On 10/13/19, jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? An even larger power-of-2 hops?)
Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails, than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns between all sets of two edge hosts. If applied together with other tech, especially regarding nets where you want any kind of useable stream (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream), beyond those hops is going to get really unperformant, and less security return than thought. You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more secure from G* as result... probably not.