The hypothesis being that Snowden is at least a triple agent. Ali Mohammed provided material support to Al Qaeda, but that was because he betrayed both the Army and Al Qaeda for the CIA. His sentencing has been on hold for a long time, and it is interesting no one asks questions about it.

If one was to look for information about my hypothesis, what would one find?

The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains.

Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection requests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with the implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.

---

Snowden's revelations increased the amount of encryption. However the NSA already collects a great amount of information through other means. For reasons unknown, much of the Snowden documents are classified at Talent Keyhole, which is explained at ( http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-classification-system.html ). Although overclassification is typical, afterall, many of the "secret" paragraphs are really FOUO because they are used in the private sector already ( https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3546567-10th-Anniversary-Edition-EP-3-Damage-Assessment.html#document/p33 ), the thing is that this implies the NSA collects data through means unhindered by encryption. Which makes "Practical-Titled Attack on AES-128 Using Chosen-Text Relations" all the more concerning. Why mock side channel cryptanalysis?

Furthermore, Github has made accidentally publishing your shared secret very easy. https://github.com/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=remove+password&type=Commits&ref=searchresults

Many cases where AWS refunds thousands of dollars of fraud because someone accidentally publishes a Github key. To think that could be millions of dollars a week. Just refunding fraud. Naturally official CIA documentation would not suggest committing a crime, that would be like putting login settings to the production database into the tutorial ( https://np.reddit.com/r/cscareerquestions/comments/6ez8ag/accidentally_destroyed_production_database_on/ ).

Interestingly, insecure defaults imperil national security: https://theintercept.com/2017/05/11/nyu-accidentally-exposed-military-code-breaking-computer-project-to-entire-internet/ .

Regardless, you can still troll the NSA. They couldn't even design the Clipper chip correctly.

Anyway, this modified limited hangout phrase is some really high level linguistics. Really complex, seems to intentionally prevent the reader from seeing patterns.