Possibly, I will defer to the more technically learnt.

I'm not a nym server expert but from my laymen perspective the Pynchon Gate design looks good. It might be totally redundant and unnecessary but if metadata analysis is the concern, wouldn't such a setup be even more secure by coding something so that the time between sending a message and receiving a reply which in theory could leak information about the nym holder, be sent at a random date in a given time-frame (unbeknownst to the metadata leeches) . i.e. In 6-12 hours from the moment I click "send" or say in 12-20 days etc.

The email message could be coded to send at random like an online roulette table ball, within a given time window: verses say reloading every 24hours. This would in theory give out incorrect message 'sent' time-stamps, or would this be unnecessary because trafﬁc from the user to the email distributors is already being controlled by the user, which queries into intervals anyway? Is that not metadata that can be tracked?

- J

On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:22 AM, danimoth <danimoth@cryptolab.net> wrote:

On 27/08/13 at 10:22pm, Jeff Scofield wrote:
[cut]

> One strategy might be to consider the adoption of a time delayed email
> system. The reason why the use of such a mechanism to allow someone the
> ability to write an email, and then have it sent off at a specified (or
> randomly generated unspecified) date is useful for multiple reasons.

[cut]

Are we trying to reinvent anonymous remailers and nym servers?