summary of my theory: godel’s conclusions stem from inferring from a logical contradiction with the axioms of logic and statements. anything at all could be inferred when this is done. i describe “this statement is unprovable” as contradictory and meaningless in a logic where true sttements are all provable, because i describe every statement as containing an implicit “this statement is true.” in other logics, the sentence would need to disambiguate in what logic it 8s stating itself to be provable or not in, and would have normal truth or sensicalness relative to the logic of interpretation. i might cast these as mistakes: assuming a universal sense of truth when there is more than one logic, forming inferences from a statement that forms a contradiction with axioms, … i’m unsure what to consider the truth of a sentence that conflicts with axioms, maybe it seems false in a logic that describes the logic containing the axioms, it seems it might work to call it unknown or undefined. i arrived at this by considering a natural logic based on a depiction of every possible event. in this logic self-referential statements only have use if they have bearing on the world, and their interpretations can be derived from reality when that is.