: Bitcoin Dev ; Gavin Andresen ; Emin Gün Sirer Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2013 11:56 AM Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP proposal - patch to raise selfish mining threshold.

On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:43:15PM -0500, Ittay wrote:

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On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Peter Todd wrote:

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On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:05:41PM -0500, Peter Todd wrote:

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On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:

Oh, and I don't want to give the wrong impression: there's no need to rush to get this problem fixed. Even if someone wanted to launch an attack right now, with a fair amount of resources, there's a lot of counter-measures based on human intervention that can definitely stop the attack in the short-term

The attack can be easily hidden. And be sure that before today, today, and after today, very smart people are at their computer planning attacks on Bitcoin. Exploits must be published and fixed FAST.

Not this exploit.

Here's a perfectly plausible worst-case scenario, that could be happening right now: RAND High Frequency Trading Corp (a subsidiary of General Evil) has a globe-spanning low-latency network of fiber, line-of-sight microwave, and some experimental line-of-site neutrino links criss-crossing the globe. They can get data to and from any point on this planet faster than anyone else. Of course, in addition to their spectacular network they have an immense amount of computing power, as well as exotic overclocked liquid nitrogen bathed CPU's that run at clockspeeds double what commercial hardware can do; in short, they have access to scalar performance no-one else has. Of course, they like to keep a healthy reserve so, 99% of all this fancy gear is constantly idle. Whatever, they can afford it.

RAND just hired a bunch of fresh MIT graduates, the best of the best. Problem is the best of the best tends to make not so best mistakes, so RAND figures a Training Exercise is in order. Fortunately for them the NSA (a subsidiary of General Evil) slipped a rootkit into my keyboard a week or so ago - probably that time when I woke up in that farmers field with a *splitting* headache - and are reading what I'm typing right now.

I go on to explain how an excellent training exercise for these fresh MIT graduates would be to implement this nifty attack some Cornell researchers came up with. It's really simple, elegant even, but to do it best what you really want is the kind of low-latency network a high-frequency-trading corporation would have. I then point out how a good training exercise ideally is done in a scenario where there is genuine risk and reward, but where the worst-case consequences are manageable - new hires to tend to screw up. (I then go on to explain my analog electronics background, and squeeze in some forced anecdote about how I blew up something worth a lot of money owned by my employers at some point in the distant past)

Unfortunately for the operators of BTC Guild, one of these new MIT grads happens to have a: passed General Evil's psych screening with flying colors, and b: have spent too much time around the MIT Kidnappng Club. He decides it'd be easier to just kidnap the guy running BTC Guild than fill out the paperwork to borrow RAND's FPGA cluster, so he does.

As expected the attack runs smoothly: with 30% of the hashing power, neutrino burst generator/encoders's rigged around the globe to fire the moment another pool gets a block, and the odd DoS attack for fun, they quickly make a mockery of the Bitcoin network, reducing every other miners profitability to zero in minutes. The other miners don't have a hope: they're blocks have to travel the long way, along the surface of the earth, while RAND's blocks shave off important milliseconds by taking the direct route.

Of course, this doesn't go unnoticed, er, eventualy: 12 hours later the operators of GHash.IO, Eligius, slush, Bitminter, Eclipse and ASICMiner open their groggy eyes and mutter something about how that simulcast Tuesday party really shouldn't have had an open bar... or so much coke.

They don't even notice that the team from BTC Guild has vanished, but they do notice a YouTube video of Gavin right on bitcoin.org doing his best Spock impression, er, I mean appealing for calm and promising that Top Men are working on the issue of empty blocks as we speak. Meanwhile CNN's top headline reads "IS THIS THE END OF BITCOIN?!?!"

It takes another hour for the Aspirin's to finally kick in, but eventually get all get on IRC and start trying to resolve the issue - seems that whenever any of them produce a block, somehow by incredible coincidence someone else finds another block first. After a few rounds of this they're getting suspicious. (if they weren't all so hung-over they might have also found suspicious the fact that whenever they found a block they saw a sudden blue flash - Cherenkov radiation emitted when those neutrino's interacted with the vitreous humour in their eyeballs)

It's quickly realized that "somehow" BTC Guild isn't affected... GHash.IO and Eligius, 22% and 13% of the hashing power respectively, decide to try a little experiment: they peer to each other and only each other through an encrypted tunnel and... hey, no more lucky blocks! slush, 7% of the hashing power is invited to the peering group next, followed by Bitminter, 6%, and Eclipse, 2%, and finally ASICMiner, 1%, for a grand total of... 51% of the hashing power!

Of course, just creating blocks isn't useful for users, they need to be distributed too, so someone quickly writes up a "one-way firewall" patch that allows the group's blocks to propagate to the rest of the network. Blocks created by anyone else are ignored.

It takes a few more hours, but eventually the attacker seems to run out of blocks, and transaction processing returns to normal, albeit a little slow. (20 min block average) Of course, soon there's a 3,000 post thread on bitcointalk complaining about the "centralized pool cartel", but somehow life goes on.

The next day Gavin goes on CNN, and gives a lovely interview about how the past two days events show how the strength of the Bitcoin network is in the community. For balance they interview this annoying "Peter Todd" guy from "Keep Bitcoin Free!" who blathers on about how relying on altruism or something will doom the Bitcoin network in the long run. After the interview Gavin respectfully points out that maybe next time they find a so called "developer" with a ratio of bitcointalk posts to actual lines of code in the Bitcoin git repository better than one hundred to one. The producer just wishes that "Mike Hearn" guy was available; at least he's got a sense of fashion, sheesh!

Anyway, I'm out of space for my little story, but yeah, the ending involves a group of now-rich pool operators who decide to start a large financial services and data networking company, oh, and time-travel...

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Nevertheless, I agree  that, as you say, we must not rush it. Look at the BIP, find if we missed anything, and let's discuss it.

Indeed.

Quite seriously, your attack is a serious long-term risk, but in the short term the social dynamics of Bitcoin are such that it's just not a show-stopping risk. At worst some miners will lose a bunch of money - that's something that's happened before with the March chain fork, and sure enough Bitcoin survived just fine.

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In addition, keep in mind that this attack is very easy to detect, so if one is actually launched we will know immediately and can start taking direct counter-measures at that time.

Not really. Please see the discussion section in our paper.

You can hide *who* is the attacker - you can't hide the fact that an attack is happening if done on a meaningful scale.

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That Gregory Maxwell so quickly identified a flaw in this proposed solution suggests we should proceed carefully.

There is no flaw. You were just reiterating that the solution does not give us the 51% percent security you thought you had before. We showed that we're not getting this back, I'm afraid.

That's not what we're concerned about - what we're concerned about is that your BIP doesn't discuss the issue, and you didn't seem to be aware of it. That suggests that the analysis is incomplete. There's no pressing need to rush changes, as explained above by example, so we're best off understanding the issue thoroughly first.

There's a whole spectrum of potential solutions that haven't been discussed - I myself have two approaches I'm working on that may solve this problem in ways you haven't (publicly) considered. I'm sure there are many others out there.

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