On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 1:55 PM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
On 12/6/15, Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> Maybe no one cares about Nicholas Merril and his fight against a national
> security letter.

did you see the unredacted version?




I saw it. But whenever someone mentions Snowden, all previous knowledge seemingly leaves the head.


 


> Maybe no one cares about Mark Klein, or that Congress gave retroactive
> immunity to telecommunications providers in cooperating with the
> government.

the Mark Klein exhibits were the first time i saw sensitive private
cable tap activities exposed to the public.  it was the first time i
had hope for judicial action against nation state spying activities on
domestic soil.
 ( i still have hope, but it is much more tempered, now :)


Congress will... grant retroactive immunity if the need arises. The Benghazi, SSCI, etc, are all a giant farce.



> Maybe no one cares...

you're missing other significant behavior modifications,

like the "voluntary" servitude of forever-secretive classified contracts,

or compelled cooperation when they catch you ridin' dirty,

or an employer dependent on military-industrial-complex, now the
cyber-spy-n-sploit racket,

or ....



 Chomsky says that control is achieved through manipulating attitudes and opinions.

https://ohtarzie.wordpress.com/2014/01/25/passing-noam-on-my-way-out-part-1/
https://ohtarzie.wordpress.com/2014/01/31/passing-noam-on-the-way-out-part-2-chomsky-vs-aaron-swartz/
https://ohtarzie.wordpress.com/2014/03/10/passing-chomsky-on-my-way-out-part-3-intermission/

We live in a democracy afterall.






> Why am I wasting my time? There are thousands of events that transpired
> before Snowden, and Snowden is a big deal? How is he a big deal?

quantified risk. we now know with greater precision than ever before,
 exactly how well resourced and bleeding edge this attacker (USA) is.

unfortunately it's almost all bad news...

( denial is not rejection; can you blame the heads in the sand, really? )



Erm... it's possible to learn by watching enough CCC videos of presentations to know all about the NSA and other five eyes intelligence. The logistics of it is impossible to hide. They have satellites next to satellites to intercept data. The FBI has thirty thousand employees (and operates DITU). The NSA has five times the budget and same number of employees. The CIA has seven times the budget and twenty thousand employees. This is just the US, the rest of Five Eyes puts in their fair share as well.

To ensure staying on the topic of cryptography, how many cryptographers do you think there are? Given the discovery of high level spies within intelligence agencies (Redl, Ames, Hanssen), how could cryptographers hope to assure security if the top spies can't? It has been alleged that activist groups had been penetrated and the course of discussion manipulated. If one million dollars per year is spent towards manipulating cryptography, how would you think it would be used?

The only secure place is your brain. If you can think for yourself, then you know your own thoughts are secure. Groupthink is the original cloud computing.

Naturally, Rogaway doesn't mention any of this. He makes no frank assessment of risks and possibilities. And I am the only person to engage in a line by line examination his treatise? It is erroneous in numerous sections. Contains a lot of obscure historical details, but seemingly ignores the important ones? What is the impact upon you from reading the document? What do you feel? What possible alternative motivations by the author are there?